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Abstract
We present three models of the role of asymmetric information in environmental
protection. Chapter one considers the market for a green credence good a good
whose environmental characteristics are not observed by the consumer, even ex
post in the presence of environmentally-conscious consumers. Producers may
choose to advertise their products. However, if communication is not regulated
it can degenerate into cheap talk. We explore the scope for credible trans-
mission of environmental information by green producers, and the limits on it.
In Chapter two we develop some similar themes in an experimental setting,
with the focus again on consumer reactions to producer-provided information
on the environmental attributes of goods, and the potential role of government
to improve social welfare by manipulating the use of certication. In Chapter
three the focus is somewhat di¤erent, whilst maintaining the theme of the role
of information asymmetries in an environmental policy setting. In the model
here a regulator has to decide whether or not to regulate a polluting activity
with imperfect information regarding the net benets of so doing. In making
her decision, the regulator can listen to an adviser, who may or may not be
biased. We look at how the decision maker can exploit the advisers incentive
to build reputation to achieve better decisions. As a whole the thesis further
underscores and illustrates the critical role that availability and distribution of
information plays in policy making aimed at environmental protection.
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Introduction
Markets for environmentally friendly goods or services are often characterised
by imperfect information. This is due to several concurring facts. In particular:
(i) many green characteristics cannot be veried easily; (ii) scientists do
not appear to agree on the costs of environmental damages. This creates two
problems for society overall.
Firstly, people will take suboptimal decisions. Consumers are not able
to assess the green characteristics they desire in a product (organic, dolphin
free, recycled. . . ); they therefore may end up buying something di¤erent from
what they expect. For example: a consumer goes to a market wishing to buy
locally produced apples; each stall vendor o¤ers apples claiming to be grown
locally, while only some of them are actually telling the truth. For him, all the
products are the same and he will therefore choose a seller randomly. Or again,
the government has to decide about the implementation of a new environmental
policy (eg. banning a pollutant, tightening environmental standards. . . ) but it
does not hold all the relevant information regarding its costs and benets. Then
it has to take a decision, knowing that there is a risk of reducing social welfare,
both by acting or keeping the status quo. Obviously, this outcome implies that
utility would have been higher by making a di¤erent choice. This can lead to
under-consumption of green products or even the possibility that the market
fails completely to form.
Secondly, it creates the possibility for opportunistic behaviour. If one
party can prot from the other partys ignorance, this is likely to happen. If
brown producers know that the consumer cannot distinguish between green
12
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and brown products and that he is willing to pay a premium for the former,
then they may wish to persuade him that their products are green.
The environmental agenda is becoming more and more pressing. On the
one hand, the overexploitation of free goods (due to the lack of or insu¢ cient
governmental intervention) has created critical situations in many di¤erent
areas (species endangerment, climate change, air pollution. . . ). On the other,
peoples green awareness has increased and they demand green products and
they expect the government to act to safeguard the environment.
The policy maker and the market have tried to nd ways to improve the
information quality and availability in order to overcome the suboptimal situa-
tion. However, di¤erent circumstances present di¤erent problems and therefore
allow for di¤erent remedies.
In this work, we look at two di¤erent types of information structures. The
literature distinguishes among markets for ordinary goods (the characteristics
of which are common knowledge), search goods (the characteristics of which are
available but ex ante research is required to gather it), experience goods (some
characteristics of which are known to consumers only ex post) and credence
goods (some characteristics of which cannot be known even after consumption).
We consider the latter two.
Environmental feature are often credence: consumers do not hold all the
information before purchase and even after consumption, they cannot deter-
mine all the characteristics of the good (or it would be disproportionately
expensive to nd out). Producers have the opportunity to ll the informational
gap by using labels. However, labels can convey true information, especially if
awarded by a third party, or not.
The rst two Chapters look at the welfare e¤ects of the use of di¤erent
types of labelling as a solution to the market failure caused by credence goods.
Chapter One starts by providing an extensive review of labelling, both in
the economic literature and in its use in the real world. The model presented
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looks at the strategic choice made by two competing rms in a market for a
green credence good. Each rm can choose to produce goods using a green
technology and have them certied by a third party or use a brown technology
and use self-certication. Consumers only buy products perceived to be green;
however, as they have no prior information on the labels, rms have to exer-
cise some e¤ort to convince consumers. Education becomes the main driver of
the market and it also represents another important assumption: information
availability is not su¢ cient to ensure consumers are informed. We will show
the conditions that lead to the rmschoice and see how they a¤ect social wel-
fare. Our focus will be on how a policy maker can a¤ect the market e¢ ciency.
One of the features of this model is that the type of certication is strictly
connected with the choice of technology chosen (green products are certied
by a third party; brown are self-certied). We nd that in equilibrium green
products may not be produced at all, but that is not necessarily detrimental
to social welfare. We also conclude that a single label for the whole market is
not always welfare maximising. According to the di¤erent situations, we look
at the decision makers best policy to achieve higher social welfare.
Chapter Two explores a similar market in an experimental setting; how-
ever, several important features di¤erentiate this model from the previous.
Firstly, we look at the behaviour of buyers and sellers alike; furthermore, some
of the buyers are not interested in the green characteristic; technology is deter-
mined exogenously and so are consumerspreferences; nally, labelling choice is
dened di¤erently: sellers can decide to use labels or not. If they wish to do so,
self certication is available to all sellers, whilst third party certication only
to green sellers. We compare markets with di¤erent availability of additional
information. We nd that allowing for cheap talk and certication decreases
welfare, although the latter increases e¢ ciency. We also highlight the scope
for policy makers intervention, as green products are consistently exchanged
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less.In particular, a change in the cost of the certication would have a positive
e¤ect on social welfare.
It is also important to note how the goods in this market are not pure
credence: in fact, at the end of each period, consumers realise what type of
products they have purchased. This would make this a market for experience
goods. However, as they cannot distinguish sellers from one period to the next,
they are not able to use this information.
Experience goods (and even more services) are fairly common. We con-
sider in particular the market for advice. Chapter three consider a situa-
tion in which a policy maker has to decide whether or not to regulate a pol-
luting activity, which depends on a future state of the world. The policy maker
realises the state of the world only ex post. However, he has access to a per-
fectly informed adviser. The decision maker has imperfect information on the
advisers agenda, which can coincide with his, welfare maximisation, or it could
be the protection of the interests of a part of the economy. If advice is sought
for more than one period, then reputational concerns may arise. Our aim will
be to assess what the best strategy is for the adviser and, in light of these
ndings, try to understand how much information the government can extract.
We nd that, according to circumstances, the decision maker can extract full
information in period one or, more surprisingly, in period two. We also show
how the advisers e¤ort to improve her reputation may be frustrated by the
market structure. We also show how the government in order to achieve higher
social welfare has the ability to push the adviser towards the preferred strategy.
As a whole, the thesis further underscores and illustrates the critical role
that availability and distribution of information plays in policy making aimed
at environmental protection. The paper conrms that in presence of credence
goods, communication loses part of its e¤ectiveness, damagin social welfare.
This is further exacerbated by two factors: the potential willingness of brown
16
producers to increase the systemic noise; and the consumersbounded ratio-
nality and their inability to use all the available information.
The dissertation contributes to the existing literature by presenting new
approaches on problems previously considered. In particular, it provides con-
ditions in which potentially biased advisers may improve social welfare, as well
as the conditions in which noisy labels are welfare enhancing. The conclusions
are then used to formulate policy making principles for a welfare maximising
decision maker. Chapter three provides particularly interesting and innovative
insight on information asymmetry problems, providing unique results for a
reputation building game, which should be carefully considered by any policy
maker. The dissertation points out the potential role of the decision maker
in increasing social welfare by improving the information market, either by
reducing its cost or by reducing the noise present in the system. This can be
either by making it more di¢ cult for spurious communication to take place or
by helping delivering the message of truthful communication.
Finally, this work presents also the caveat that the Governments interven-
tion may not always be indispensable and -sometimes- it may even be wel-
fare damaging. it is important that the policy maker considers the situation
carefully, weighting the benets arising from his intervention against the unin-
tended costs, which may turn out to be higher. Several policy instruments are
presented throughout the work, according to the specic situation: the govern-
ment should analyse carefully what the situation requires.
Chapter 1
Public policy optimisation in Markets with information
asymmetry
1.1 Introduction: General overview of the problem
In the last few decades, people have become more and more aware of envi-
ronmental issues. Only a few years back, environmentalists were dismissed as
idealist tree-huggers or doomsday prophets. Today, in many MDCs, Kyoto Pro-
tocol, carbon footprint, organic food have all become front page material. The
UK in 2011 presented the worlds rst annual green budget. Firms boast the
massive investment they are making to become greener. In UK, many com-
panies have put a big e¤ort, like energy companies (such as BP, Shell) and
supermarkets (in primis, TESCO and Sainsburys).
This change of attitude is caused mainly by two sets of concerns: rstly,
some products are (perceived to be) better in quality or better for ones own
health (for example organic food: not only the avour of the product is supposed
to be more "as it should be", but the lack of pesticides and articial products is
also healthier). Secondly, products could be better for someone (or something).
In this latter category fall products like "fair trade" or "sustainable".
This change in preference has gone hand-in-hand with the rmsinterest in
producing such goods. The reasons for this are numerous. For example, rms
may want to boost their image with environmentally-aware credentials or to
exploit the possibility of charging more for this particular product.
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But when we talk loosely about "green" products, we indeed refer to a con-
cept that is quite complex. In fact the environmental friendliness of a product
is multi-faceted. Let us consider the following di¤erent characteristics:
1) Materials: are raw materials recycled? Or recyclable? Or used in a sus-
tainable way? Are all the materials natural or are there any articial ingredi-
ents? Is there anything toxic used somewhere in the production process?
2) Production: how polluting is the technology used? Is the production
process using renewable energy? How are workers treated? Are they paid
enough to allow them a dignied life?
3) Geography: where does the product come from? What is the carbon
footprint implied in its transport? Are there local impacts?
This multidimensionality creates complications: what if a product is pro-
duced locally, but with the use of pesticides? What if production is carried out
in a poor country, workers earn a good salary and education is provided to
the community, but the transport of the products implies thousands of miles
transfer, when the same product could be produced closer to the consumers?
The combinations of all these characteristics are endless and they are inter-
twined with all the other "normal" characteristics we expect from a product
(appearance, safety, durability, a¤ordability...). Consumers are therefore facing
an almost impossible task: ordering di¤erent products taking into consideration
a very large set of variables, holding only incomplete information.
There is a further complication: often these elusive green characteristics
become even more di¢ cult to track down, as they cannot be appreciated by
the consumers, even after the product has been bought and used. If we buy
an apple, even after eating it, we would not be able to assert whether the fruit
was grown in a greenhouse, or if it was genetically modied or if the farmer
was paid a fair wage.
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A didascalic example to support this: a recurring episode is green grocers
selling "ugly" apples as "organic", as that is the way they are perceived to
look.
This has two main implications: consumers cannot really nd out whether
they are consuming products with the desired qualities. And as a consequence,
they may not be able to learn anything about the di¤erent rms even after
repeated consumption. In other words, producers may be willing to provide
eco-products but have no way to credibly communicate the information; and
consumers may prefer green products but they cannot be sure of the quality
of the chosen (or discarded) products. This situation has two negative conse-
quences: on the one hand people will not be able to choose what they prefer;
on the other, as environmentally-friendly products tend to be more expensive,
there is the risk these goods are driven o¤ the market.
In this situation, it is incumbent upon the producer to start investing in
further communication to consumers, generally referred to as labeling.
An eco-label is a written statement of the green characteristics of a product,
generally found on the product itself. It can take di¤erent forms (a symbol, a
list of characteristics, data about particular materials...), di¤erent awarding
bodies (it can be a claim made by the rm, a certication by an external body
or the government) and it may be specic to a particular product or shared
by di¤erent ones. A large share of products carries an acknowledgement of the
green features of the goods, and we are now quite used to recognising some of
them: "organic", "fair trade", etc.
At rst sight, this seems to be the solution to the problem, however it
appears communication has broken down somehow: in other words, consumers
do not always choose what is best for them. The reasons for this are varied
and to some extent have been mentioned already: on the one hand, too much
information can literally be too much to be processed by consumers and be
the tantamount to no information at all; on the other hand, the message can
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be blurred by uncertainty: reputation cannot be established, ordering multi-
dimensional products may not be feasible (or being subjective). Finally, there
can be the possibility that some of the information is unreliable. As consumers
cannot determine the quality of the goods, they need to rely on the producers
statements. But the risk of the producers overestimating the quality of their
product is high: it would be, as an old saying goes, like asking the innkeeper
if she sells good wine. The consequences of this are similar to those seen when
there was no communication at all: if communication is unreliable, it is di¢ -
cult to inuence consumersbehaviour; and if it does, it may lead to consumers
being misled in their choices.
Solutions to this can be found: building a reputation can be one way; or
if that is not possible, then having an independent body vouching for the
productsgreen credentials allows for more credibility.
But once more we are faced with the problem of information-processing.
Even if the information is available and reliable, consumers have to be able to
nd it and process it. When in a supermarket, if a person were to assess all the
available information for each item she wanted to buy, she would spend hours
during each visit: the opportunity cost to process all the available information
would be too high.
Therefore rms may wish to ll in the information/understanding gap by
putting in pro-active e¤ort to explain what their products are like and what the
label on them means. The number of consumers will be dependent on the e¤ort
they exercise. Clearly, nothing is stopping rms producing standard products
to try to convince consumers that her products are eco-friendly, but it will
simply take more e¤ort. Therefore, rms face the trade-o¤between producing a
more costly (green) product or having more di¢ culties marketing their (brown)
product.
At the same time, a policy maker may be willing to intervene to correct
market failure. The mismatch between producers and consumers is one concern;
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the possibility for the producers to mislead consumers is another. The issue is
that clearly self-declared labels are a cheap way for rms to communicate with
the consumers (and cheaper than exogenously-declared ones); however, the pos-
sibility that words may be used in a deceitful way is higher. The policy maker
has to evaluate what is the best outcome for society (striking a balance between
the rmsfreedom of communication and restriction in quality of information)
and push the market towards that direction.
The paper will present a duopolistic market for a green good, the character-
istics of which cannot be detected by the consumer. Firms can decide whether
to produce a green, more costly product or a brown cheaper one. Either way,
she will engage in communication, the e¤ectiveness of which is proportional
to the quality of the good. If the rm chooses to produce the lower quality
product, then the communication will be spurious, as it aims at deceiving
consumers about the real quality of the product. We will try to answer the
following questions:
* What is the rmsbest strategy? Will cheap talk be chosen or naturally
excluded?
* Does a welfare maximising policy makers preferred outcome coincide with
the market equilibrium? If not, what are his best instruments for intervention?
1.1.1 Structure of the paper
Because of the credence dimension of many environmental qualities, green mar-
kets will not, in general, reach an e¢ cient equilibrium. For this reason producers
are induced to adopt certication. A small number of recent papers recognises
that although consumers are interested in purchasing green products, they do
not fully understand what labels mean. The novelties in this paper are mainly
two: 1) as the underlined assumption that consumers fully understand this
information is violated, rms do not only label products, but have also to exert
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e¤ort to explain to consumers what the labels mean. Firms choose this e¤ort
strategically. We show that those choices interact with the labeling decision
itself; 2) spurious labels are judged on an economic (and not ethical) ground,
assessing whether the existence of spurious labels may be welfare improving. In
the paper, self-declared labels are all considered misleading (spurious). There-
fore, if we prove that in particular circumstances, spurious labels may lead to
optimal level of social welfare, then a fortiori this must be the case when part
of these labels convey some information.
The article draws from the literature (1.2) devoted to justify the existence
of (voluntary) labels, especially in markets for credence goods. Chapter 1.3 pro-
poses the model used in this paper. (1.3.1) presents the general assumption the
model relies upon: di¤erent product-quality and labeling; the role of educa-
tion; the reasons why the traditional Bayesian Model has not been considered
adequate to describe our market. (1.3.3) presents the model used; for clarity, a
simpler market with one producer and one available technology is introduced;
(1.3.4) presents the overall model and (1.3.5 and 1.3.6) derive the solutions of
the model.
We then consider the insight that the model brings us: (1.4.1) looks at the
producersstrategy, whilst (1.4.2) tries to nd general rules a the policy maker
who wishes to intervene in this market; (1.4.3) considers a specic function in
order to gain a deeper understanding on the possible situation that may arise
in this kind of market. Chapter 1.5 summarises and concludes.
1.2 Literature review
As the model takes a fairly di¤erent approach from existing literature, it is
somewhat di¢ cult to present correlated papers. The following section presents
the literature and the evidence behind the most important features of the paper.
We introduce credence good markets (1.2.1) and why (1.2.2) labeling may be
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a possible solution to overcome the market failure caused by the information
asymmetry, concentrating on the main features of labels (1.2.3). In particular,
it presents one of the key assumptions of the model, i.e. consumers do not
use all the information available to them. This feature separates the current
model with the majority of the literature. To overcome the information gap, we
propose (1.2.4) that rms proactively try convince consumers via education.
1.2.5 looks at the government role to improve the e¢ ciency of these markets.
Finally, 1.2.6 concludes by highlighting the links between our model and the
existing literature.
1.2.1 Search, Experience and Credence.
In a classic paper, Akerlo¤ (1970) shows how with imperfect information,
adverse selection can occur. In the best case, high quality producers are driven
out of the market, whilst in the worst, the market collapses altogether.
The issue is that one agent has information necessary for the other to make
an optimal choice, but it is against her private interest to disclose it.
Stiglitz (1994) demonstrates how e¢ ciency is compromised when informa-
tion is imperfect or costly; the cost can be explicit (the information is available,
but at a price) or implicit (the information is not readily available and to obtain
it the agent has to spend time and e¤ort to gather it). These ndings justify
the strive to improve the availability of information, in order to increase the
markets e¢ ciency.
Scholars realised that information (or its lack) determines di¤erent market
structures. Nelson (1970) denes ordinary the goods that can be fully appre-
ciated ex ante. He then discriminates between search and experience goods:
the former are goods the quality of which can be easily deducted ex-ante; the
quality of the latter, instead, can be fully appreciated only ex-post (that is, after
purchase or consumption). Experience good markets therefore can reach an
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e¢ cient equilibrium only in specic circumstances, eg. if purchase is repeated,
through reputation building.
Following Nelson, Darby & Karni (1973) distinguish a fourth category
of goods. Credence goods are characterised by the fact that consumers nd
assessing at least one of its qualities either: a) impossible; b) excessively costly;
or c) excessively slow. This means that consumers are not able to determine
all the features of a good neither ex ante nor ex post.
The literature on credence goods has mainly focused on services in which
diagnosis and treatment are generally given by the same agent. This type of
market is rather common. Consider the following examples:
* Taking a car to a garage, the mechanic is at the same time the person
assessing what repairs are needed and the one carrying out the repairs: the
incentive to over provide services is particularly high;
* Going to a lawyer for legal advice, the lawyer is the person advising
whether it is worth pursuing an issue with legal action, and the one actually
arguing the case;
It is easy to extend the previous examples to aesthetic surgery, plumbing
services, service (phone, insurance, utilities, bank....) upgrades and so forth.
Even in Akerlo¤s market for lemons, cars have strong credence characteristics,
as car dealers are the only ones knowing the true characteristics of the cars.
The literature has identied several substantial examples in the real world
where credence good theory is very relevant: Domenighetti et al. (1993) report
how in Switzerland, where doctors are paid proportionately to the numbers of
surgeries they undertake, an average person would undergo 33% more surgical
operations than doctors; this is due to the fact that a surgeon will be able
to talk her patients into unnecessary surgery, unless the patient is a doctor
himself.
Patterson (1992) describes how 9 times out of 10, the employees of a Auto-
motive Centre recommended repairs that were superuous.
25
In this way, a consumer may receive unnecessary services (overtreatment);
or services of higher than the optimal quality; or pay for high quality, while
only receiving low quality (overcharge)1.
More recently, due to the increase of consumersinterest in green products,
credence good theory has been applied to environmentally-friendly markets.
For example: carbon footprint labels report how much carbon has been
emitted to bring products onto stores shelves; paper can been produced from
sustainable forests2; dolphin-free tuna (dolphins captured in the process of
catching tune is released), and so on.
The problem with credence goods and imperfect information may be solved
(or mitigated) if:
a) it is possible for sellers to build reputation (Shapiro, 1982) and therefore
separate honest (or high quality) producers from the cheap talkers. However,
to be able to create reputation, consumers have to be able to observe, even
noisily, the characteristics that in the short run make the good a credence
one; in other words, the good has less credence features and more experience
ones. Hanson (2003) proves how reputation is hard to establish when a good is
highly homogeneous and produced by several small rms (in markets like the
ones for agricultural goods or meat). Cason and Gangadharan (2002) show that
although increasing (quality) reputation can be enough to create incentives for
producers in other contexts, this is not the case for environmental goods.
b) it is possible to separate advice from treatment (Emons 1999). If, for
example, it is possible to ask a mechanic for his opinion on a car and then
go to another to have it xed: in this way, the rst specialist wont have an
1Another way to dene credence is a situation in which consumers know the
quality of the products in the market but they do not know what quality would
satisfy their needs. For a recent survey and analysis of the latter, see Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006). In the rest of the article, we will refer to the former denition
of credence good markets, ie. consumers know the quality they need but they cannot
determine the quality available in the market.
2Where trees cut for paper production are substituted with newly-planted ones.
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incentive to lie and the second will not have the opportunity to. Therefore,
any time the consumer can obtain the opinion of a seller and purchase the
good/service from another, then the information asymmetry can be solved.
However, there are often economies of scope between diagnosis and treatment.
Sometimes, surgeons need to "open and see" and then make up their mind
on the necessity to operate: it would be impractical, if not dangerous, having
the operation carried out by another doctor. Or again, for particular technical
faults in a car, a mechanic would have to spend considerable time dismantling
the engine and assessing the problem. Going to another garage may incur an
excessive extra cost. In both cases, the economies of scope are apparent. For
the customer it would be non-economical (if non-feasible) to ask for a second
opinion.
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) note that authors have often imposed
(implicitly or explicitly) one of the following two hypothesis: i) it is possible
to verify the quality of the good; or ii) that some sort of liability constraint
would prevent consumers from getting an unrequired treatment. It follows that
to achieve an e¢ cient equilibrium three conditions have to hold: 1. veriability
(the quality of the good can be assessed ex post) or liability (the producers
are impelled to provide the appropriate level of service or quality of a good)
assumption; 2. large economies of scope between diagnosis and treatment; 3.
consumer homogeneity. If these are not all satised, then according to which
condition is relaxed the market will have a di¤erent degree of ine¢ ciency (up
to failing altogether).
Furthermore, the Folk theorem (Nash Equilibrium in a game can be
achieved through repetition, often via reputation building) cannot be applied
to pure credence goods: in other words, if it is impossible for a seller to estab-
lish reputation or for a consumer to infer anything on the characteristics of the
purchased goods even by game repetition, then there would be no premium for
the higher quality products. If, as is generally the case, these products have
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higher costs of production, then the market for green goods will not arise, as
in Akerlofs lemons market.
Farrel (1993) points out how it is therefore necessary to have some sort
of monitoring in order to avoid any communication degenerating into cheap
talk. Scholars have pointed out two other solutions which, however, entail the
intervention of the government or of a third party: McCluskey (2000) shows
how implementing even noisy monitoring and repeat purchase, a credence good
acquires the characteristics of a search good, while Kennedy et al. (1994) pro-
poses that the government simply corrects the market failure caused by the
asymmetric information, publicly providing the missing data.
But third party monitoring and/or information-collection can be di¢ cult
or costly if not impossible.
Environmentally-friendly products are often pure credence goods, especially
when the green characteristics stems from the production process. Thus, even
if the government were to ban a particular product, deemed to be too environ-
mentally damaging, enforcement would require a high and continuous e¤ort.
Although the majority of environmental features are credence, the contrary
does not hold. We have decided to focus on them for two sets of reasons3: 1.
Green credence markets. 1.1 Green markets are becoming more and more
popular and they are all characterised to some extent by credence features; 1.2
as Gil et al. (2000) point out, the large majority of environmental products
are perishable and of common/daily use (often of low unit value) and therefore
the credence quality becomes of more importance; 1.3 This is even more so as
consumers are willing to pay a premium. 2. Information. We look at mar-
kets in which consumers do not use all the information in the market. This is
particularly true for green marketes for several -often unique- reasons (see the
paragraph below on Bounded Rationality).
3It is of course possible to apply the results of this model to other credence
markets, provided they share similar characteristics.
28
For this particular subset of goods, then, economists have focused on
labeling.
1.2.2 Reasons for Labeling
Conventionally, economic analysis has focused on environmental issues as a
burden on rms. Since environmentally-friendly products are more costly to
produce, rms would only be induced to take on pollution-reducing activities
by regulation or other policy intervention.
In recent years, increased emphasis has been placed on the benets that
rms might be able to derive from improving environmental performance and,
by implication, on the scope for self-regulation.
These benets may arise from di¤erent channels, which are considered in
the next two paragraphs.
Supply side considerations
Producers may gain an edge against their own competitors: Roy and Vezina
(2001) highlight how environmental concern can be seen as a diversication
strategy. This holds for any good but, most of all, in those markets charac-
terised by high homogeneity of products. A straightforward example can be
any agricultural product an apple, corn or a potato cannot be distinguished
from the next one. However, through a green diversication, it is possible to
create higher loyalty from existing consumers as well as attract a new niche of
buyers, interested in the new quality of the product. Porter (1991) and Porter
and van der Linde (1995) hypothesise how leading the path in environmental
production can lead to a decrease in cost (and therefore comparative advan-
tages) as well as technological leadership. A large branch of literature has been
dedicated to the existence of double dividends, the possibility to achieve prot
and at the same time to improve environmental quality.
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Another way to explain Porters hypothesis is that by producing goods with
high environmental standards, it is possible to create a barrier to entry against
producers that do not abide to these new green standards. Therefore, companies
that carry out animal-tests (in countries where these are not regulated) often
have to change their policies to adapt to the situation of the new market.
Recently, Chinese producers of motor vehicles had to adapt their production
to the stricter standards coming from western producers. Houe and Grabot
(2009) suggest how recycled and recyclable materials as inputs may result in
barriers to entry against low labour-cost countries and at the same time lead
to a competitive advantage, because of the increased consumer awareness of
environmental problems (Thogersen, 2002, Teisl, 2002; Mascle and Ping Zhao,
2008).
Ambec et al. (2013) consider the evidence supporting Porters hypothesis
and show the di¤erent scenarios in which applies.
On a slightly di¤erent note, Codron et al. (2005) point out that retailers may
adopt higher quality standards because theyre worried about their own repu-
tation. Again, in particular in markets where goods are highly homogeneous,
not building a good reputation is the tantamount to a negative reputation and
therefore loss of market share. Firms are more or less explicitly expected to
care for the environment, to please the consumersexpectations (McAloone,
1998; Argument et al., 1998; van Hemel, 1998).
Finally, Bloom and Krips (1982) suggests that adopting particular green
standards could be a cheaper way for rms to advertise the characteristics of
their own products. In other words, by advertising either one line of products or
some specics of a product, a rm can promote more cheaply several products
or one product to di¤erent target audiences.
The rmsgrowing interest in green markets can be showed, on the one
hand, by the interest marketing scholars have in understanding green consumers
(among others, Moorthi 2002, Marcus and Adam, 2009, Cegarra-Navarro and
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Martínez-Martínez 2009, Moser et al. 2011) and on the other by the pro-active
practical approach. In 1986 in the United States, about 1% of the new prod-
ucts were claimed to be green; in less than a decade, the number rose to more
than 13%, with peaks in some markets of more than 35%. (marketing Intelli-
gence Ltd., Marketscan Service, cited in Wasik 1996). Globally the amount of
environmentally-related certication is growing exponentially: Roy and Vezina
(2001) report that in 2001 there were already more than 27,500 di¤erent labels.
According to Co-operative Bank (2007), in UK alone the green market in 2006
was worth more than £ 32 billions, with a rather steep increasing trend.
Demand side considerations
An important aspect, both theoretically and empirically, which needs to be
considered is also how green products are perceived by consumers.
Bougherara and Piguet (2009) distinguish three kinds of costs consumers
face in a credence goods market: (i) denition costs: environmental character-
istics are not dened by demand side; therefore a consumer needs to assess
what a particularly exogenously-dened feature means to himself in terms of
utility; (ii) verifying costs: these represent the e¤ort to assess the producers
statementsveridicity; and (iii) signaling costs: these are the costs consumers
incur in order to interpret and understand the information a label incorporates.
Due to these di¤erent costs, green markets can exist if and only if there are
consumers who are willing to face these additional costs and this would only
happen if the utility derived by the goods in question is higher than consuming
standard (brown) products.
Recent surveys (CSRwire, 2007 and Co-operative Bank, 2007) show how a
niche of consumers can be considered green, in other words, that value green
features of goods (sustainability, fairness...) and make at least a weekly con-
sumption of such products.
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In Switzerland, after only 15 years from their introduction, fair trade
bananas represent almost 60% of the market, being often the only alternative
in large supermarkets. European Commission (2008) presents the results of a
survey, showing that 3 in 4 people in the European Union would be willing to
pay a premium to buy some environmentally friendly products. And even if
the number dropped to 1 in 5 people who actually recently bought a good with
an eco-label, still this represents a sizeable share of the market. Loureiro and
Lotade (2005) estimate that in the co¤ee market the premium for fair trade
co¤ee is between 5 and 20%. Lusk and Hudson (2004) present other evidence
for other agricultural markets.
This is because these products are seen as superior, even when the "green"
aspects are not patent (e.g. when the di¤erence is in the production rather
than in intrinsic characteristics of the nal good itself): often environmen-
tally friendly food is proved to be healthier, as it contains less pesticides and
articial ingredients which would justify the reason why some people would
prefer them; or white goods may be more energy e¢ cient (implying a lower
carbon footprint); other times, though, the environmental characteristic may
be intrinsic in some stage of the production and therefore a brown and a green
product may be physically identical but the latter is preferred because, for
example, it was produced taking care of its producerswelfare, or it was not
tested on animals, or it was produced in a sustainable way. The good therefore
is perceived as "better" as it is "ethically better" or it internalises part of the
negative externality created4.
Another set of reasons why consumers are interested in green goods depends
on di¤erent societal interactions:
(a) Nyborg (2000) states that private and social preferences are di¤erent
and, therefore, we may prefer to do the right thing for society, even if it con-
tradicts the maximisation of personal utility;
4These arguments are analysed in detailed in Collier at al. (2010).
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(b) McCluskey (2000) points out how consumers may be attracted by green
goods not only because these products are (perceived to be) better, but also
for fashion or ethical reasons: real fur is probably warmer and u¢ er than fake
fur, but it is often considered to be "wrong" and targeted by animal-rights
groups: therefore even if a consumer may not care for foxes or mink, she would
still choose the product that was not the cause of any animal mistreatment;
(c) Brekke et al. (2003) analyse the "warm glow5 of giving", adding to
the theoretical analysis empirical data to show that individuals act not only
considering their personal utility function, but also considering an exogenously
determined code of conduct. Therefore, the warm glow can be included in
the consumers utility functions. This implies that moral motivation is not
necessarily incompatible with utility maximization.
(d) Pedersen (2000) instead focuses on the e¤ect of societys recognition
of ones own choices; in other words, a consumer derives utility not only from
consumption and the need/desire for "feel-good actions", but also from the
appreciation coming from the rest of society. This is a similar argument to
the one Codron et al. (2005) describe for producers. Therefore, there is some
sort of peer pressure to act in a particular (better) way. This phenomenon is
particularly accentuated when consumption has moral/ethical aspects, as in
the case of green products (Brécarda et al. 2009). Starr (2009) has added to
the analysis with empirical data supporting the hypothesis of the existence of a
"warm glow" in the consumption of green products. This particular argument
borders closely with environmental psychology (for a thorough survey on the
topic, see Vining and Ebreo 2001) and behavioural economics (for a survey see
Houe and Grabot 2009).
In the last decade, scholars have started to link psychological and eco-
nomic perspectives to assess "environmental morale and motivation. Early
5The concept was rst described in (Andreoni 1990). The author denes it as the
increase of private utility due to a particular "morally superior" choice, independent
from the actual payo¤ of this particular choice.
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works include Lee and Holden (1999), Thøgersen (1999, 2000), Stern (2000),
Grankvist and Biel (2001), Loureiro and Hine (2002): they all concentrated
on particular behavioural features that are complementary to the neoclassical
utility; in other words, they add on neoclassical theory without breaching any
assumption made by it.
Building on this literature, Frey & Stutzer (2006) nd that consumers
choices are based on private utility as well as absolute and social principles,
fairness and altruism. Berglung and Matti (2006) add that individual decisions
depend on ethical values and beliefs, customs, culture and several kinds of
social, political and moral values, and also on institutional settings.
Therefore, on the one hand, some consumers are willing to pay a premium
for environmentally friendly products and on the other, green producers are
willing to o¤er these products that are (often) more expensive to produce. The
reason for this extra economic burden can be seen either as cost-sharing of the
information process or as internalisation of externalities.
1.2.3 Labeling
Labeling can be dened as a rms or third partys policy tool that sets the
rules for the producers on how to present specic information of the products to
consumers, making available information otherwise only known by producers.
In practice, it is often a symbol or a table highlighting the information the
producer wants to communicate to consumers.
It is important to remember that (Caswell et al., 2002) consumers make
their choices considering the attributes that are intrinsic to the product as well
as the extrinsic signposts provided by the sellers, especially when characteristics
are di¢ cult to perceive or understand.
Cason and Gangadharan (2002) suggest how one of the main function for
these labeling schemes is to reduce transaction costs stemming from the reg-
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ulation enforcement and a more precise (i.e. information bearing) use of envi-
ronmentally related jargon.
Third-party labels, spurious labels & Greenwash
Labels unfortunately are costly for rms. Nielsen (2001) has identied this
extra cost as additional abatement-costs, auditing or R&D. Dixit and Norman
(1978) interestingly point out how the extra costs may derive from a strategic
diversication (therefore changing the product) or from a campaign to raise
awareness among consumers.
Cost depends on who is awarding the label. A rm may decide to create
a label ad hoc for its products (self certication), or it may choose to join
an existing scheme, run by a private company or the government (third party
certication). A self-certied claim will be cheaper than one certied by an
external body: as rms are free to determine their own standards (without
adapting their technology to exogenously determined parameters), there is no
need to implement monitoring or pay a fee to have the right to use a label and
so forth.
The problem with self-certication is that it is less reliable (than third-party
certication), as rms producing standard (brown) products try to disguise
themselves as green rms. When claims are not regulated, there is an incentive
and the possibility for brown producers to pass false information. This par-
ticular problem is often referred to as greenwash: rms make dishonest claims
about the environmental qualities of their product. Kirchho¤ (2000) shows
how this problem may not disappear even with the possibility of reputation
building, as consumers do not know how producers operates (and therefore
their cost functions). When the "green" characteristics are hard to assess for a
consumer (OBrien and Teisl, 2004 and Teisl et al., 2001), and the monitoring
costs are particularly high (especially with an ever-increasing number of newly
created labels), it is easy to foresee the creation of spurious labels. Spurious
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labels aim to make consumers believe that a particular good is green while in
reality it is not or at least it is "not as green" as advertised. For example:
(a) Tepelus and Cordoba (2005) mention sustainable tourism, showing how
"sustainability is often used in a very lax sense. The core point here is that by
using a spurious label a rm can pass a certain degree of false information;
(b) A British co¤ee shop chain has recently advertised its latest series of
fruit smoothies as "100% natural": as the word "natural" has no legal meaning,
one could at best assume that it is used as antinomy of "articial". Even so,
that does say very little about what is actually in the beverage (technically it
could be just tap water);
(c) Detergent products have been for long time under strict scrutiny as they
were carrying labels claiming to be "greener than ever" or "50% more envi-
ronmentally friendly": the generality of the statements can be hardly proved
to be untrue, but it hardly conveys any true meaning.
Farrell (1993) concludes that in a market for credence green goods in which
labels are used, without third-party monitoring, there would not be any green
market. In fact, communication would degenerate into babbling, consumers
would not be able to assess which statements are true or false; even exogenously
awarded labels would lose credibility, partly because it is unsure whether the
claims have been veried and partly because consumers may not fully under-
stand the di¤erence among the multitude of existing labels.
In general, green producers have an incentive to use labeling to separate
themselves. Brown producers will do the same to try to blend in the pool of
good producers and harvest the green premium.
However, even third-party certication can represent a noisy form of com-
munication. In other words, it could occur that either the information con-
veyed by the label is lost on the consumer or brown(green) producers are
allowed(excluded) to use third-party certication. This can be explained in
36
several ways: too many labels, overly complicated information, multidimen-
sionality, misleading advertising, poor monitoring, cost of labeling,...
Mason (2009) makes certication a noisy process in which green producers
have more chances to pass the test (but error type I and II are possible). In
other words, the monitoring process may be faulty for di¤erent aleatory reason
which may cause green products to fail the screening or vice versa. The relative
costs of the two rms characterise the di¤erent equilibria. Mason shows how
labeling can actually reduce the number of environmentally-friendly products
in the market and still increase the social welfare; on the other hand, mandatory
ecolabeling makes social welfare collapse.
This behaviour is partly unavoidable, but sometimes even endorsed by the
establishment. In Countries such as the USA, the Congress has set general
guidelines for the rmsmarketing, but no specic rules on the adopted tech-
nology, therefore leaving the possibility for the rm to induce consumers to
believe that her products are greener than what they are in reality (Cason
and Gangadharan, 2002). While the consumer is not always able to spot a
spurious label, he will rely less on self-certication. Heyes and Maxwell (2004)
have shown how the coexistence of mandatory exogenously awarded labeling
and optional in-house labels can improve the expected social welfare. Lanoie
et al. (2011) show that brown rms may benet from green labels, by purpos-
edly specialising in the production of brown products. Carlsson et al. (2005)
using experimental data show how cheap-talk on green attributes decreases con-
sumerswillingness to pay and therefore makes more di¢ cult, or at least less
protable, the existence of green products if costs of production are substan-
tially di¤erent. Mahenc (2009) shows how unveried claims dent consumers
trust in all eco-labels, decreasing the e¤ectiveness of communication and there-
fore the markets e¢ ciency. Bougherara and Piguet (2009) run an experiment
to show the e¤ect on market e¢ ciency of di¤erent information cost, showing
how the di¤erent kinds of labels play di¤erent roles according to relative cost.
37
The present paper aims to assess whether there is any economic justication
for spurious labels. In the real world, there are several explanations for these
kinds of labeling: 1) the regulator cannot be overly strict on what it is allowed
and what is not, or the system would lose in exibility; 2) it is di¢ cult to
discriminate between what is a "green label" and what is mere advertisement;
3) rms can fund a third party to be certied, e¤ectively creating a third-party
label ad-hoc.
Intuitively, the existence of cheap talk labels would induce consumers to
make non-maximising choices and therefore decrease social welfare. The model
presented here attempts to clarify whether there are situations in which spu-
rious labels represent the best solution for the market.
Consumersbounded rationality.
One of the main assumption of the model we present is that consumers do not
fully understand the information available in the market via labels. Over the
last years, several scholars (among others, Titus and Bradford (1996) and Car-
rigan and Attala (2001)) have pointed out how information is a more complex
issue than theory predicts. When it comes to ethical or environmental pur-
chase, in fact, consumers appear to be slightly helpless and confused, rather
than sophisticated as many believe. It is reported how most consumers men-
tion that the declarations of contents are the major source of information when
they want to check the environmental performance of a product. Many admit,
however, that they do not understand them.
Harbaugh et al. (2011) consider the proliferation of voluntary labels,
showing how this tends to confuse consumers (rather than clarifying their
ideas) leading rms to strategically choose their labels, according to the quality
they want to adopt. These strategic choices, however, backre as consumers
discount the intrinsic value of a label who would accept the endorsement of
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products with poor reputation (drawing a parallel to Groucho Marxs famous
statement that he would never join a club willing to have him as a member).
AELA (2004) reports how Australian consumers awareness of di¤erent
labels is very poor and it varies among di¤erent states, according to the impor-
tance that is given to environmental issues by each separate administration.
This paragraph presents evidece from existing literature. The reasons
behind this behaviour can be summarised as follows:
(a) the green feature may be multidimensional: the greenness of a product
is in fact a vector of characteristics only partly dependant on each other. For
example, a particular snack could be described according to the following fea-
tures: 1) genetically modied; 2) organic; 3) fair trade; 4) carbon footprint; 5)
sustainability of source of ingredients; 6) recyclable packaging;... It is easy to
understand how one product may be superior to a substitute in all but one cat-
egory bringing into the choice-making a more complex information processing,
if not subjectivity. On the one hand, this multidimensionality is indeed more
confusing for the consumers and therefore it may lead to non-optimal solu-
tions; on the other, consumers may value di¤erently some characteristics and
this leads to di¤erent optimal-choices for di¤erent people. This heterogeneity,
in turn, may be judged non-optimal, as in Economics it is generally assumed
homogeneity among consumers. Travisi and Nijkamp (2008) look at how con-
sumers value di¤erent credence attributes and show there are no underlying
patterns although they can be helped to form.
(b) the green characteristics of a product have to live alongside, if not
compete, with all the other characteristics (taste, appearance, practicality, tra-
dition...). In France (example reported in Krarup and Russell, 2005) a label
signaling products containing the least superuous packaging has decreased
sale volumes of some products carrying it, as consumers may have preferred
the convenience of the previous packaging and committed to recycling. Another
example can be found by looking at washing powder: both bio and non-bio
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labels are present in the market: the former claims to be green as it is not
made using chemicals; the latter nds its green characteristic in the fact that
you need less soap and therefore a¤ecting the environment less;
(c) the green feature is di¢ cult to understand per se. Certied timber, shade
grown co¤ee, water footprint are all concept that are not of immediate grasp,
which can then confuse consumers;
(d) the quantity of labels present in a market may be an additional problem.
Even if consumers are perfectly rational and are able to order precisely, di¤erent
labels in order of increasing quality (and as previously mentioned, this may not
be possible), the quantity of information required to make an optimal decision
may be too vast to be a feasible option. As much as it is possible to assume
that people can collect information about tens of labels in each market, it
is not very likely in the real world, considering the high costs involved and
the high technical knowledge that may be required to understand them fully.
Arunachalam et al. (2009) suggest that a way the market is trying to solve this
information overexposure is to creat a "food system", in which more complex
certications are trying to become over-arching best practice.
(e) as already noted, labels may also convey misleading (if not false) infor-
mation. In the United States, beef can be labeled either "grass fed only" or
"grass fed" (if the particular diet was followed only for a part of the animals
life). It is easy to see how the latter can be confused for the former.
Again, the term "organic" refers both to characteristics of the products
that can be measured or observed, as well as characteristics of the production
process, which may be more di¢ cult to quantify. If the legislation is blurred,
the perception of it cannot be clear;
(f) psychological e¤ects may taint consumersrationality even when char-
acteristics are reported clearly: Kleinmuntz and Sckade (1993) identify a few
key factors that can inuence the choice of the consumers; for example, the
paper shows how, statistically, the same information given in numerical rather
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than alphabetical characters has more impact on consumers. In other words,
the same product acquires more or less credibility according to the di¤erent
labels it carries. Jiang and Chia (2010) show how di¤erent types of internet
certication (interpersonal, formal and anonymous...) have di¤erent impacts
on consumers, according to the type of good in question (formal works better
for experience and search, whilst credence goods are better marketed using
informal, personal communication).
It is not surprising, then, that Nilsson et al. (2004) and Bjorner et al.
(2004) have drawn attention to how consumers do not fully rely on even the
exogenously awarded certication.
(g) labels may convey little information on the green attributes of the good,
or these characteristics might not be apparent but rather concerning the pro-
duction process instead (e.g., the use of renewable energy or resources in gen-
eral).
(h) buyers may rely on consumersorganisation to trace any sort of mali-
cious advertisement. And it is easy to imagine how these organisations might
fail to promptly detect potential spurious labels.
1.2.4 Education
The following paragraph starts by presenting the existing problem buyers have
using the information that is made available to them. It then continues pre-
senting the solution for this, which is consumerseducation.
Information availability & Information understanding
When it comes to information provision, the traditional assumption made in
Economics is that imperfect information can be reduced -if not completely
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eliminated- by simply providing the missing information to the market. It fol-
lows that the more information, the more e¢ cient is the market; hence, eco-
label prolication has to be a positive phenomenon, as consumers have available
a full range of classied characteristics.
However, this is not always the case in reality. Palm and Jarlbro (1999)
studied the Nordic Swan, one of the most established green labels in Europe.
After several years since its introduction, in Finland, Sweden and Norway 60%-
75% were aware of it and had a good grasp of what it e¤ectively means: this
implies that a quite sizeable share of the population ignored it. Furthermore,
in Denmark (which adopted the label few years later than the other countries)
only 18% were aware of the label; 95% of the Icelandic population did not
know anything about the Nordic Swan. The survey o¤ers two other impor-
tant facts. 1. Another Danish eco-label (Ø-label, the state controlled label for
organic food) was known by roughly a third of the population, implying that
Danish people are sensitive to environmental issues and that, therefore, the pre-
vious data ought to be a¤ected by other factors; 2. at the beginning of 2001,
the Danish Environmental Protection Agency (Miljøstyrelsen) implemented a
strong campaign to increase the consumersawareness of the two main inter-
national ecolabels (Swan and EU-Flower). Soon after the campaign, and then
after six months, surveys were carried out. Results showed that recognition of
the swan increased from 56% to 68% (with knowledge of its meaning raising
from 26% to 41%); the EU-ower was recognised by 36% against of the initial
16% (with knowledge increasing from 4% to 16%).
Another survey, reported in EU (2001), a¢ rms that the lack of information
is supposedly the single most important obstacle for environmentally conscious
purchasing.
The European Barometer (European Commission, 2008) highlights how
more than 2 people out 5 is unable to discriminate green from standard product,
even when they bear an eco-label.
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Finally, some studies have concentrated not on labels, rather on the con-
cepts certied by the labels themselves. Fletcher and Downing, (2011) consider
consumersawareness and understanding the common environmnetal jargon6;
the result shows how there is a wide gap between the number of people who
have heard and have seen any of the terms in question and the number of
people who actually know what they mean. Interestingly, the number of people
who use these terms to discriminate when buying products is sometimes higher
and sometimes lower than the percentage of people who know what the terms
actually mean. Firms have been aware of this for a number of years and have
reacted accordingly. For a review of the literature in this area, see Bagwell
(2007).
We have showed that there may be the need to provide extra information
but this may not: a) reach the consumers; b) be trusted; c) be understood; d)
lead to consistent behaviour.
While the last of these issues is purely within the realm of Behavioural
Economics, the others are extremely relevant to our discussion.
To express the complexity arising in the communication, Leire et al. (2004)
di¤erentiate the nine increasing degrees of relation between consumers and eco-
labels, from generic knowledge to endorsement7. This means that even if pro-
ducers make information available through labeling, if a consumer lies within
the rst 8 categories of communication, the information is (at least partially)
lost.
Therefore, it is not realistic to assume that information is like a switch in
the consumers head that can be turned on simply by creating labels. Classical
economic theory does not predict accurately the market behaviour in this case.
If complete information is a necessary condition to an e¢ cient equilibrium,
6Such as carbon footprint, ecological, organic,water neutral...
7These are: 1. Knowledge of; 2. Noticing; 3. Association; 4. Connotation; 5. Trust;
6. Condence; 7. Recognition; 8. Interest; 9. Attitude to labels, statements and
declarations.
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no amount of complex information is su¢ cient to achieve it. Marette (2010)
shows that the existence of di¤erent labels and confused consumers lead to the
di¤erent equilibria that di¤er in level of e¢ ciency, according to the level of
confusion in the market.
Educating consumers.
One way to solve this communication faltering is for rms to invest resources
(e¤ort) to make the label known and understood to consumers (education).
It has been established how producers need to respond with information
that reduces implicit costs (in the lack of information) or they lose consumers
condence. Therefore educational spending and/or improvement in e¢ ciency
of educational spending is necessary to increase market share when consumers
search costs are positive. Marketing scholars have studied a similar problem for
a long time. For example, Becker and Murphy (1993) present a model in which
advertisement and the quality of the good are complement and they nd the
condition to establish when rms under/over-invest in education.
This relationship between education and market share can be qualied fur-
ther noting two separate aspects:
a) As it has been pointed out, the fact that information exists does not
necessarily imply that a consumer is able to access or to understand it. Dis-
semination is crucial for their e¢ cacy. Edlund et al. (2002) more explicitly
asserts how di¤erent consumers have di¤erent knowledge and understanding of
environmental characteristics. In other words, some consumers would require
a minimal investment in education, while others would require more
b) Lohr (1998) analyses what happens if there are di¤erent, competing
labels pushed by di¤erent producers. As much as education is still positively
correlated to the size of the market, there is also a negative correlation with
the e¤ort that the rivals are putting in. This relation has been characterised
in literature by Scherer (1979) as cannibalisation. In other words, the e¤ort of
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a producer to convince consumers that her products are in e¤ect green will
attract new people (increasing the size of the market for environmental goods),
but also attract consumers who were already in the market, but previously
someone elses costumers.
The Bad Education
The optimal level of information is an issue that has been studied extensively
(Nelson, 1974; Dixit and Norman, 1978; Glaeser and Ujhelyi 2010), showing
how too much information can be detrimental to social welfare.
It is important to note that the problem arising from labelling is not fully
resolved by investing in education. In fact, as any rm can decide to pro-actively
interact with consumers, then brown rms willing to deceive consumers can do
that too.
Hattori and Higashida (2012) summarise the research made in looking at the
e¤ect of the noise purposedly created by rms to confuse consumers. Broadly
speaking, the e¤ect is similar to the cannibalisation e¤ect discussed earlier.
In our model, if a rm decides to produce using brown technology, we
explicitly allow investment in "bad education", as a marketing strategy.
1.2.5 Government Intervention.
Standardisation of labels has been proposed as a solution to the problem: in
other words, a third party strictly regulates how to present information and
how to guarantee quality. This would be benecial because it would make it
easier to gather information even if consumers have bounded rationality (Teisl
& Roe 1998). However the paper points out how too strict a denition may
have a lock-in e¤ect on quality standards, where incentives to innovate may be
reduced as well as previous investments in alternative technologies or labeling
may result in dead weight losses for companies.
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However, often governments prefer to purposely leave denitions "loose" or
more freedom of action. One of the reasons for this "exibility" in denitions is
to avoid the drawback of loss in exibility and stimulus to R&D (Antle 1996).
Maxwell (1998) proposes a ban of brown products, in order to avoid labeling
costs. This has been possible in particular cases (such as the ban of CFC), but
several caveats need to be noted: a) if the ban is not internationally accepted,
rms may lose competitiveness in the global market; b) the benets have to be
substantial to compensate for increase in costs of production and potential loss
in consumers utility (for all those consumers who preferred the banned goods);
c) enforcement has to be easy.
Constantatos and Herrmann (2011) show that setting compulsory standard
benets rms, as the lag between their investments in green technologies and
the buyersrealisation of this decreases and therefore the impact on revenue is
anticipated.
Scholars disagree on the e¢ ciency of compulsory schemes in improving
social welfare. Carlsson et al., (2007) have shown, using a survey on GM-
free meat, that mandatory labeling improves on e¢ ciency and social welfare
if compared with voluntary labeling, although there may not be a change in
the willingness to pay from the consumers. Gracia et al. (2007) nds opposite
results analysing the Spanish food market. Galarraga and Markandya (2006)
show how society would benet from the imposition of a Pigouvian tax on
regular (non fair trade) co¤ee and tea, to nance subsidies to fair trade ones.
International NGOs have supported and fostered some of these schemes.
In particular the OECD in the last decade has worked hard to inuence gov-
ernments throughout the world to incorporate in their agenda environmental-
related issues, establishing standards, publishing research ndings and so forth.
Among the several projects, it is worth mentioning the long-standing OECD
Seed Schemes and the Worldwide Implementation Now(W.I.N.) of energy
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e¢ ciency that acts as over-arching umbrella for the di¤erent schemes (manda-
tory standards mandatory labels, voluntary labels and voluntary standards)8.
Caswell and Mojduszka (1996) show how labels can be used and encouraged
in order to inuence the overall quality of the products in the market. If it is
socially better to produce only green goods, then it is possible to see how the
creation of MQS (minimum quality standard) or ban of the brown technology
can actually be benecial for the rms (which do not need to spend money on
education, diversication or labeling assessments). In the UK, a recent example
could be the case of the old incandescent light bulbs which are being phased out
gradually, in advance of the European gradual ban starting in 2012. Another
example is the ban on plastic bags which has been announced in several coun-
tries in recent years.
Andre et al. (2009) justify these voluntary actions as benecial to all rms,
as they solve the coordination issue, which could otherwise lead to excessive
competition and non-Pareto e¢ cient equilibria.
For a general overview of the di¤erent government intervention see Cole
and Harris (2005).
1.2.6 The present model & the previous literature
The model presented here incorporates the concept that the presence of infor-
mation in a market for credence good is not su¢ cient to solve the information
asymmetry (Titus and Bradford, 1996). Follow the idea expressed by Harbaugh
et al. (2011) that labels can confuse consumers and rms exploit the level of
confusion to choose strategically their label, we set up a model that analyses
this strategic choice.
Considering then Palm and Jarlbro (1999)s ndings, that label adminis-
trators can exert e¤ort in order to raise consumersawareness, we added to
8For a comprehensive list of the schemes present in the di¤erent countries, see
http://www.ecolabelindex.com. The list includes independently veried labels, as of
June 2010.
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the model the feature that rms have to spend e¤ort to make consumers aware
of the characteristics of the products. Although the scholars have looked into
this extensively (see literature review), to our knowledge this is one of the rst
applications to environmental policy making. The nal characteristic we added
is the interdependence between the two rmse¤orts, expressed as in Scherer
(1979), ie. cannibalization.
The model assumes that all green producers adopt third-party certication
and brown ones adopt in-house (spurious) labels. This assumption is purely
instrumental to look at the strategic choices made the rms; our interest in
to see whether (1) spurious labels are detrimental to social welfare; (2) green
production is always part of the equilibrium mix; (3) the governmental should
intervene and, if so, (4) how to do it best. We nd that in equilibrium green
products may not be produced at all but that, even in presence of negative
externalities, this may not require the regulator intervention. However, if it is
in societys best interest, the decision maker has several ways to intervene.
According to the di¤erent situation, the best policy could be banning one
certication, provide a limited amount of licences to use a particular certica-
tion, R&D investment, educational campaigns or no intervention at all. We also
show how having a unique certication could be benecial to society, especially
if it a¤ects consumersperception of the labels.
1.3 Deriving the Model
This chapter presents the model we have used. The literature review in the
previous chapter has set the context for the aim of this piece of research,
highlighting the issues and some of the main ndings.
1.3.1 Main Assumptions
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The model studies the strategic interaction between two prot maximising rms
in a market for a homogeneous credence good, meant for export9.
Labels. Firms use labels for their products. See 1.3.1 below.
Price. Price is assumed to be constant (there is no price competition on the
supply side, and no bargaining power on the demand side). The main reason
to assume this is to isolate the e¤ect education has on producerschoices and
eliminate any price e¤ect. Furthermore, one could argue that brown rms will
exploit the products homogeneity and the information asymmetry to match the
green rmsprice, as a lower price could be seen as a signal of lower quality;
therefore there wont be any price competition. In the same way, green pro-
ducers may not be able to extract a premium from the market, as consumers
are not able to assess whether they are getting anything for the higher price.
Purchasing Condition. Only goods that are perceived to be green are
sold. Consumers have no prior belief about the sellers or the labels. Consumers
who are not convinced that a good is green will not make any purchase. There-
fore, rms spend resources to make buyers aware of the characteristics of the
label borne by their own products.
Consumers heterogeneity. Consumers are believed to have di¤erent
preferences. Firstly, it is recognised that some consumers may not be interested
in consuming green products; however, the model only consider the niche of
consumers that do (looking simultaneously at the market for green and brown
products could represent an insightful extension of the current model). In other
words, heterogeneity is recognised but it is to a large extent eliminated, con-
sidering exclusively the market for green products. Secondly, among the people
demanding for green products, it is assumed that di¤erent individuals will have
distronger/weaker preferences/knowledge about the green features of the good.
This implies that education will not have a constant return (see below).
9This allows us to ignore consumerssurplus in the evaluation of social welfare.
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The duopolists make two decisions: a) the quality of the product; and b)
the quantity of e¤ort invested to convince the consumers the product is green.
Each of these decisions is analysed in the following paragraphs.
Quality of the Good
As only green goods are sold, rms use labeling. If a rm decides to produce
a brown product, then it wont be able to certify her products exogenously,
therefore it will use a self-awarded one (cheap talk); producers choosing to
go for green products will adopt exogenously awarded label10. In other words,
rms decide between:
*produce with a green technology and adopt a third-party awarded label;
or
*produce with a standard technology and adopt an in-house certica-
tion11.
All the products will therefore carry a label: a rm deciding to produce a
green good will adopt a third-party awarded label, whilst a rm producing a
brown product will adopt a spurious one.
From this, it follows that "spurious" and "in-house" are considered here as
synonyms.
An important assumption is that green technology is more expensive.
This is a standard condition in the literature, and it is strongly supported by
market analysis12. This could be explained with two di¤erent sets of consider-
ations: a) green producers internalise the negative externalities, or use more
costly technologies to avoid them altogether, or have higher abatement costs
10This can be justied as follows: third-party certifying body can detect green prod-
ucts with no noise. Brown producers cannot access exogenous certication, therefore
they implement spurious labeling.
11This assumption can be relaxed, as it is discussed in the Appendix.
12A simple counterfactual could be: if it were cheaper to produce an environmen-
tally friendly good, and it is also easier to market it, rms would always choose green
technologies.
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or costs of auditing or b) having the goods certied and production monitored
is costly (the analysis of these costs has been done in the previous chapter).
On the other hand, a brown rm avoids these additional costs non -
internalising externalities and self-awarding certication, making her produc-
tion costs marginally lower.
Consumersbehaviour. Consumersbehaviour has been "blackboxed":
since (i) they will only buy products believed to be actually green; (ii) they have
no prior belief about the products and (iii) price is unique; then the demand
of each product is dependent on the level of e¤ort put in by each rm.
Education
Because of the presence of spurious labels, consumers are not always sure of the
actual quality of the products, creating market ine¢ ciency, both by committing
type I error (consumers not buying green goods thinking they are actually
brown) and type II error (consumers buying brown goods assuming they are
green).
Consumers face two information-related issues: the existence of spurious
labels, and the lack of knowledge about the di¤erence between di¤erent labels.
To exemplify the issue, let us consider this situation. A consumer faces the
choice between two homogeneous products, only di¤ering for the green seal they
bear. One is awarded by an independent, reputable, international organisation
(say WWF) and the other is simply something the marketing department of a
rm attached to the product. If the consumer does not recognise the di¤erence
between the two labels, even looking at the symbols and information, then the
information carried by the seals is lost.
Since we assume that consumers have no previous beliefs regarding the
products or labels, and since they only purchase products that are perceived
to be green, then the demand will be a function of the money invested by
the producers in any activity to raise consumers awareness, which we call
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education. If no money is spent, then consumers will not be able to distinguish
between the di¤erent labels and they will not know for sure whether the goods
are green and therefore they will not commit to buy anything.
E¤ort is costly and has a positive, yet decreasing, e¤ect on consumersbelief
that the product is actually eco-friendly. Furthermore, e¤ort is more e¤ective
if the good is actually green.
Let us consider these characteristics separately:
1. E¤ort has decreasing marginal returns. This is a rather standard
hypothesis (law of decreasing marginal returns). This can be a consequence
of di¤erent factors: (i) some consumers will be more informed than others
about existing labels and therefore requiring little further information to be
convinced of the green characteristics of a good; a consumer who knows little
about that particular good would need to be taught about di¤erent labels,
the specic product requirement to obtain it and so forth: this will clearly
require more e¤ort. (ii) a rm may begin to advertise in more dense areas
or using more penetrating mass-media, and then eventually target smaller or
more remote places where targeted potential consumers are fewer. (iii) some
consumers may be more gullible than others, or have a lower resistance to
believe in advertisement (broadly intended) or put a heavier weight on green
qualities and therefore they would be more easily convinced.
Therefore, the most environmentally friendly, the most gullible and the best
informed would be the rst to be convinced and they are convinced with a small
investment. The more skeptical might give in, but after a stronger e¤ort from
the producers.
2. Brown rms are assumed to be less e¢ cient in convincing con-
sumers of the greenness of their products. This is quite standard in literature.
This can be explained in several ways: (i) it is easier to convince someone
of something true rather than the opposite. One needs only to think at an
example: Phillip Morris may nd proof that smoking is not really harmful for
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ones health, but it surely would take a lot of research and time to nd a scien-
tist willing to say so and most probably his credibility will not be of the highest
(denitely not after a statement like this). On the contrary, the same amount of
educational e¤ort put in by the NHS to convince people who smoking is harmful
will have a larger impact. (ii) There is a stronger resistance to self-awarded
labels, as market research has conrmed. Highly-aware consumers realise the
label source and they of course question its reliability. (iii) It is di¢ cult for
a brown producer to mislead consumers without openly lying, which would
unmask them or it would make their statement illegal. In other words, if a rm
wants to overstate the green characteristics of her products, she will do so with
vague and less convincing statements and often with poor proofs of the facts,
in order to not be accused of stating falsities. This weaker certication will
inuence demand but not as strongly as that of a third-party label.
In the model, it is assumed that rms use a brand-enhancing education
e¤ort, therefore the e¤ort spent by a rm increases the awareness of its products
only. It is important to notice how the "e¤ort" a company decides to put in will
not inuence directly the reputation of the competitor, as it is assumed that
the marginal e¤ectiveness is only a function of ones own e¤ort. However, it is
intuitive to see how in a limited market, if a company increases her e¤ort (and
her own market share), then, ceteris paribus, the competitor will be left with a
shrunken market and, consecutively, the total quantity sold by the latter will
decrease.
This relation is incorporated in the model implicitly, as in any duopoly
model.
Reputation and Bayesian Consumers
As previously mentioned, the model does not use the classical Bayesian updated
consumersbeliefs. This section explains why Bayesian theory is not the best
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choice to describe this market, as the description of a homo oeconomicus
bahaviour may be approximated more closely by our model rather than by
Bayesian theory.
The market considered here is a market for credence (green) goods. Pure
credence, as said, is a quite common feature, especially when the green attribute
comes from the way the good is produced (e.g. using renewable electricity or
resources). Although it might be possible to see whether a book is printed on
recycled paper, it would be impossible for a consumer to assess whether the
paper comes from a sustainable exploited forest).
This particular feature of the market has two important consequences:
* Information Asymmetry: consumers cannot know ex-ante the prod-
uctscharacteristics;
* No reputation: it is not possible to gather further information ex-post.
Contrary to experience goods, the green characteristic cannot be inferred
after consumption.
But if consumers cannot learn anything about the good they have previously
purchased, then Bayesian learning process would be useless, as
P (A j B) = P (A) (1.1)
We can identify diverse scenarios where Eq. 1.1 holds true:
a) One-o¤ decisions. If the good is a durable good, the consumer creates
beliefs about the situation at the moment of the potential purchase and then
makes up her mind. By the time of her subsequent purchase, the market will
have undertaken so many changes that her prior knowledge is obsolete and
therefore of no use, if not even misleading. This knowledge obsolescence could
be due by developments in the technology (which could make what it is con-
sidered to be a green good today, a brown good in light of new discoveries.
For example, what was considered to be an e¢ cient refrigerator 15 years ago
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is now considered extremely polluting). Alternatively, the standards (i.e. not
the products but just the labels themselves) could be di¤erent (e.g. for cars,
in the EU the standards change every other year. EURO1, EURO2....) as new
pollutants are considered;
b) Large number of small labels. Even considering non durable goods,
it has been noted how for each particular market, the number of green labels is
large and increasing. In this setting, the chance that a consumer always faces
the very same set of labels is limited, which implies that even repeated purchase
wont make consumers any more informed.
c) Consumersbounded rationality. If we consider the massive amount
of di¤erent labels existing in the di¤erent markets (as mentioned elsewhere in
the paper, close to 30.000), it seems like a strong stretching of reality that
a consumer would remember how to rank several labels (in terms of green
characteristics) for every single market. The problem is two-fold: on the one
hand, it is di¢ cult to rank (and remember) hundreds of labels; on the other,
the multidimensionality of green characteristics makes ranking di¢ cult, if not
subjective (eg. is it better to use recycled paper produced by underpaid under-
aged workers, or fair-trade non-recycled paper?)
The implication of applying Bayesian theory to consumersrepeated choice
is that it is plausible to assume that every consumer is able to understand, learn
and remember all the details involved in previous purchases, but this does not
seem to be very realistic. It seems more likely that a consumer would gather
easily available information at the moment of each purchase and then make
up her mind. Therefore, every time a consumer has to decide what product
to buy, it is as if she was facing that choice for the very rst time. In view of
the specic characteristics of the market, this assumption seems to be more
reasonable than a Bayesian learning process.
d) Credence goods. The purchase and consumption of goods the quality
of which cannot be fully appreciated with consumption will not allow consumers
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to become any wiser with consumption. "Homemade" food, "sustainable" (use
of forestry; tourism...), fair-trade, organic are all good examples of character-
istics which cannot be inferred.
Therefore, every time we consider situations in which the consumers pre-
vious belief will not inuence her future belief and therefore inuence her behav-
iour (or do so only very marginally13), an alternative to a Bayesian Consumer
should be considered.
All the reasons expressed above go a long way to justify why we have
excluded reputation building. In credence goods literature the distinction
between models in which reputation is possible or not is very clear. Our
interest was to look at di¤erent choices and we disregarded this option - an
example of reputation building model is considered in the last chapter of
this dissertation. But how realistic is this assumption? If we consider one-o¤
decisions, then this is very credible. Whatever reputation a company may have
is incorporated in the e¤ectiveness of education and there is no interest in
what we learn from the experience. The same holds for occasional purchases or
markets the consumers is not familiar with (like purchasing something when
abroad, where even the reputation of the seller may be unknown). On top of
that, if we consider the perfect credence quality of the product, then reputation
becomes less credible.
13Even considering imperfect credence good markets, applying Bayes rule to
describe consumers behaviour only slightly improve the precision of the model.
Clearly, we can imagine how a consumer may learn something through the con-
secutive processes of buying, but as noticed before, this process would be extremely
bumpy and slow. If it is true that there are several labels for each market, by the
time that a consumer has faced each possible pairings, several periods have passed
while little extra information has been gathered. It is important not to forget that,
by assumption, the green characteristics are not detectable even after consumption.
All in all, even if at best there could be the possibility that some extra information
may be conveyed through Bayes learning process in particular circumstances, in
terms of economy of the model it would not add much, while it would make things
much more complicated. Most of all, though, it is very di¢ cult to assume that that
is the mechanism guiding consumerschoices.
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On the other hand, "perfect" points to something belonging more to a
textbook than reality and it is not impossible to imagine situations in which
consumers will try to nd ways to best guess what they are purchasing from
previous experiences. This could come not from the good purchased, but from
the purchasing experience as a whole (ie. that particular retailer is known to be
eco-friendly, therefore I assume that its products are likely to be green). This
scenario is not considered by the model presented here, although later on we
suggest how it could be partly incorporated. Future research could incorporate
this in two ways: either by di¤erentiating the e¤ectiveness of education (to
reect the di¤erent reputation of the di¤erent rms) or by making the one-
shot game into a repeated game, in which reputation can be incorporated.
1.3.2 Introducing the model: single producer, single quality.
We now present the model that has been adopted. In the next section we intro-
duce a simplied version of it, where there is only one producer and there only
exists one quality of the good. The general maximisation problem is presented,
in order to ease the reader into the use of the notation. Paragraph (1.3.4) will
then introduce the complete duopoly model with two qualities of products.
A prot maximising rm produces a credence good with a given technology
and a given green label. Consumers are interested only in green products.
To persuade consumers that her products are environmentally friendly, the
rm spends resources in order to make information available and disseminate
education.
Therefore, the rm chooses the amount of e¤ort expended in order to inform
consumers about the existence and the meaning of her label.
There is a positive correlation between the e¤ort and the share of people who
will be convinced that the product is green and that therefore will buy it. Price
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is considered constant. Therefore, the demand function is solely dependent on
the e¤ort level. It is also assumed a decreasing return to education.
Being e the level of e¤ort of the rm, it is possible to characterize the
demand function, , as follows:
 = (e) (1.2)
0    1 (1.3)
@
@e
> 0 (1.4)
@2i
@2e
< 0 (1.5)
(0) = 0
lim (e)
e!1
= 1 (1.6)
that is, that the e¤ect of e¤ort is concave.  represents the normalised
quantity of consumers believing in the label14 and that will therefore buy it.
It can be observed how when the e¤ort is equal to zero, no one believes the
product is actually green and therefore that it takes an innite level of e¤ort
to convince the whole market.
The higher the e¤ort expended by a rm, the higher the number of people
who will be convinced that her products are indeed green. However, the e¤ort
has diminishing returns. Therefore, the most environmentally friendly, the most
gullible and the best informed (or least informed in the case of a spurious label)
14In other words, the share of the total Market, rather than the absolute number.
Being X the total size of the Market, then N is the amount of people believing in
the label, given the level of e¤ort e:
N = (e)X
As we are not interested in the size of the Market, we look at the relative size of
the market, eliminating a parameter from the model, without losing in generality.
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would be the rst to be convinced and they are convinced with a small invest-
ment. The more skeptical might give in, but after a stronger e¤ort from the
producers. This implies a very high level of e¤ort to convince the totality of the
population (Eq. 1.11). Figure 1.1 graphically summarises these assumptions.
1.3.3 Introducing the model: single producer, single quality.
We now present the model that has been adopted. In the next section we intro-
duce a simplied version of it, where there is only one producer and there only
exists one quality of the good. The general maximisation problem is presented,
in order to ease the reader into the use of the notation. Paragraph (1.3.4) will
then introduce the complete duopoly model with two qualities of products.
A prot maximising rm produces a credence good with a given technology
and a given green label. Consumers are interested only in green products.
To persuade consumers that her products are environmentally friendly, the
rm spends resources in order to make information available and disseminate
education.
Therefore, the rm chooses the amount of e¤ort expended in order to inform
consumers about the existence and the meaning of her label.
There is a positive correlation between the e¤ort and the share of people who
will be convinced that the product is green and that therefore will buy it. Price
is considered constant. Therefore, the demand function is solely dependent on
the e¤ort level. It is also assumed a decreasing return to education.
Being e the level of e¤ort of the rm, it is possible to characterize the
demand function, , as follows:
 = (e) (1.7)
0    1 (1.8)
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@
@e
> 0 (1.9)
@2i
@2e
< 0 (1.10)
(0) = 0
lim (e)
e!1
= 1 (1.11)
that is, that the e¤ect of e¤ort is concave.  represents the normalised
quantity of consumers believing in the label15 and that will therefore buy it.
It can be observed how when the e¤ort is equal to zero, no one believes the
product is actually green and therefore that it takes an innite level of e¤ort
to convince the whole market.
The higher the e¤ort expended by a rm, the higher the number of people
who will be convinced that her products are indeed green. However, the e¤ort
has diminishing returns. Therefore, the most environmentally friendly, the most
gullible and the best informed (or least informed in the case of a spurious label)
would be the rst to be convinced and they are convinced with a small invest-
ment. The more skeptical might give in, but after a stronger e¤ort from the
producers. This implies a very high level of e¤ort to convince the totality of the
population (Eq. 1.11). Figure 1.1 graphically summarises these assumptions.
Assuming that production costs are linear, then it is now possible to write
the prot function as follows:
15In other words, the share of the total Market, rather than the absolute number.
Being X the total size of the Market, then N is the amount of people believing in
the label, given the level of e¤ort e:
N = (e)X
As we are not interested in the size of the Market, we look at the relative size of
the market, eliminating a parameter from the model, without losing in generality.
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Figure 1.1: Education e¤ectiveness
 = TR  TC = pq   (cq + e)
(e) = (p  c)(e)N   e (1.12)
(e) = k(e)  e
k = (p  c)N
where p is the price of the good and c the marginal cost of production. k
represents the maximum achievable prot of production, if education were free.
The rm needs only to choose the level e¤ort for which Eq. 1.12 is maximised.
1.3.4 The whole Model
Now that the main mechanisms are su¢ ciently clear, let us consider the full
model.
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Two identical prot maximising rms compete in a market, producing an
homogeneous good. Goods are meant for export. The good can be produced
using two alternative technologies: one environmentally friendly and the other
not. The nal products are however not distinguishable, either before purchase
or after consumption. The market, therefore is characterised by two di¤erent
products, one green and another brown (determined by the two di¤erent tech-
nologies), but this element is not detectable by consumers. Regardless of the
chosen technology, rms will adopt a label. However, a rm deciding to use
the green technology adopts a third party certication, whilst a rm using a
standard technology relies on self-certication label.
Production costs are linear. Green products have a higher marginal cost of
production than the brown ones. Price is unique in the market.
Consumers are willing to purchase the good if and only if they believe it is
green and they do not have any knowledge about the di¤erent labels. For this
reason, rms invest a certain amount of e¤ort to promote their own products
as green.
As we have already discussed, there is a positive relation between the e¤ort
and the share of people who are convinced, although there are decreasing
returns to education. Consumers believing that both goods are green will ran-
domly choose either one16. Consumersbehaviour is therefore stylised, assuming
that the share of consumer believing in a given label is dependent on the level of
e¤ort and on the technology used. Without any micro-foundation, it is possible
to characterise the demand side as follows:
i;m = i(em) (1.13)
16Since the products are homogeneous, apart from the label, and environmental
characteristics cannot be inferred, even after consumption.
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where  is the share of consumers believing that the goods produced by
rm m are green, when the technology adopted by the rm is i and her level
of e¤ort is e: We can further describe  as follows:
@i;m
@em
> 0 (1.14)
@2i;m
@2em
< 0 (1.15)
lim i(em)
e!1
= 1 (1.16)
i = g; b
m = 1; 2
that is, that the e¤ect of e¤ort is concave. The higher the e¤ort put in by a
rm, the higher the number of people who will be convinced that her products
are indeed green. However, the e¤ort has diminishing returns.
Finally, it is assumed that the e¤ectiveness of education depends on the
technology a rm chooses:
g(e) > b(e) (1.17)
8e 2 ]0; +1[
where g stands for the green technology and s for the standard one. Eq.
(1.17) means that given the same level of e¤ort, an exogenously awarded label
would convince more consumers than an in-house one, and that this holds for
any level of e¤ort. The assumption is consistent with reality. It is easier to
convince someone that the product X is green, if the good is indeed green.
This is true at any level of skepticism.
This set of assumptions are exemplied graphically in Figure 1.2, where
it can be seen that both functions tend to one for high levels of e¤orts, but
education is always more e¤ective if an exogenously awarded label is used.
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Figure 1.2: Education e¤ectiveness for di¤erent technologies
The distance between the two curves depends from many factors, which
contributes to the reputation of the two labels. As it has already been men-
tioned, we assume that brown products are more di¢ cult to market. We can
therefore consider that the di¤erence between the two curves incorporate the
reputation of the producer (which will a¤ect the marketability of the product
as well). It follows that a rm with a good reputation would have the two
curves represented in 1.2 very close to each other, as even producing brown
product, she would be able to use her overall reputation. On the other hand, a
new entrant in the market (or a company with a low reputation) would have a
wider gap between the two of them.
In our model, we have assumed that i di¤ers by technology, but it is the same
for the two competitors. This is of course a very convenient simplication, which
makes the model more manageable and allows to draw conclusions even before
getting to functional specication. However, setting the reputations di¤erent for
64
each company would have enriched the model with the possibility of considering
how the reputation of dixoerent companies would axoect the choice. This is an
interesting extension that future research could explore
Since the products are homogeneous, consumers buy products by the rm
believed to be green or, should both be believed to use green technology, ran-
domly choosing one of them . In this case, then, m represents the relative
number of consumers who believe ms goods are green. Regardless of the tech-
nology, the normalised quantity sold by the rm m (qm) can be expressed as:
qm = m(1  n)| {z }
a
+
1
2
mn| {z }
b
m;n = 1; 2 (1.18)
The rst term (a) represents the number of consumers who believe that
only the rm m produces green products, while the second term (b) represents
those who believe that both are using green technology and therefore choose
randomly whose products they will buy. It is possible to re-write Eq. (1.18) as:
qm = m   mn +
1
2
mn = m  
1
2
mn
qm = m(1 
1
2
n) (1.19)
Let us now look at prot functions. These can be expressed as:
ij = (pqij   ciqij)N   eij (1.20)
cg  cb (1.21)
where i is the technology chosen by the one rm and j is the technology
chosen by the other. p is the price of the good which is considered unique and
constant; ci is marginal cost, which is assumed to be linear, as well as the cost of
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e¤ort eij. Eq. 1.21 simply states that producing one unit of green product is no
cheaper than producing one unit of product with no environmental properties.
Plugging Eq. 1.19 into Eq. 1.20 and re-arranging, we obtain:
ij = ki(i  
1
2
ji)  eij (1.22)
where ki = (p  ci)N
and kb  kg (1.23)
ki therefore represents the maximum prot of production, excluding there-
fore the cost of e¤ort: this is the prot obtainable by a rm using the technology
i, selling to every single consumer, without any e¤ort to promote its products.
Eq. 1.23 is, then, true by denition, considering Eq. 1.21. The closer the costs
of production for the two di¤erent technologies, the closer kb to kg: As men-
tioned earlier, we would not be interested in the opposite scenario ( kb < kg),
as it would generate a simple case in which the standard technology is simply
inferior to the green one (more costly and less marketable) and therefore never
chosen.
Each rm will choose the technology and level of e¤ort that maximise their
prot. The following section will analyse the di¤erent scenarios, arising by the
combination of the di¤erent choices of technologies made by the two rms.
It is important to highlight the fact that if both rms choose to go for a
green (brown) technology, it does not mean they will adopt the same label,
but simply that they will both adopt an exogenously (endogenously) awarded
label. When we consider the di¤erent policies that can be adopted, we will also
see whether it is more e¢ cient for society if rms adopt the same label.
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1.3.5 Solving the model: Producers using the same technology.
If both rms were to choose a green (brown) technology, then it possible to re-
write the quantity produced omitting the subscript referring to the technology,
as:
qm = m(1  n) +
1
2
mn = m  
1
2
mn = m(1 
1
2
n)
m;n = 1; 2
and therefore the prot functions would be:
m = kiqm   em
m = kim(1 
1
2
n)  em (1.24)
The two rst order conditions then will have this form:
@ii
@e1
= ki
@
1
@e1
(1  1
2

2
)  1 = 0 (1.25)
@ii
@e2
= ki
@
2
@e2
(1  1
2

1
)  1 = 0
Since the level of e¤ort of a rm depends on the others, we can derive the
reaction functions:
@e1
@e2
=  
@21ii
@e1@e2
@21ii
@2e1
=
1
2
@1
@e1
@2
@e2
@21
@2e1
(1  1
2
2)
(1.26)
@e2
@e1
=  
@22ii
@e1@e2
@22ii
@2e2
=
1
2
@1
@e1
@2
@e2
@22
@2e2
(1  1
2
1)
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The reaction functions are symmetrical, which means that the equilibrium
is found for equal level of e¤ort by the two rms (and therefore same level of
prot). That is,
e1 = e

2 = e
 (1.27)
It can also be noticed that
@en
@em
< 0 (1.28)
as the numerator is always positive, being the two rst-derivatives posi-
tive by Eq. 1.14 , while the denominator is instead always negative, being the
second-derivative negative by Eq. 1.15 and the term in the brackets is always
positive considering Eq. 1.8.
This implies that the rmsproducts are perfect strategic substitutes. In
other words, if rm 1 increases her e¤ort level, then rm 2 will react by reducing
hers.
This could be explained by the fact that if rm 1 increases the e¤ort, this
will a¤ect rm 2 in two di¤erent ways: on the one hand, the unchartered market
has now shrunk (rst right-hand side term of Eq. 1.18), while the shared market
has increased at the expense of rm 2 (second right-hand side term of the same
equation). Figure 1.3 represents the reaction functions17.
Going back to the prot functions, since the e¤ort of the two rms is going
to be identical, then we can derive the condition that characterise the optimal
e¤ort level as follows:
17We have represented linear reaction functions for simplicity of exemplication.
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Figure 1.3: E¤ort level when the same technology is chosen
45°
e2
e1
1'e
2'e
*e
1 = 2 = ki

(1  1
2
)

  e (1.29)
@
@e
= ki

@
@e
(1  1
2
)  1
2

@
@e

  1 = 0
e j 0 = 1
ki
1
1   (1.30)
Eq. 1.30 gives the condition that needs to be satised to determine the
optimal level of e¤ort for each rm and that will also determine the maximum
prot. We can observe that:
@e
@ki
> 0 (1.31)
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This can be easily proved. In fact, if this were not the case, then when ki
increases, e would decrease. But this would imply that 0 increases but also
that  increases too, which for Eq. 1.30 is impossible, as the left hand side of
the equation would increase, whilst the right hand side has decreased.
However, the e¤ect on prot is unsure, as total revenue would increase (as
both marginal revenue and quantity produced are increasing) but also total
cost (as the e¤ort level would increase, for Eq. 1.31).
It is also interesting to compare the results in the two di¤erent scenarios
(only green/brown). Our goal is to see whether:
gg ? bb
As it has been observed, it is not possible to determine if
eg ? eb
without making further assumption on the technology functions. This
strictly implies that in equilibrium, quantities produced can be larger when
both rms choose one or the other technology. But then, it is not possible
to determine univocally this relationship for prot either. To see this, let us
assume that the level of e¤ort in both cases is e, then:
gg ? bb
kg(g  
1
2
gg)  e ? kb(b  
1
2
bb)  e
kg
kb
?
b   12bb
g   12gg
(1.32)
By denition, we know that
kg < kb
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This can also be expressed as:
ki = (p  ci)N
kg
kb
=
(p  cg)
(p  cb) =
MRg
MRb
that is that the left hand side of Eq. 1.32 is the ratio of the marginal
revenue of the two di¤erent technologies. We also know, from Eq. 1.17, that
the numerator of the right hand side is smaller than its denominator. This
ratio (the quantity sold in each scenario) can also be interpreted as the level of
communication ine¢ ciency of the brown producers with respect to the green
ones. Re-writing Eq. 1.32:
MRg
MRb
R Q

b
Qg
(1.33)
Whilst the right hand side depends on the level of e¤ort, the left hand side
is the ratio of two (exogenous) parameters: it is easy to see how, by changing
the technology specication and the cost structure, it is possible to change the
direction of this inequality:
1.3.6 Solving the model: Producers adopting different tech-
nologies.
Let us assume that rm 1 has chosen the green technology, while rm 2 has
chosen the brown one. Then the two quantity functions will be in the form:
q1 = g(1  b) +
1
2
gb = g  
1
2
gb = g(1 
1
2
b)
q2 = b(1 
1
2
g) (1.34)
Deriving the prot functions and rst order condition, we obtain:
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1 = gb = kgq1   e1
2 = bg = kbq2   e2
where the subscripts letters ij under the prot function help to remind,
respectively, of the strategy chosen by the rm in question and the one chosen
by her competitor. The two rst order conditions, then, can be expressed as
follows:
@gb
@e1
= kg

@g
@e1
(1  1
2
b)

  1 = 0 (1.35)
@bg
@e2
= kb

@b
@e2
(1  1
2

g
)

  1 = 0 (1.36)
@e1
@e2
=  
@2gb
@e1@e2
@2gb
@2e1
=
1
2
@g
@e1
@b
@e2
@2g
@2e1| {z }

(1  1
2
b)
(1.37)
Similarly,
@e2
@e1
=  
@2bg
@e1@e2
@22bg
@2e2
=
1
2
@g
@e1
@b
@e2
@2b
@2e2|{z}
1
(1  1
2
g)
(1.38)
The reaction functions in this case are not symmetrical, as the rst part of
the denominators of Eq. 1.37 and Eq. 1.38 ( and 1) is the second derivative
of two di¤erent functions. Therefore, the optimal level of e¤ort for the two
rms is di¤erent. Once again, the reaction functions are downward sloping and
therefore the products are imperfect strategic substitutes. Figure 1.4 shows
how this condition can be represented graphically.
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Figure 1.4: E¤ort level when di¤erent technologies are chosen
45°
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It is worth noting how the linearity of the reaction functions has been
adopted for simplicity of the representation. Most of all, the axes are labeled ei
and ej to show that the adoption of one technology does not necessarily imply
a higher e¤ort (and therefore production) level.
To prove this, let us consider each case separately and see if they are fea-
sible. The general equilibrium levels of e¤ort are expressed by the following
conditions:
egb j 0g =
1
kg
1
1  1
2

b
(1.39)
ebg j 0b =
1
kb
1
1  1
2

g
(1.40)
Let us now consider the two alternative cases.
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i) In equilibrium, the green rm produces more than the brown
one.
In other words, we want to see whether it is possible that in equilibrium:
egb > e

bg (1.41)
Then, if this is the case, it must it follow that:
g > b
1
1  1
2

b
<
1
1  1
2

g
We know that kg is smaller than kb (Eq. 1.23). Then, we can consider a
subgroup of the values that kg can assume which is dened as follow:
kg = kb
1  1
2

g
1  1
2

b
+ 
8 2]0; kb
2

g
  
b
1  1
2

b
]
Then, by Eq. 1.39 and Eq. 1.40:
kg
1  1
2

b
<
kb
1  1
2

g
! 0g < 0b
These conditions are summarised in Figure 1.5. The gure shows that eg >
es; g > s; 
0
s > 
0
g; which proves that it is possible to have an equilibrium
described by Eq. 1.41.
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Figure 1.5: Marginal education level for di¤erent technologies and e¤ort levels
(1)
ii) In equilibrium, a brown rm produces more than the green
one.
We now turn to consider the opposite case, and we try therefore to see if it
possible that:
eg < eb (1.42)
If we assume that is the case, by the way technologies have been dened, it
is still unsure whether:
g R b
But, then, it can be true that the left-hand side is smaller than the right-
hand side. This implies that it is possible that:
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g < b
1
1  1
2

b
>
1
1  1
2

g
1
kg
1
1  1
2

b
>
1
kb
1
1  1
2

g
since we know that
kg < kb
is true by denition. We now have to show that:
0g > 
0
b
By denition, we also know that:
9~e j 8e < ~e! 0g(e) > 0b(e)
As 0i is continuous and decreasing, whenever the equilibrium level satises
the condition e < ~e: Then,
0g(eg) > 
0
b(eg) > 
0
b(eb)
which is shown in the Figure 1.6. The gure shows that eb > eg; b >
g; 
0
g > 
0
b, which is what we wanted to prove.
Conclusion 1 If rms choose di¤erent technologies, it is not possible to deter-
mine which of the two will produce more, unless technology functions are further
specied.
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Figure 1.6: Marginal education level for di¤erent technologies and e¤ort levels
(2)
It is important to note that this example is particularly general, as no
further hypothesis has been made on the shape of i.
Lemma 2 If rms choose di¤erent technologies, it is not possible to determine
who will make the highest prot, unless more assumptions are made.
This is already a very important result, as it implies that with no coordi-
nation possible, it is di¢ cult to determine what the nal outcome would be,
should this be the equilibrium18.
18Suppose that the payo¤ matrix is as follows:
G B
G 2; 2 4; 5
B 5; 4 3; 3
Pareto equilibria are (B;G); (G;B). However, as there is no possibility of commu-
nication between the two players, chances are that the solution to this game would
be (B;B). But again, if the NW and SE payo¤s were inverted, the likely solution
would be (G;G); proving the statement just made.
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1.4 Results
We now present the ndings of this model. The next two paragraphs will draw
broad conclusion derived from the solution of the general model, describing
the producersdominant strategy (1.4.1) and the policy makers alternatives
to maximise social welfare (1.4.2). Paragraph 1.4.3, nally, presents a functional
specication, in order to exemplify in more detail the main results.
In the previous section, we have presented the model and the equilibrium
conditions according to producerschoices. We are now ready to address the
two main questions, namely:
1. What technology is each producer going to adopt?
2. What is the best policy the government can adopt in order to achieve
social optimum level?
To answer the latter question, we need to (a) dene a social welfare function;
and (b) answer the rst question. As we are mainly interested in the supply side
of the market, we have assumed that goods are meant for export; in this way,
we can disregard consumersutility. Social welfare, therefore, can be dened as
follows:
SW = 1 +2   d (1.43)
where i is the prot of the rm i and d represents any eventual damage
caused by the production of brown goods. As we have assumed that consumers
are beyond the scope of this paper, then the damage has to come from produc-
tion practices.
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1.4.1 Producersstrategy
In this section, we will try to establish how a rm chooses the technology
to adopt. A rmsgoal is to maximise their own private prot. As d repre-
sents external costs, rms will not consider it when choosing their technology,
implying that prot maximisation may lead to results which are not social best.
Let us consider rstly the case in which rms choose the same technology and
then the case in which they choose di¤erent technologies.
Same technology.
Going back to Eq. 1.27, we have noticed that it has a straightforward interpre-
tation. When the two rms adopt the same technology, their levels of e¤ort,
and therefore quantity produced, are equal. Therefore the prot function can
be written as:
ii = ki

i(e

ii)

1  1
2
i(e

ii)

  eii
ii = ki

i(e

ii) 
1
2
2i (e

ii)

  eii (1.44)
i = g; b
As i is concave, Eq. 1.44, is maximised for nite and positive values of e

ii.
We have also previously showed that
egg ? ebb
Then, the optimal level of prot in the market when both rms choose
the technology i can either be larger or smaller compared to the prot level
when both rms choose technology j, depending on relative marginal prots
of production (kg   kb) and the relative e¤ectiveness of the e¤ort (). In fact,
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considering Eq. 1.21 and Eq. 1.17 , even considering the same level of e¤ort
the disequality could take either directions. In other words
gg(e^) ? bb(e^)
Different Technologies.
Even more ambiguous is the interpretation of the results when the two rms
choose di¤erent technologies, as the prot functions depend on both optimal
e¤ort levels and di¤erent e¤ectiveness of e¤ort.
In the previous section, we have showed (Eq. 1.33) that, in equilibrium, the
rm putting the highest e¤ort may have adopted either technology. It is now
straightforward to show that, in equilibrium, when the rms adopt di¤erent
tecnologies, either can be the one making the highest prot, that is:
ij ? ji
as, ceteris paribus, green producers have a lower marginal revenue (kg < kb)
but a higher return to education (g > b), and vice versa. If more assumptions
are not made, it is not possible to evaluate which technology will maximise
private prot.
Once the exogenous parameters (shape of i, ki) are set, rmschoices of
technology and e¤ort are univocally determined. For rms, choosing a green or a
spurious technology is relevant only to the extent that it leads to the maximum
prot. The choice of one over the other has no other ethical or strategic concern.
Which means that the change in one of the parameters might imply a switch
of technology. No concerns on potential externalities are present.
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Furthermore, we have pointed out how the products of the two rms are
always strategic substitutes: if a rm decides to increase her e¤ort (and there-
fore production), the competitor will be reacting by decreasing her e¤ort (and
production).
Remark 3 The model presented here explicitly excludes the possibility that a
rm may opt for the green technology for marketing or reputational reasons.
This is because we are focusing on a market in which social welfare depends
on the perceived quality of products, rather than the real quality, as the truth
is never known by consumers. The main objective for the rm is to maximise
prot; green technology is one way to convince consumers more quickly to make
a purchase.
Conclusion 4 In a market for pure credence good, the choice of technology is
not dependent on any consideration but prot maximisation.
This could give a di¤erent meaning to the warm glow of giving, as rms do
the "moral" thing purely for private interest, as there may be the chance this
may never be found out.
Conclusion 5 Firms may maximise prot by adopting any of the three possible
combination of technologies (both green, both brown, one brown and one green).
Conclusion 6 Once exogenous parameters are set, rmschoice of technology
is univocally determined.
Conclusion 7 Technologies are considered strategic substitutes: if a company
increases her e¤ort (production), the other reacts by reducing her own.
Conclusion 8 Due to the characteristics of the market, reputation building is
neither useful nor possible.
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1.4.2 Public policy
We can turn now to the second question. How can a policy maker push the
economy towards the maximum level of social welfare? Social welfare has pre-
viously been dened as:
SW = 1 +2   d
The rst consideration is that as producers have not got an a priori pre-
ferred option, it is impossible for the policy maker to take a policy resolution
applicable to all circumstances. We therefore try to analyse the di¤erent sce-
narios and see what the policy makers best response is.
We start separating two cases, according the value of d19.
Public policy with no externalities
We start looking at the special case, in which
d = 0
Proposition 9 If there are no externalities, then private prot maximisation
is likely to coincide with social optimum equilibrium.
In fact, social welfare is simply the sum of producersprivate prots. Firms
act rationally and therefore they make choices that maximise their own prot.
As consumerssurplus is not included in our denition of social welfare, then it
19The no externalities case is presented here as a benchmark for the other -more
interesting- scenario, as very often credence goods have some sort of externalities
and therefore the assumption of zero externalities may sound unrealistic. However,
one could consider this particular assumption in a di¤erent way: if the external costs
happen at time of consumption, and the products are exported, then the government
would have no incentive to legislate to protect people outisde its sovereignty. In other
words, d=0 if only production is considered, making this scenario not only realistic
but also relevant to policy making.
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is unimportant if some consumers buy brown products believing they are green
instead. In the given setting, the market becomes similar to a neo-classical
market. There may be the possibility that, due to strategic interactions, rms
may end up in non-Pareto e¢ cient equilibria, as we will discuss further on.
Proposition 10 An equilibrium with no third-party labels not only is feasible,
but it could also be a socially optimal equilibrium.
It is feasible that social welfare can be maximised with no green products
in the market and therefore the government shouldnt intervene. This case
is particularly evident as we assumed that there are no production-related
externalities. More generally, it is possible that the external damage is lower
than the di¤erence between the the private prots for (B;B) and the second
best alternative.
Let us consider the payo¤ matrix reported in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1: Payo¤Matrix
G B
G gg;gg gb;bg
B bg;gb bb;bb
To have a market with only brown products as a stable equilibrium, it has
to be true that:
bb > gb
bg > gg
which guarantees that B is a dominant strategy and (b; b) the only Nash
Equilibrium. If, then, it is also true that:
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bb > gg
then (B;B) is Pareto e¢ cient as well. Finally, if
2bb > gb +bg
then (B;B) is also social optimum and therefore the government ought not
intervene.
Beyond the mathematical derivation, it is important to see when this could
be the case in the real world. This could happen if any of the following four
condition applies:
a) communication is very noisy and/or consumers are very confused. If
this is the case, green producers would have to spend a lot of e¤ort trying to
convince consumers of their veridicity. Put in another way, a brown producer
may use the confusion in the market to easily attract consumers to her stores;
b) products are multi-dimensional. Consumers care about the certied char-
acteristic, but there are other features -often even green ones- which are taken
into consideration at the moment of purchase and therefore consumerschoice
may not be univocal. This is not necessarily due to consumerslack of infor-
mation, but it could be due to bounded rationality or to incomplete informa-
tion. Even the most careful of consumers would be hard pressed to choose the
greenest product between organic Australian beef coming from free grazing ani-
mals and non-organic British beef (or any other combination). Some of these
characteristics may as well be self-certied.
c) if all the rms in the market advertise extensively, the risk is cannibali-
sation; therefore, the markets return to advertising becomes negative. In other
words, rms increase e¤ort, but the market does not increase in size; this is a
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cost both for the rms (as e¤ort is costly) and for society. This also implies
that it may be the case that adopting a more expensive (green) technology may
not pay o¤;
d) the cost of the green technology is particularly high; or, put in other
terms, the benet coming from the green technology are small. For example,
many local producers nd that a¢ liation to "Fair Trade" is not worth it, even
when they already tick all the boxes to qualify, as the certication per se is too
costly.
Proposition 11 Banning brown production may not be advisable.
If the policy maker were to prefer green production over brown (on moral
grounds or because of externalities), then it may be still possible that if the
Government were to ban spurious labels, social welfare could deteriorate.
In other words, if (B;B) is Nash (and Pareto) equilibrium, ceteris paribus;
banning the brown technology may not improve on social welfare.
However, it is important to consider of the implication a ban of the brown
technology would have on conusmersbehaviour; in other words, whether this
ban would alter the e¤ect of education (the shape of ). Let us consider the
di¤erent possible cases:
1. Spurious labels are banned and  is unchanged: in this case, the
only solution possible is (G;G); by assumption this solution was inferior to
(B;B) and therefore social welfare decreases;
2.  changes if brown technology is banned. (Spurious labels are
banned and consumers facing only the truthful label are more receptive towards
it). A numerical example should help. Let us consider the prots reported in
Table 1.2.
where (B;B) is Pareto and Nash Equilibrium. However, if the government
were to ban the brown technology, then consumers might be less confused,
reading the ban as a de facto endorsement of the other products and therefore
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Table 1.2: Payo¤Matrix
G B
G 4; 4 2; 5
B 5; 2 6; 6
education becomes more e¤ective and g is going to shift upward. This may be
due to the fact that consumers are aware that there is now a tighter control on
the veridicity of labels. In this way, in equilibrium each rm will make a prot
of -say- 7.
Figure 1.7: Game Tree: Government/Producers interaction
As no other solution is possible, Figure 1.7 represents the decision the gov-
ernment faces. The rm would opt for (B;B) in the no-ban scenario. If the
policy maker enforces the ban, then the only solution is (G;G); the solution of
86
the game is then for the government to "ban" (and for the rm to use green
technology) maximising social welfare. However, this clearly depends on the
e¤ect the ban has on 20.
But an important lesson comes from this:
Remark 12 If the government is able to a¤ect the e¤ectiveness of education,
it is possible to improve social welfare by banning brown technology, even when
the latter was previously Pareto optimal.
3- (B;B) is a Nash equilibrium, but not Pareto e¢ cient.
Remark 13 If (B;B) is Nash Equilibrium but not Pareto E¢ cient, banning
in-house certication will impact positively on social welfare.
Let us suppose that the prots pattern is a prisoners dilemma (Table 1.3).
Table 1.3: A Prisoners dilemma Payo¤Matrix
G B
G 4; 4 2; 7
B 7; 2 3; 3
In other words, if b is dominant strategy but (G;G) is Pareto superior to
(B;B), then government intervention (eg. via minimum standards, or making
third-party labels compulsory) increases social welfare and also private prot.
In the real world, this is one of the reasons a policy maker may tighten
environmental standards, which is the tantamount to banning brown producers.
This may e¤ectively lead to a change in the consumersperception of the newly
created standards, as they are guaranteed by the government.
20It is easy to see how the change could have been lower making (G;G) inferior to
(B;B).
87
Remark 14 The concession of a limited number of licences may be a better
option than a total ban, when a dominated strategy would lead to a Pareto
optimal equilibrium, which is not a Nash equilibrium.
Banning brown production in the previous example leads to a Pareto supe-
rior solution, but it may not lead to social optimum, as it may be the case
that:
2gg < gb +bg
as it is showed in table 1.3 (4  2 = 8 < 9 = 2 + 7):
In this case the equilibrium with the highest social welfare is the scenario in
which each rm chooses a di¤erent technology. As coordination is not possible,
this is a more di¢ cult equilibrium to obtain.
This is a particular case, possibly less easily applicable to the real world.
However, one could imagine how a policy maker could award only one company
with governmental endorsement (be it via license, or awarding the best prac-
tice in the market,...). This company however may have particular limitation
(total size of the market, geographical distribution, multidimensionality of the
products...) which would imply steep decreasing returns to education (or more
in general, fast increasing marginal costs), leaving space for a second cheaper
alternative21.
Similarly to the case just made, it is important to highlight:
Remark 15 Banning green technology could be welfare improving if (G;G)
represents a Nash equilibrium but its not Pareto e¢ cient.
21Considering a similar situation, outside the green market, in the UK, particular
retailers are awarded with "Royal Appointment". This is a sign of distinction and
allegedly higher quality. However, the geographical localisation or the scale of the
business may make it non-economical for them to serve the whole country.
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It is easy to show how in theory that is easily attainable22. As the two
technologies are substitutes both for rms and government and there are no
externalities, the policy maker should not hesitate to ban the green technology,
unless there are other issues at stake. This seems counter-intuitive, but it may
be the case that producers are pushed into a "green trap", where playing envi-
ronmental true blue is the only acceptable strategy. A recent event exemplies
the situation quite closely: after many British supermarkets have created a
brand for their own "bags for life", it has turned out that the costs of these
bags is actually higher than the damage coming from the poor disposal of
normal plastic bags. Firms were under consumerspressure, and therefore they
chose the greener-looking alternative. If the government had intervened, private
prot, as well as social welfare would have improved.
Taking stock, we have outlined the di¤erent circumstances in which the
government ought to intervene to increase social welfare, highlighting how to
best do so, when the market has no negative externalities.
Public policy in presence of externalities
Let us now consider the case
d 6= 0
Generally speaking, due to the negative externalities, governmental inter-
vention is more likely to be welfare enhancing.
Examining the discussion in the previous paragraph, whenever there was a
case for the policy maker to intervene, then a fortiori he should intervene in
this case.
22Looking at table 1.3, one only needs to swap the names on columns/rows.
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If, instead, there are some externalities, then the government will respond to
the producerschoice, if it does not lead to a desirable outcome. It is important
to see what these results imply in terms of policy intervention.
Proposition 16 If (B;B) is the Nash Equilibrium but not Pareto e¢ cient,
then if externality exists, (G;G) > (B;B) and banning in-house labels would
improve social welfare.
This is rather self-explanatory. If instead (B;B) is also Pareto e¢ cient, then
the social optimum could be either scenario, depending on the veridicity of the
following condition:
gg > bb   d
2
(1.45)
If the condition above is not satised, then even in presence of externalities,
it may still be best for society to opt for the brown product, provided the
damages are either very small or inicted outside the borders. If the condition
above is true, then social welfare can be increased by either banning the brown
technology or by a Pigouvian tax. The two in theory would have the same
e¤ect in equilibrium. However, if the former a¤ects consumersbehaviour (see
previous discussion), then the ban would be superior to the tax.
In general,
Proposition 17 If the policy maker is able to make the producers internalise
the externalities, then the market will behave as a perfect competitive market,
reaching social optimum. This may be via the use of either labels.
This could be an indirect way to sort the issue: by charging a Pigouvian
tax, the policy maker forces producers to take the external costs into consider-
ation. This increases the cost of adopting brown technology; again to see which
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alternative leads to social optimum, one has to consider condition 1.45. This is
of course nothing new. However, it is interesting to note that in the real world,
when the externalities are low, the policy maker may decide not to intervene,
due to the risk of miscalculating the e¤ective level of externalities and for the
burden of enforcing the tax or regulation, which may o¤set the gains from the
internalisation of externalities. The other problem in this kind of market is the
main distinguishing characteristic of credence: it would be hard for the govern-
ment to distinguish brown products from the green ones. This would be simple
to x in his model, as it would only require to tax products with in-house
labels. However, in the real world, the scenario is clearly more complicated, as
green products may hold with in-house labels.
One, centralised label
Finally, we consider two (connected) aspects of this market, ie. a centralised
label and the role of industry level certication.
Many people advocate the centralisation of labels, in order to cut the
number of schemes present in a market. In our model, it is implicitly assumed
that if the two producers adopt the same kind of label, they do use di¤erent
labels. To see if a single label works better than two of the same kind, we
compare the amount of people convinced by the two rms with the number of
people convinced by a larger producer using a double level of e¤ort23. This is
expressed by the following condition:
2(e)  2(e) > (2e) (1.46)
If the condition does not hold, then it is better to have a unique label,
meaning that the policy maker could impose a centralised label to whomever
wanted a third-party certication. Re-writing the equation, we obtain:
23In other words, we are looking for potential (dis)economies of scale.
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2(e)  (2e) > 2(e)
On the left-hand side we have a measure of the diseconomies of scale: as
e¤ort has decreasing returns, then a single body educating consumers would be
marginally less e¤ective. On the other hand, on the right-hand side we have the
"wasted" e¤orts of the two rival companies who excercise part of their e¤ort on
the same audience. This overlapping, of course, does not exist if there is only
one label.
It has been noted how markets are ooded with di¤erent green labels and
it has also been noted how consumers are bounded rational. One could assume
that a reduced number of labels would make it easier for consumers to discern
the available information. But this assumption should be tested.
We have therefore presented the condition for which rms would be better
to join e¤orts and create one single label. Another connected issues, is the role
of the industry as an entity. It is a fact that in many markets, rms are aligning
their strategies and creating a industry-wide response to the certication issue.
This enhances credibility of each single rm and it also helps to reduce the costs
of keeping up the label, via economies of scale. The focus of this paper is on
the choice between third party certication and a spurious label and therefore
looking at industry level lies to some extent outside the remit of this model.
However, we briezy consider how much (or little) the current model should be
adapted to include that.
A simple way to do so would be to give each rm the choice between the
existing labels and a third one. The features of this new industry-wide label
would be that its marketability is higher than both the brown and green labels.
In other words,
ind > g > b (1.47)
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where ind stands for industry. On top of that we would assume that the
cost of these products is higher than the one for the brown product (for the
same reasons used to dene green/brown costs), but it would be cheaper than
the existing green products, as the industry-level scheme can exploit economies
of scale. This means that:
cg > cind > cb (1.48)
but considering conditions 1.47, 1.48 and 1.46, then it must be true that the
new scheme is strictly superior to the existing green label (and more marketable
but more expensive than the brown one). This implies that the choice for a rm
would be still between two technologies. For this scenario, the existing model
would hold pretty much unchanged, once the denition of green label has been
adjusted.
However, if condition 1.41 holds, then the model would have to be expanded
signicantly, by adding a third option for the rms, adding assumptions on how
ind would change if one (or both) rms join the scheme, and so on. Future
research could start from the results presented here to look into this.We believe
that, despite the augmented complexity and extra scenario, the quality of the
results should be unchanged. This means that for given values (k; ), rms will
choose di¤erent technologies, whilst for other they will go for the same, for
some values the brown one and for some other the alternative(s).
1.4.3 Functional specification
Let us consider now a function specication to gain more insight into the con-
siderations just made. As much as this is a considerate restriction of generality,
it will be shown that the quality of the results reects the general model for
which di¤erent values of the unknown parameters will make the optimal choice
di¤erent in terms of level of e¤ort and in terms of technology.
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As has been shown previously, the generic function does not allow us to
make any more considerations on the prots in each scenario and therefore on
the level of e¤orts and technology that rms will choose. Let us now consider
a function specication of the generic one. In particular, we dene:
i(xm) = 1  e xm (1.49)
 is a measure of the relative ine¢ ciency of the e¤ort of a standard rm,
with respect to a green one. Explicitly, it is possible to re-write the previous
equation as:
g(xm) = 1  e xm
g = 1
b(xm) = 1  e xm
where b = 
0 <   1
The higher the ine¢ ciency, the harder for a rm using the standard tech-
nology to convince consumers that her products are green. The closer  is to
1, the closer b is to g and therefore the less incentive to choose a green tech-
nology (as the marginal prot of production is lower and it has similar marginal
return to education).
It is also easy to see that this particular function satises the initial hypoth-
esis. In fact
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i0 > 0 :
@ (1  e xm)
@x
= e xm > 0! 8x
i00 < 0 :
@2 (1  e xm)
@2x
=  2e xm < 0! 8x
g(e) > b(e) : 1  e x > 1  e x (1.50)
x > x! 8x (1.51)
9~e j 8e 2 [0; ~e]! 0g(e) > 0s(e)
e xm > e xm (1.52)
! x < log
  1 (1.53)
Re-writing now the prot function,
mn = km

1  e xm

1  1
2
 
1  e nxn  xm
mn = km

1  1
2
e xm
 
1 + e nxn
  xm
It is possible to simplify further the notation by setting:
kb = 1
 ! kg = k 0 < k < 1
g;i = k

1  e xg

1
2
+
1
2
e ixi

  xg
b;i = 1  e xb

1
2
+
1
2
e ixi

  xb
i = g; b
It is not straightforward to nd the values for which a rm would choose one
or the other strategy. We therefore present a graphic solution. In the Appendix
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Figure 1.8: Strategic Equilibria
the mathematical derivation is presented. The di¤erent scenarios are repre-
sented in Figure 1.8.
 is represented on the y-axis and k on the x-axis. The light blue area
represents the values for which both rms choose the green technology; the
purple area represents the values for which both rms choose brown technology
and the green where rms choose di¤erent technologies. Red and Blue areas
show the values for which there are two equilibria (G;G) and (B;B); the di¤erent
colours show when prot is higher if both choose green technology (red) or
brown technology (blue).
Graph 1.9 instead represents the maximisation of social welfare. Social wel-
fare is maximised if both rms choose green technology (purple), brown tech-
nology (blue) or di¤erent technologies (green).
The main information we can derive from the rst graph is that rms will
choose their strategies according to the change of the e¤ectiveness of education
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Figure 1.9: Outcomes maximising Social Welfare
and relative cost of production. Similarly, the second graph shows that the
policy maker will be interested in pursuing di¤erent outcomes to maximise
social welfare. As a direct conclusion of these two considerations, it is obvious
that the government (i) may or may not need to intervene to improve on social
welfare and (ii) if she wishes to do so, best policies may vary.
Combining the two previous graphs, we obtain Graph 1.10, which shows
when Government ought to intervene to maximise social welfare (light blue
area) and when, instead, intervention is not require (dark blue).
It is important to highlight at this point how this numerical example is
purely qualitative, rather than quantitative. In other words, the size of the
areas do not want to guide the policy maker on the frequency with which she
should intervene, but rather simply raise the attention to the fact that (i) the
market alone may lead to optimal outcome and (ii) this outcome may be any
of the three possible ones.
97
Figure 1.10: Should the Government intervene?
Graph 1.11 gives us a more in-depth vision of the previous graph, repre-
senting specically what kind of intervention is required. The green area shows
where social welfare is obtained by leaving the rms choosing freely their strate-
gies. In the blue area, social welfare is maximised when rms choose di¤erent
technologies, but they would rather both produce brown products; in the purple
area social welfare is instead maximum with only brown products, whilst rms
would choose di¤erent technologies. Finally, the red area represents the situ-
ation in which rms would choose to produce only green products, but social
welfare is maximised with the production of only brown products. We have
already discussed in the previous section what policy implications these results
would have.
To conclude this simple exemplication, let us now consider the case in
which there are externalities.
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Figure 1.11: Best Policy Maker intervention with No Externalities
Graph 1.12 and 1.13 shows how policy makers best strategy changes when
the production of a unit of brown products has low (former graph) or high
(latter) externality. It is possible to see how the scenario in which only green
products are produced becomes more likely to be maximising social welfare
(orange area, when rms would opt for di¤erent technologies and blue when
they would both opt for brown technology). The green area still represents
where social welfare is maximised by private behaviour; the shrinking purple
and red areas are still where social welfare is maximised by only producing
brown products, whilst rms would choose di¤erent technologies (purple) or
only green products (red). Finally, the brown area is where social welfare is
maximised by the use of di¤erent technologies, but rms would choose to pro-
duce brown products.
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Figure 1.12: Best Policy Maker intervention with Low Externalities
This numerical example was presented to reinforce the results presented
in the paragraph before. We are now ready to put our ndings together and
conclude.
1.5 Conclusions
Let us summarise the results presented in the previous paragraph. In this paper,
we have departed from the larger part of the literature and have assumed that
even if information is available in the market, consumers may not be aware of
it. We consider a market for a green credence good. Consumers only purchase
goods believed to be green. As a consequence, rms must adopt a label to
provide the missing information to the market, and then they also have to
invest in costly e¤ort in order to convince consumers. Firms choosing to produce
brown products adopt a spurious, self-certied label, whilst green producers
adopt a third-party certication. Firms choose their technology strategically.
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Figure 1.13: Best Policy Maker intervention with High Externalities
Brown products are cheaper to produce but more di¢ cult to market (ie. lower
marginal return to education). There is no possibility to create reputation (if
not through e¤ort) and therefore intrinsic motives are ruled out.
We have noted that products are strategic substitutes: if rms choose the
same technology then the products will be perfect substitutes. Our rst impor-
tant conclusion is that, according to the costs structure and the levels of e¤ort
e¢ ciencies, the strategy that maximizes prot changes. In other words, it is
not possible to say a priori whether the market will o¤er exclusively green
products, or brown products or a mix of the two.
This is very important for the policy maker, as a market with no green
products is not only feasible, but it could represent a stable equilibrium. The
important question is, then, whether the government should intervene or not.
We showed that governments intervention is not always advisable, as a
market with only brown products could be better for society. This could be
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due to mainly two factors: (1) green products are relatively too expensive to
produce; (2) the information market is too noisy.
If the government has a preference for a market that o¤ers green products,
then it can either invest in R&D (in order to reduce green technology costs)
or invest in education (reducing the e¢ cacy of brown rms in convincing con-
sumers). However, in the short run, we showed how banning brown technology
would be detrimental to social welfare.
Of course, the higher the externalities created by brown products, the higher
the governments inclination towards solutions including green production. In
the case in which the market does not reach social optimum, the government
can intervene in order to move the equilibrium to a more desirable solution.
If social optimum is achieved by having the rms adopting di¤erent tech-
nologies, then the government could consider allowing for only one green license
or, alternatively, it could put a quota on the brown products.
The introduction of a Pigouvian tax, as in any other market with exter-
nalities, would solve the issue, as it would completely solve the market failure
and it the market could then be relied upon to allocate resources e¢ ciently.
However, when externalities are low and in particular for goods that are pure
credence, this option becomes less practicable.
If social welfare is maximised by the exclusive production of green goods,
then the policy maker could consider banning spurious labels, or setting min-
imum standards (e¤ectively banning brown products). Three important con-
siderations have to be made here:
1) Banning one type of labels could change consumersperception of the
remaining label. As the ban could be perceived as an implicit endorsement of
the third party, education could become more e¤ective. If this is the case, then
social welfare would increase also for the reduction in the rmstotal costs.
2) It is important to note how governments intervention could make rms
better o¤, even if it may imply internalising externalities. In fact, the policy
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maker can avoid the market to get stuck in a green trapor in a prisoners
dilemma.
3) Forcing all companies to obtain a third-party certication can have a
side-e¤ect: rms may create ad hoc bodies, aimed at certifying as green their
brown products (in other words, creating spurious third party awarded labels).
The previous point is of particular interest, as we have shown that there is
evidence of this practice taking place. One solution to this would be to have a
governmental label.
We have not explicitly looked at this situation, but we can draw some
conclusions about it, using the results we have derived. Firstly, we have to
remember that this would be a potentially good solution exclusively if green
products would increase social welfare. Having a centralised label could bring
advantages, as it would cut o¤ cannibalisation completely. On the other hand,
due to the decreasing return to education the net e¤ect is uncertain. A positive
e¤ect could come from the change in consumers behavior. If that were to
happen, then for the same level of e¤ort, more consumers would purchase the
goods. This e¤ect could be probable. On the one hand, there is evidence that
the high quantity of labels creates confusion in the consumers. On the other, it
has also been proved how government-backed labels acquires more credibility.
The model shows that there is ample space for the government to improve
the market performance but that its intervention is not always required, nor it
should necessarily be to foster environmental production. By increasing con-
sumersawareness (making it more di¢ cult for brown companies to cheat con-
sumers) or by decreasing the production cost di¤erential, the government can
make the market freely move towards an equilibrium with higher green pro-
duction.
Firms should consider carefully their choices. As we have showed, adopting
a spurious label could be more protable than producing green products and
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go for third-party certication. However, in reality this is a particularly risky
strategy for large rms, as if unmasked, the reputational damages could be
substantial. Furthermore, the policy maker is more and more keen to make
legislation and monitoring tighter, meaning that the e¤ectiveness of spurious
labels will depletes in time.
Labels administrators could benet from this analysis too, according to
what their goal is. If they are interested in maximise the sales of green prod-
ucts, then it could be better to set a limit to membership, if the introduction
of a separate label would attract more consumers. Alternatively, they could
lobby for stricter rules on labelling or higher minimum standards: this would
make more likely for any rm entering the market to choose to produce green
products.
Our results also suggest that a green label is geographically diversied from
others, then it is likely to be more e¤ective remaining independent than by
merging with a rival.
This also sets potential guiding lines for governments, as it shows that
having one, unied label (eg. Euro Flower) and ban of brown production may
not necessarily be the best available solution to maximise social welfare. Future
research should look into the e¤ect of market changes on the e¤ectiveness of
labels () to give a more precise answer to these additional questions.
The model presented here could be used as a base for future research. In
particular, as it has been already noticed, it could be useful to allow for di¤erent
marginal e¤ort for each rm. This extension would allow for the model to take
into consideration rmsdi¤erent standing (or label schemes) in the market, as
well as consumersattempt to use past information. In this strand of extension,
we can include the inclusion of a industry-level scheme, as previously described.
Another way to explicitly include reputational updates would be to make
the game a repeated one, rather than a one-shot game. Another possible exten-
sion is to consider the whole market, ie. including the demand for brown prod-
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ucts. In this case, price di¤erentiation should be introduced, be it exogenously
set or endogenised. But adding a di¤erent kind of consumer requires a better
description of consumersbehaviour. That could be obtained, for example, by
allowing rms to also engage in general advertising; or by dening the demand
curve for brown products in terms of price; and so on. Obviously, all the exten-
sions suggested would add layers of complexity which may require stronger
assumptions somewhere else.
One nal set of extension can come from relaxing the perfect credence fea-
ture of the good considered. This on the one hand is partly connected with
reputation building, but it also allows for more and di¤erent government inter-
ventions. In fact, it would possible to endogenise a more pro-active role for the
government, like minimum standards, monitoring/penalties and so on.
Chapter 2
Green Coated Chocolate - An Experiment on Information
Behaviour in a Market for Environmental Credence Goods
2.1 Introduction
We have seen in the previous section that is very common for environmental
features to be credence, especially when the "green" characteristic is connected
with the production process or resources. These features are not apparent in
the quality of the nal goods/service. This means that even the most discerning
buyer will not be able to tell if a product is (for example) organic, neither before
the purchase nor after having tasted it, because the "organic" feature is not
detectable in the product at any stage.
This is of big concern to buyers as well as sellers. On the one hand, there
are consumers willing to buy "green" products, often at a premium price; on
the other, we have sellers willing to provide them, but, since all the products in
the market look homogeneous (as the "green" characteristic is imperceptible),
the market fails, with the likely consequence that the green market will not be
able to form altogether.
For this reason, some rms decide to engage in costly communication in
order to pass the relevant information to interested consumers - labelling. By
lling the communication gap and by providing consumers with all the relevant
information, rms hope to attract more consumers or to charge a premium.
Consumers are now able to discern the goods they prefer and consequently
may be keen to pay more to get what they want.
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Reliability however becomes a problem: a producer can pass on misleading
information, giving the impression that goods have characteristics they do not
actually possess. Obviously, if a rm makes a statement regarding the quality of
their own product, it is free to make unsubstantiated statements. The incentive
to mislead consumers lies in the premium or in any competitive advantage
arising from the green quality.
To increase the reliability of the certied information, independent bodies
are created to award labels and give quality assurance to the process. Therefore,
the need to ll the information gap leads to labelling, whilst the need to increase
communication reliability has lead to the creation of third-party certication.
Theory predicts that self certication is disregarded by consumers and
therefore not used by producers. It is also predicted that complete informa-
tion is su¢ cient to reach an e¢ cient equilibrium.
In this section, we continue to analyse credence markets, but changing
approach and focus. We create a market in which buyers and sellers interact,
in di¤erent informational settings.
Using a laboratory experiment, we test how sellers use di¤erent labels and
how buyers perceive the information available. We have also tested the e¤ect
di¤erent labels have on the overall e¢ ciency of the market with respect to the-
oretic predictions. Our main goal is to examine how laboratory results compare
to theoretical predictions. From these results we are then interested in drawing
policy recommendations.
After section 2.2 has set this paper in the perspective of the relevant
literature, section 2.3 presents the hypothesis on which our model is based
and the experimental design, concluding with economic theory predictions.
Section 2.4 presents our empirical results, discussing their relation with the
theoretical results and section 2.5 discusses policy implications and concludes.
107
2.2 Literature Review
As a large part of the relevant literature has been presented in the previous
section, we focus here on aspects not yet considered. Paragraph 2.2.1 looks
at how e¢ ciency can be improved in the credence markets. Paragraph 2.2.2
focuses on labelling. Firms decide to engage in further (often costly) commu-
nication, in order to signal the quality of their product. For our purposes, we
are interested in distinguishing labels according to who is assessing the quality
of the product: self-declarations and third-party certications. Theoretical lit-
erature has proved how unregulated advertisement has at best no e¤ect on
the equilibrium of a market. Empirical studies are more divided. Furthermore,
theory predicts that an improvement in the level of (reliable) information has a
positive e¤ect on welfare. Paragraph 2.2.3 summarises the main ndings of the
papers in this branch of literature (empirical, experimental and theoretical).
Our interest is the e¤ect of these two kinds of communication on the market
e¢ ciency. Paragraph 2.2.4 summarises the relevant ndings of the paper.
2.2.1 Efficiency
The line between experience and credence goods is often blurred in experi-
mental literature. We therefore present them jointly. Authors have tried to
nd conditions to improve e¢ ciency in these markets. Grossman and Stiglitz
(1976 and 1980) show how equilibrium is reached in markets with asymmetric
and costly information. Information is treated like a normal good, the price of
which, in equilibrium, will be equal to the marginal utility of its consumption.
The authors conclude that because of this transaction cost, the equilibrium
quantity of information will be less than optimally e¢ cient.
Huck at al. (2010) show in their experiments that whenever it is possible for
the seller to build reputation, then e¢ ciency is improved. Reputation is built
by providing good quality in subsequent periods and providing a signal for the
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quality o¤ered in future periods1. Reputation-building is however not possible
in markets for pure credence products. This is due to the fact that (pure)
credence qualities are undetectable. It is necessary for the good to have some
features of experience goods (ie. to have imperfect credence characteristics).
Dulleck et al. (2011) highlight four characteristics that help solve market
failure in credence good markets: liability (the necessity to always provide at
least the quality needed by consumers), veriability (consumers can correctly
assess sellersactions), reputation (buyers can identify a sellers trading part-
ners and remember the quality o¤ered in the past) and competition (free choice
of trading partner among a set). The authors nd that although theory predicts
that veriability is an important factor to improve e¢ ciency, in their experi-
ment, liability and competition are by far the most important factors. Liability
has a strong impact on e¢ ciency: without it, even if trade increases, e¢ ciency
may drop because of under-treatment. Competition is the next most important
driver for an e¢ cient market. However, these characteristics are not su¢ cient
to reach full e¢ ciency.
McNulty and Hu¤man (1996) draw from Stigler (1961) and show that the
market equilibrium price is a¤ected by the actions of decision makers acquiring
optional amounts of information.
2.2.2 Signalling and labelling
Firms may be willing to volunteer information, if they have the opportunity
to get a private benet (premium, delisation of consumers, competitive edge
etc...). Miller and Plott (1985) consider an experimental market in which sellers
can engage in costly signalling. Quality of sellers is exogenous and information
cost is higher for lower quality sellers. Signalling for low quality products is
more expensive, as it is more di¢ cult for low-quality producers to convince
people of something that is not true. In other words, signalling becomes only
1A reputation building model is presented in the last part of this work.
109
partially informative (as low-quality sellers can use it too). It is shown that
a separating equilibrium is achieved only if the di¤erence in marginal cost of
signalling is signicantly high.
Signalling is necessary in markets for environmentally friendly products. In
the last 30 years, green labels have grown very rapidly and there are now tens
of thousands of claims made by producers about the environmental qualities of
their products. Firms producing high quality products want to separate from
the rest of the producers to be able to claim the premium. Larson (2002) empir-
ically shows that if a seller can create a credible label, then the market will split
into two fragments (green and brown products) with di¤erent demand curves
and prices of equilibrium. This is possible as sellers can build a reputation.
On the other hand, low quality producers have an incentive to pool with the
high quality ones, by engaging in further communication to make their goods
look greener than they are.
But if unveriable, any sort of communication may deteriorate into bab-
bling, where communication does not convey any information and it is not
connected to anyones payo¤ (cheap talk) - in environmental economics terms,
greenwash2. Terrachoice (2009) found that 98% of the 2219 labels considered
in the report perpetrates some degree of greenwashing. It is also worth noting
that, in general, it is very di¢ cult to prevent subtly misleading communica-
tions, when the seller is actually not lying about the product.
For example, a company may have started to recycle paper within its o¢ ces,
and therefore claim that its products are "now more environmentally friendly
than ever!!", even if production has not been changed. The claim is therefore
true, but consumers may assume that the degree of eco-friendliness of the prod-
ucts is higher than it actually is. Or the label could simply introduce graphics
2Greenwashing can be then dened as the e¤ort producers put into making con-
sumers believe a product is more environmentally friendly than it actually is. Self-
reporting green characteristics of a product is very common. The term is attributed
to J. Westerveld, who seems to have used the term for the rst time in a series of
articles in 1986.
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that may be associated with eco-friendliness. A large British supermarket chain
recently changed the packaging of one range of its eggs: all the writing is now
in di¤erent shades of green and a stylised tree has been added. The tree is com-
monly associated with paper recycling and more broadly with eco-friendliness.
However, at a closer look, the product has no particular green characteristics.
To avoid greenwashing, scholars (see for example, Kuhn (2005)) have high-
lighted that not all the labels have the same e¤ectiveness. In particular, labels
are divided according to who awards them: (a) in-house, if the statement is
self-declared; and (b) third-party, if an independent organisation is certifying
this particular quality.
Apart from the misleading use of self-declared labels, some green producers
may decide to use in-house advertisements to promote real features of their
products. For instance, many companies have become weary of paying the
large fee to be part of the "fair trade" network and have decided instead to
improve the conditions of their workers and then advertise the change (among
the most notable cases, Nestlé and Lavazza).
In literature, greenwashing has gained interest in the last 30 years. Cason
and Gangadharan (2002) show in their experiment that greenwashing can be
explained as the e¤ect of the looseness in environmental claims regulation.
Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Farrell and Rabin (1996) investigate when
communication becomes cheap talk: if the interests of sellers and buyers are
di¤erent enough, then communication has no e¤ect on the e¢ ciency of the
market.
Mason (2009) characterises certication as a noisy process in which green
sellers are more likely to pass than brown ones, under the assumption that
monitoring cannot be continuous.
Due to the uncertainty about labels reliability, consumers may struggle to
interpret them. Boulding and Kirmani (1993) show that, in an experimental
market for environmentally friendly products, consumers may even look at
111
warranties as a non-credible signal. But, if (i) signalling is costly and (ii) the
information is lost, then not only there is going to be pooled equilibrium (if
not a market for lemons), but e¢ ciency may be even lower than in a market
with no communication, because of the waste of resources in communication.
Paradoxically, the extra provision of information depletes social welfare instead
of increasing it.
In most real world markets, the two kinds of labels coexist.
2.2.3 Welfare implications of introduction of labels
Laboratory experiments testing the e¢ ciency of labels in credence good mar-
kets are not abundant and tend to give a rather mixed outcome. Cason and
Gangadharan (2002) show that in their experiment sellers opt for veriable
certication (even if costly) over cheap talk, delivering more clean products
and enhancing e¢ ciency. Reputation plays an important role in striving for
e¢ ciency. Mahenc (2009) points out how, empirically, the presence of unsub-
stantiated claims in a market creates scepticism in consumers, undermining the
credibility of eco-labelling and therefore decreasing the level of e¢ ciency of the
market. If the eco-label is fully trusted, then the cost of labelling can be seen
as a Ramsey tax.
Dosi and Moretto (2001), instead, question the statement that labelling
necessarily improves market e¢ ciency and they demonstrate when that is not
the case. The authors focus on how labels a¤ect investment choices for a rm
that decides to adopt certication for part of its products. Mason (2009) nds
that eco-labelling is not necessarily increasing market e¢ ciency and that green
sellerspayo¤s are more volatile when certication is introduced, due to the
noise in label awarding. Henriksen (1998) shows that the change in social wel-
fare caused by the introduction of certication depends on the relative change
in demand for green goods with respect to its supply. If demand is larger than
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supply, then certication increases social welfare, otherwise it creates dead-
weight losses. If the demand is not a¤ected by the introduction of labels, then
only green buyers benet from it.
Larson (2002) empirically shows how an increase in the demand for certied
goods would decrease the demand for non-certied goods and therefore their
price. The new price di¤erential would attract some of the green consumers
back to the non labelled products: this process may erode the chance for green
sellers to command a premium for their products. The size of this phenomenon
clearly depends on the price elasticity of demand. Björner et al. (2004) mention
the risk of the shift in the demands of labelled and unlabelled goods, causing
social welfare to drop, even when green products may push brown ones out of
the market.
Bougherara et al. (2003) point out, in their empirical research, another
risk of perverse side e¤ects coming from the introduction of (labelled) green
products: if consumers are interested only in the marginal social cost coming
from the consumption of a product, the shift to greener products may lead
to a higher overall consumption which may, in turn, create an even higher
negative externality than before the introduction of signalling. In other words,
consumers move from brown to green products, reducing the unit externality,
but if overall consumption increases, this may lead to a higher total level of
externality.
Finally, Bougherara and Piguet (2009) study, with a laboratory experiment,
the e¤ect of di¤erent information costs on the e¢ ciency of a market for credence
goods, in which buyers can demand further information for a fee. The paper
nds that if the cost of certication is low enough, then adverse selection can
be avoided, but, after a certain threshold, green products are driven out of
the market. The authors also consider the role of self-declarations, nding that
these labels improve market e¢ ciency, by increasing sellerspayo¤s (compared
with both the scenario of no signalling and one in which only costly certication
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is allowed; e¢ ciency is however lower than in the case of cheap certication).
This is due to the cost di¤erential of the two communications (cheap talk is
assumed to be free)3. Furthermore, when information cost is particularly high,
then the demand for information decreases and the buyers rely more on self-
declared labels. These results are explained by the authors as an e¤ect of the
use of self-declared labels as proxy for the expensive certication or as an e¤ect
of reputation-building.
2.2.4 Summary and motivations for this paper.
In the experiment we present here, the traded good is characterised in a manner
to make it as close as possible to a pure credence, and therefore of the character-
istics highlighted by Dulleck et al (2011), liability, veriability and reputation
are ruled out, whilst competition is possible only via price.
Our model is somewhat similar to Larson (2002), as it presents a "rep-
utable" label, but our is so by denition, while Larsons becomes trustworthy
via reputation. Our aim is to see if reputation in exogenised, markets still sep-
arate. Similar results are obtained by Cason and Gangadharan (2002); in this
last paper not only the market separates but the green sellers, when o¤ered the
opportunity to choose between third-party and self-certication, they always
choose the former. In our model, we provide the choice between two similar
labels, but on the one hand, again, reputation is ruled out. On the other, our
third-party certication is non-noisy. We are interested in comparing our results
with Mahenc (2009) and Mason (2009). The rst shows that spurious labels
create noise which causes e¢ ciency to decrease; the latter highlights how green
buyersand sellerspayo¤s are more volatile and green markets tend to be less
e¢ cient than the ones without certication. Finally, Bougherara and Piguet
3In other words, certication allows for more good matches between high quality
products and consumers, but as certication is costly, the overall e¢ ciency decreases.
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(2009) show how self-certication is used as a proxy for third-party certica-
tion, when this is too expensive. The di¤erence with our model is that we make
self-certication costly. Finally, most of the experiments consider homogenous
consumers, whilst we describe two separate kinds of consumers (green/brown).
This paper adds to the literature in several ways:
* it introduces goods that are pure credence goods. Buyers nd out whether
their purchased goods are green or not at the end of each period (when they
nd out their payo¤s), but they are not able to use the information in the
following period (as sellers are non recognisable);
* we analyse whether and why cheap talk4 is e¤ectively used. Despite the-
oretical predictions, empirical literature has pointed out that (especially when
this is free or relatively inexpensive) this communication is used. We will try to
see whether we can infer what the driving force is in the adoption of cheap talk:
on the one hand, it could be that consumers are only partly rational; on the
other, it could be that green sellers may use this communication as a cheaper
way to signal their quality;
* furthermore, we make cheap talk a costly process for the seller, in order
to see whether there is still an incentive to adopt it;
*a market with perfect (free) information is always going to have higher
social welfare; we build a market in which if information is complete, prot
for green sellers is higher, but social welfare is lower than if no information is
purchased and we look at the e¤ect that non-noisy (costly) labels and cheap talk
(costly but cheaper) labels have on e¢ ciency. The model assumes that a market
with certication is overall less e¢ cient. To make more general considerations
4It is to note, one for all, that the use of the term cheap talk is partly imprecise.
Cheap talk should have no direct impact on private prot or social welfare. This
implies that this kind of communication ought to be free. However, in literature
the term is used even when it is costly. It is used to represent the fact that the
communication does not convey any information.
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about the di¤erent scenarios, we then look at the relative e¢ ciency of each
scenario, in order to remove the inuence of the specications of the model.
The results will then be used to give policy recommendations on how to
create better regulations in credence goods markets.
2.3 Experimental Design
The experiment simulates a market for credence goods. Some of the sellers
produce green goods and some brown. Some of the buyers care for the greenness
of the products, others do not. The treatments di¤er from each other only in the
kind of communication allowed. In the baseline treatment no communication is
allowed. Then, unveried advertisement and certication are introduced, rst
separately and then jointly.
The next paragraph (2.3.1) sets out the main assumptions made in the
model and the hypothesis we want to test.
Paragraph 2.3.2 describes the experiment: 2.3.2 focussing on the common
features of the treatments, whilst each of the other sub-paragraphs (??-2.3.2)
describes one of the four di¤erent treatments. Paragraph 2.3.3 sets the main
feature of the experiment environment. Finally, 2.3.4 presents the expected (ie.
theoretical) results.
2.3.1 Characteristics of the model and hypothesis
In this paper we are interested to see how sellers choose di¤erent labels and
how buyers respond to them. To do this, we consider a market in which there
are two qualities of product (green/brown) and at least one seller willing to
produce each of them. On the other side of the market, a subset of consumers
cares about the green quality. We further assume that the products are pure
credence goods and therefore buyers cannot distinguish green goods from the
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brown and sellers cannot build reputation. For this, veriability and liability
are also unattainable.
To isolate the behaviours we are interested in, we have explicitly made some
assumptions:
1- Technology and preferences (green/brown) are exogenous;
2- There is an equal number of sellers adopting each technology.
These choices were made because our main focus is on the sellersapproach
to di¤erent kinds of labelling; therefore, having a market with both kinds of
sellers will make the sellers act strategically purely considering the di¤erent
types of communication. Furthermore, it was felt that asking the sellers to rst
choose technology and then the type of communication; nally the price would
have made their task too complex, with the risk of blurring the rationality of
the choice.
3- The number of consumers caring for the green characteristic is
the same as those not caring for it.
This assumption mirrors the previous ones.
4- Green is substituted with "high quality" and brown with "stan-
dard quality".
The experiment was set with green markets in mind. But it can clearly
be applied to any kind of credence good. When setting up the experiment we
had to decide whether to use environmentally-related wording or something
more neutral. We decided to go for the latter, for three reasons: (1) literature
is fairly unanimous in recognising that environmental labels are more e¤ective
than generic ones. Therefore, using words like "green" and "brown" would have
likely showed strong results, but adding little to the common knowledge; (2)
linked to the previous point, we are interested to see whether consumers are able
to use all the information provided and see how they react to the two di¤erent
labels. Having a "green e¤ect" would have made it di¢ cult to separate it to the
other variables; (3) the use of words with a strong connotation (that overlaps
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their denotations) is important when we want to mould peoples preferences.
In our experiment preferences are set and therefore buyers simply have to
unerstand their prot functions and the information they receive.
Future research could look into the same experimental setting but using
environmentally-related words to see if indeed it impacts signicantly on
results.
In some of the treatments we allow for additional costly information. In
particular, we allow for two di¤erent kinds of eco-labelling. One will be called
advertisement; the other certication. Advertisement represents self certi-
cation and therefore can be adopted by any seller, regardless of the quality of
the goods. Certication is instead a third-party awarded label and can only be
used by green sellers. There is a trade o¤ between reliability and a¤ordability.
As it has been observed in the real world, certication is more expensive than
self-awarded labels, as standards are imposed externally, costing companies, in
terms of money and e¤ort. On the other hand, having someone else guaran-
teeing the quality of our product is a safer guarantee than having the same
statement made by the seller without any moderation.
5- Certication has no noise.
In other words, only high quality sellers can purchase this kind of label and
consumers know for sure that a product bearing this label is positively green.
We have ruled out the possibility of type I errors (low quality sellers able to
purchase certication). This was done as it would have been more di¢ cult for
consumers to deal with two di¤erently noisy signals: this would have added
uncertainty (rather than explanatory power) to our results.
6- Sellers cannot build a reputation.
A buyer consuming a good with pure credence characteristics never nds
out whether the consumed good has (or not) that particular feature. A large
part of the previous literature on information asymmetry has concentrated on
the importance of reputation building. Its e¤ect is well known both in theo-
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retical and experimental research. Reputation is often su¢ cient to outweigh
asymmetric information, allowing the market to reach a (more) e¢ cient equi-
librium. This in the real world is possible because either goods are not perfectly
credence (but more leaning towards experience) or because consumers look for
proxies. This could be for example the distributorsreputation, a celebrity who
decides to be associated with a particular product and so forth.
We purposedly chose to steer away from this branch of literature5. This
does not want to deny the fact that consumers would still try to create their
own beliefs, but we preferred to consider other aspects. Firstly, we felt that
experimental economics has largely disregarded such markets; another side to
the same coin is that, on the contrary, recreate a market in which sellers can
create reputation would have not added much to the existing knowledge, as
we know that reputation is good for the market. Of course, this market was
created not merely because it was a theoretical novelty, but because it mirrors
existing markets. For a discussion of these markets, see the previous section
1.3.1. Not allowing for reputation has nally another advantage: it allows to
isolate the di¤erent e¤ects of certication and advertisement, which is what
this research is aiming to do.
For this reason, we have chosen not to allow consumers to knowingly pair
with the same sellers: in this way, it is possible to make the market closer to a
credence good market.
However, to create the right incentive (and rational behaviour), in our
experiment buyers do nd out what the utility coming from their consump-
tion is (and therefore they can gure out how many units of high quality good
they have purchased) but by not being able to recognise who sold it, they would
enter the market in the following period none the wiser. It is important to stress
here that even though consumers learn something about the goods purchased
5The last section of this work presents a reputation building model, using a fairly
di¤erent setting.
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(eg. two out of three are HQ), this is information does not give any insight
when it comes to the choice in the following period. Therefore, the goods in
our market cannot be considered experience goods, rather credence goods.
2.3.2 Description of the experimental market
Defining the market
We consider a market composed of six sellers and six buyers in which one good
is traded. They trade for ten consecutive periods a good that is homogeneous
except for one unobservable characteristic6. Goods with this feature are called
H (high) and the others S (Standard). Quality of production is determined
exogenously: three sellers produce H goods and three produce S ones. Produc-
tion costs for H products are higher than for S. Marginal costs increase for both
technologies. Each seller (he) sets the price for his own goods (p 2 N) and he
can sell up to four units, provided that the marginal cost is not higher than
the asking price. Table 2.1 represents the cost functions for the sellers.
Table 2.1: High/Standard Quality sellerscosts
1st 2nd 3rd 4th
HQ 7 8 9 10
SQ 5 6 7 8
Each row shows the cost of producing the n-th unit of product of the named
quality (HQ/SQ).
6Number of people: we needed 4 groups with the same amount of people. 8 people
would have not allowed for enough dynamics, whilst 16 would have meant that each
session would have lasted too long and the risk was to alienate the participants. For
this reasons, we set the number of participants to 12.
Number of trading periods: 10 is fairly standards. We discussed whether to alter
it. The trade o¤was between giving more time to the participants to understand the
game and the risk of wearing the participants out and/or the necessity to pay them
more.
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If, for example, an H Seller sets a price of 9, he can sell up to 3 units of the
traded good. If, on the other hand, an S seller chooses a price of 9, he can sell
up to 4 units. Using this information, we can represent the supply curve for
the 2 kinds of suppliers, as Figure 2.1 shows.
Figure 2.1: Supply curves for the two kinds of suppliers
0
5
10
15
0 5 10 15
SSP SHP
Payo¤s are as follows:
j =
10X
i=1
(pijqij   Cij) (2.1)
 =
6X
j=1
j (2.2)
where pij is the price asked by seller j in period i, qij is the number of units
sold, and Cij is the total cost of producing the sold units (in that period)7.
Let us now consider the demand side. Three of the six buyers have higher
utility if they consume H products (H buyers), the other three have no extra
utility (S buyers). Buyerstype is determined exogenously. Marginal utility is
7This implies that if a seller sells less than the maximum she was willing to
produce, she will only face the cost of the sold units.
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decreasing for both kinds of buyers. Each buyer can buy up to three units of
good, from one or more sellers. This means that each buyer may buy products
of a di¤erent quality and at a di¤erent price. Table 2.2 and 2.3 shows the utility
function for each kind of buyer.
Table 2.2: Utility of H-type buyers
1st 2nd 3rd
HQ product 14  p 13  p 12  p
SQ product 12  p 11  p 10  p
Table 2.3: Utility of S-type buyers
1st 2nd 3rd
HQ=SQ product 12  p 11  p 10  p
The demand curves are represented in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Demand curves for the two kinds of buyers
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It is important to note that the blue line represents the demand for HQ
products by HQ buyers, whilst the red one represents SQ buyersdemand (but
also the demand for SQ products by HQ buyers).
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Buyersutility is computed as follows:
uj =
10X
i=1
(aji   pji) (2.3)
U =
6X
j=1
uj (2.4)
where aji is consumer js utility in the ith period, and pji is the money shes
spent in that period.
Baseline treatment: no information
Each seller decides what price he wants to charge. In this treatment no
communication is allowed. Products are presented to the buyers (she); for each
price she will know how many units are available for purchase, but she wont
have any information about the quality or the identity of the seller. Buyers
are randomly ordered and one at a time they decide how much to buy. Once a
buyer has nished her purchase, the following buyer is presented with whatever
is left in the market. At the end of each trading period payo¤s are computed.
H-Quality buyers will now be able to deduce how many units of high quality
products they have purchased, but as sellers are unnamed, they wont be able
to use this information in the following period. Each session is composed of 10
trading periods.
Ad treatment (cheap talk)
Sellers decide what price to charge for their products; after that, each seller
(regardless of the quality produced) has the opportunity to advertise his
product as high quality. Advertisement is costly (2 ECU ) and it tells buyers
the product may be H goods. Buyers are presented with the list of goods
ordered by price and the relative quantity of product o¤ered. Furthermore, it
will be highlighted which product is advertised as H. The purchasing process
develops as described above.
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(Third-party) certification treatment
Sellers decide their price. In this stage, H sellers (but not S-sellers) can adopt
a costly8 (4 ECU) certication to signal the high quality of the products.
When buyers are presented with the list of sellers, their prices and the quantity
o¤ered, they will also see the sellers who decided to go for certication: they
will then know that certied goods are surely H. Purchasing process develops
as described above.
Advertising and certification treatment
Sellers choose their price. S-Sellers can decide whether to engage in adver-
tising (or not). H-Sellers are o¤ered the possibility to certify, advertise or do
nothing. The features of the two communications are as in the previous treat-
ments. Buyers are presented with the price list of products, which highlights
which units are advertised and which have been certied. Certied products
are surely high quality, whilst the advertised can be either. The purchasing
process develops as described above
2.3.3 Implementation
All the participants were undergraduate students from Royal Holloway Univer-
sity of London from various disciplines. The participants had no previous knowl-
edge of game theory and had no experience in market experiments. Overall we
conducted twelve sessions with twelve participants each. The sessions took place
in March 20099 at the experimental economics laboratory at Royal Holloway.
8We wanted to keep the information easy to play with. Therefore the di¤erence
between green and brown is two units. Regarding the cost of the labels, we wanted
certication to be proportionately much larger than advertisement. We felt that
charging 1 unit for Ad was too little and people would have considered the cost
more as a token than really something a¤ecting their utility. Hence we went for 2.
Consequently, Certication was charged twice as much, at 4. This cost is low enough
to make it worth while for the green sellers to buy it and still make a prot.
9In February 2009, we had two dry runs, to test the programme, length and
accessibility of the instructions and the task. The two sessions highlighted few minor
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The program was written and run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Instruc-
tions used neutral wording, which did not make reference to the environmental
aspects that the experiment was trying to tackle, in order to avoid behavioural
bias. In this way, subjectschoices were not a¤ected by (anti) environmentalist
ideas.
The instructions (presented in the Appendix) were handed out in hard
copy and then read aloud. There are four di¤erent sets of instructions, each
describing a di¤erent treatment. The wording was the same for describing the
aspects of the experiment that were common to the di¤erent treatments. At
the end of the reading out, a short questionnaire was presented to check the
understanding of the participants. Twelve repetitions have been carried out
(three for each of the four treatments), each composed of ten trading periods.
Sessions lasted on average 60 minutes (between 50 and 75 minutes). Trade in
the experiment was made using ECU (Experimental Currency Unit) which was
then converted into GBP using the following conversion rate:
Buyers 1 ECU= $0:1
Sellers 1 ECU= $0:1
A show-up fee of $4 was paid to all the participants. Monetary payo¤s
ranged between $5  2010 (average $13).
2.3.4 Theoretical predictions
In this paragraph we present what the theory predicts should happen in the
di¤erent scenarios and the implication in terms of policy making. In the fol-
lowing chapter we will then present the experiment outcomes and compare and
points to straighten, as not completely clear. Overall, there was a strong agreement
that the instructions were clear and straightforward. From the debrieng we picked
up that people realised that green sellers had the toughest job, but that it was
manageable if one were to put the e¤ort to do some thinking and that, ultimately.
time was the best teacher.
10The payo¤s were set to be higher, but close, to what a student can earn in an
occasional job on campus.
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contrast them with the theoretical results. This will then lead to (i) explain the
di¤erences in the results; (ii) present recommendations for the policy maker.
Baseline treatment
In this treatment, as noted above, sellers have no way to communicate with
the buyers. This implies that they will compete within the same market. In
the same way, buyers will compete for the cheapest products, as green buyers
are not able to discern any signal about the quality of products. The aggregate
demand and supply curves are represented in Figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Baseline Treatment Equilibrium
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The market can clear at p = f8; 9g, with all buyers purchasing three units
(the maximum allowed), adding up to q = 18. If all the sellers set a price
p = 8, then brown sellers will sell 4 units each, making a prot of
b;p=8= (8  4)  (5 + 6 + 7 + 8) = 6 (2.5)
The green sellers will only be able to provide 2 units and their prot is:
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g;p=8= (8  2)  (7 + 8) = 1 (2.6)
However, sellers realise that at this price no seller can actually produce
more, and therefore if she increases her price to p = 9, nobody will be able
to undercut her. When all the sellers follow suit, potential supply has now
increased to q = 24 and therefore each seller will sell 3 units11; note that even
brown sellers will be better o¤:
b;p=9= (9  3)  (5 + 6 + 7) = 9 (2.7)
g;p=9= (9  3)  (7 + 8 + 9) = 3 (2.8)
As both green and brown sellers are better o¤ at this higher price, there is
no incentive to defect and undercut the competitors. Therefore the equilibrium
price will be p = 9.
Brown consumersutility is computed as follows:
Ub = (12 + 11 + 10)  (9  3) = 6 (2.9)
Buyers will have a probability of 0:5 to randomly buy a green product12.
Then, green buyersexpected utility is:
E(Ug) = (12 + 11 + 10) + (2  3)  0:5  (9  3) = 9 (2.10)
Social welfare is therefore simply the sum of the utilities of the players:
11We assume that on average all sellers will sell the same amount, as the products
are homogeneous and the price is the same.
12This is shown in the demand curve in Figure 2.3 with some consumers willing
to purchase goods at p = 13.
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SW = (9 + 3 + 6 + 9)  3 = 81 (2.11)
To conclude, let us benchmark this result with the social welfare in a market
for a search good (or to put it in other terms, a market in which certication
is free); the market would not su¤er from deadweight losses, due to lack of
information: green buyers would buy exclusively green products and social
welfare would be 9013.
Ad treatment
To analyse this scenario, we start making this consideration: if no seller pur-
chases advertisement, then the equilibrium, utilities and prots are the ones
described in the previous section.
However, sellers may consider purchasing advertisement, in the hope of
attracting more buyers. This may happen either (i) due to a change in willing-
ness to pay (and therefore giving the seller the possibility to charge a higher
price) or (ii) if green buyers attach an increased probability of a product being
green if it bears advertisement (in other words, between two goods with the
same price, if the green buyer is more likely to buy the one with advertisement
than one that does not).
(i) Green buyers change behaviour if they think that their probability of
choosing a green good increases. Therefore, they compute the probability:
P (seller = green j Ad) = 0:5 (2.12)
13SW = (b +g + Ug + Ub)  3:
All the terms are like the ones computed above, except:
Ug = (12 + 11 + 10) + (2  3)  (9  3) = 12
SW = (9 + 3 + 12 + 6)  3 = 90:
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and therefore, since no information is derived by the advertisement, buyers
will not change their behaviour and carry on choosing randomly among sellers
who are charging the same price.
(ii) If buyers were not to change their willingness to pay, but decide to give
preference to advertised products, this would allow a seller to sell 4 units at
the equilibrium price of 9. But this will lead to a prot for a brown seller of:
Ad = 9  4  (5 + 6 + 7 + 8)  2 = 8 (2.13)
which is lower than the expected prot of a seller who does not advertise
(as we have showed in Eq. 2.10).
Sellers are rational and know that buyers will not be fooled by the advertise-
ment: ultimately, each seller will sell the same amount of products but sellers
who purchased advertisement have a lower prot.
Therefore, no seller will buy advertisement and the equilibrium is, as pre-
viously mentioned, identical to the baseline treatment.
This is no surprise: by the way advertisement has been characterised, it is
tantamount to cheap talk. The reason for calling this di¤erently is threefold:
the term may have a¤ected the behaviour of the players (the connotation of
"advertisement" is surely more neutral than that of "cheap talk"); also, one of
the reasons why we have run this experiment is to e¤ectively test whether, in a
market of this kind, communication is indeed recognised and treated as cheap
talk. Finally, (as mentioned before) this advertisement is not strictly cheap
talk, as it is costly for the seller.
Certification treatment
As it has been previously noted, if the good were ordinary (or if certica-
tion were free), then we would have the creation of two separate markets and
optimum levels of social welfare.
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In this case, information is asymmetric and costly, which means that if the
three green sellers buy certication, then total social welfare would be lower
than in the perfect information scenario.
Furthermore, when information is bought, social welfare is even lower than
in the baseline scenario. In fact, maximum social welfare in the case of free
information is SW = 90. But information costs C = 4  3 = 12 making total
welfare only SW = 90  12 = 78; whilst in the baseline scenario it was 81:
So the question is whether green sellers would invest in certication. The
answer is positive, provided they are better o¤.
Let us then suppose that all the green sellers purchase certication; if this
were the case, the two markets reach separate equilibria (Figure 2.4 and 2.5).
Figure 2.4: Certication treatment: green market, all green sellers buying cer-
tication
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The supply curve in Figure 2.4 has this shape because of the cost of cer-
tication. For any price p < 10, the seller would make a negative prot and
therefore is better o¤ not entering the market, as Table 2.4 shows.
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Figure 2.5: Certication treatment: brown market
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Table 2.4: Prots for di¤erent prices for a green seller buying certication
p Quantity Revenue Cost Profit
7 1 7  1 = 7 7 + 4 = 11  4
8 2 8  2 = 16 (7 + 8) + 4 = 19  3
9 3 9  3 = 27 (7 + 8 + 9) + 4 = 28  1
10 4 10  4 = 40 (7 + 8 + 9 + 10) + 4 = 38 +2
To see what the best strategy for green sellers is, let us see what their prot
would be in the separate equilibria and then benchmark the other solutions
against it. If the markets are separate, the green market clears at:
pg 2 [10; 12]
q = 9
If the sellers set the price p = 12, then prot is going to be:
g;p=12 = (12  3)  (7 + 8 + 9)  4 = 8 (2.14)
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which is higher than the prot they would make in the pooled equilibrium,
where no information is bought.
To see if this is the equilibrium price, we try to consider the alternatives. If
one of the green sellers were to try to undercut the other sellers, then his prot
would be:
g;p=11 = (11  4)  (7 + 8 + 9 + 10)  4 = 6 (2.15)
implying that there is no incentive to drop the price.
Green buyersutility for a price of 12 is:
Ug = (14 + 13 + 12)  12  3 = 3 (2.16)
Clearing price in the brown market:
pb 2 [7; 10]
If brown sellers charge a price of 10, then their individual prot is:
b;p=10 = (10  3)  (5 + 6 + 7) = 12 (2.17)
If one of the sellers were to try to undercut the others, then the prot of
this seller would be:
b;p=9 = (9  4)  (5 + 6 + 7 + 8) = 10 (2.18)
Even in the brown market there is no incentive to undercut and therefore
the equilibrium prices are:
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pg = 12
pb = 10
Each brown buyersutility is:
Ub = (12 + 11 + 10)  10  3 = 3 (2.19)
like the green buyers.
However, green buyers can always decide to buy goods in the brown market.
If they do so, then demand for the green goods would drop, making prots drop
and potentially the price too (attracting buyers back). However, their total
utility would be unchanged, as even though the price in the brown market is
two units lower than in the green market, their utility to consume a brown
product is also two units lower. Therefore, for a green buyer it would not make
any di¤erence to be purchasing in one market or the other. The question is,
then, whether this is a credible threat for the green sellers to drop their price.
As there is no chance of coordination, if all the green buyers were to leave the
green market, then the brown market would look like Figure 2.6.
Brown sellers charge p = 11, and prots and utilities in the market would
be:
b;p=11 = (11  4)  (5 + 6 + 7 + 8) = 18 (2.20)
U = (12 + 11)  11  2 = 1 (2.21)
In this case, there is an excess of demand in the brown market and an excess
of supply in the green market. Green buyers could buy a unit of green product
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Figure 2.6: Certication Treatment: Brown Sellers and all the Buyers
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at price 12, but although social welfare would increase, their net marginal
utility would be zero (as MUq=3 = 12). Therefore, it is not convenient for the
green buyers to migrate to the brown market and green sellers do not believe
in this threat and keep pg = 12:
To see, however, if this is a stable equilibrium, it is important to consider
what happens to prot if one (or more) green seller were to decide not to
purchase certication and therefore compete with the brown sellers. Table 2.5
summarises the di¤erent pay-o¤s of a seller who has to decide whether to certify
or not. The rst payo¤ is referred to this seller, whilst the second to any other
green seller. The rows show the two di¤erent options the green seller has, while
the columns show the three di¤erent scenarios he could face (ie. no other green
sellers buy certication, one buys it or both the other sellers buy certication).
When nobody chooses certication, her prot is 3, as this is identical to the
baseline scenario.
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Table 2.5: Dominant strategy for the seller
No Cert 1 Cert 2 Cert
Cert 14; 6 10; 5 8; 8
No Cert 3; 3 6; 14 5; 10
The underlined prots show how "Certication" is strictly dominant, regad-
less of the opponents strategy, meaning that all the green sellers choose to
certify. Social welfare is then:
SW =
X
(g +b + Ui)
= 3  (8 + 12 + 3  2) = 78 (2.22)
It is worth mentioning that the process that leads to prot maximisation
has been shown to be fairly complicated. Thinking of an experimental set-
ting and the inevitable learning curve, one could expect that it would require
considerable time for sellers to realise their best strategy via trial and error.
Advertisement and certification treatment
As we have mentioned earlier, the players are all rational. Therefore, they
realise that advertisement does not convey any information and therefore it is
not used at all. This implies that the equilibrium in this treatment is identical
to the Certication treatment analysed in the previous paragraph.
Theoretical policy conclusions
Taking stock of the theoretical predictions presented so far, a policy maker
would have important hindsight in how to shape regulation.
1. Cheap Talk
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1.1 As the market disregards this kind of communication, it is not essential
to do anything about it, as it will not be adopted anyway. Therefore, banning
cheap talk would not only be redundant, but it would also have implementation
and compliance costs, along with non economic reputational cost (red tape).
1.2 However, if the policy maker were to gag only brown producers, then
green producers could adopt cheap talk, separate themselves from the brown
producers and increase social welfare; as advertisement is cheaper, social welfare
would increase by 6 units. The problem with this is that the government would
have to have clear information on the sellerstechnology. As the market failure
is caused by the lack of this information in the rst place, it would be di¢ cult
to actually achieve this, without a costly monitoring.
2. Certication
2.1 By reducing the cost of information, welfare increases. In other words,
the governement could try to invest in R&D or any other form of centralised
help to drive down the cost of certication. As the information cost represents
a net loss in social welfare, this would increase the e¢ ciency of the market.
2.2 Having a unique large producer (with constant return to scale as the
three separate sellers) would increase social welfare, as information cost would
be reduced. If all the green sellers bought certication, the information cost on
society would be threefold; if there were only one large green seller, she would
have to pay for certication only once and provide all the green goods. Social
welfare would hence increase by 8 units (the cost of the two foregone certica-
tions). The problem with this alternative is potential monopolistic behaviour.
However, two considerations ought to be made: on the one hand, in this
particular case, if the monopolist were to increase her asking price (ie. p = 13)
then the demand for her product would drop (q = 6) and the prot would drop
as well, as Table 2.6 shows.
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Table 2.6: Prot for a green monolopolist
revenue cost prot
p = 12 12  9 = 108 (5 + 6 + 7)  3 + 4 = 58 50
p = 13 13  6 = 78 (5 + 6)  3 + 4 = 37 41
Furthermore, even considering a di¤erent prot structure in which the green
sellers were better o¤ by increasing the asking price, the monopolists price
strategy is further constrained by the potential competition coming from the
sellers in the brown market. In fact, if the price di¤erential in the two markets
is higher than 2, then green buyers are better o¤ purchasing brown products.
Taking stock, allowing for a single green monopolist would improve the market
e¢ ciency. Di¤erent demand curve could create incentives for the seller to mark
up the price for his products with respect to the competitive green market.
The monopolistic behaviour is limited by the price di¤erential with the brown
market. If some green buyers move to the brown market, then two things may
happen: the brown market could absorb the excessive demand from the other
market, resulting in an equilibrium at q = 18 and redistribution of surplus in
favour of the sellers (and in particular the green monopolist); if the excess of
demand from the green market is larger than the 3 units (which is the excess of
supply in each market), then competition among buyers would push the price
in the brown market up.
2.3 If cost of certication cannot be reduced and it is not possible/viable
to create a green monopoly, then banning certication would actually increase
social welfare.
This is a rather interesting result. If information was costless, then certi-
cation would improve social welfare. However, as the cost of information is
higher than the sum of the surplus coming from green buyers consuming green
137
products, then forbidding the use of certication would increase social welfare
(and, as it has been noticed earlier, green buyers still have a 50/50 chance
of randomly buying green products). This result is clearly dependant on the
choice of the model we have made.
2.4 The quantity of green products exchanged in the market does not change
in the di¤erent treatments; this is (at least partly) due to the fact that tech-
nologies are exogenous. Green producers often make lower prots than the
brown ones, implying that in the long run (if they had the possibility) some
would swap for the brown technology and therefore reduce the amount of green
products exchanged. If the policy maker has some intrinsic reasons to prefer
green products (say that there is an externality that has not been considered
in our model), then this would be an unwelcome outcome, which should be
dealt with.
3. Externalities
3.1 Externalities have been explicitly excluded14 from this model. However,
green (brown) markets are often characterised by external benets (or costs).
Therefore, the quantity consumed of the green (brown) products would actually
positively (negatively) a¤ect social welfare. In our model, in equilibrium, 9
brown and 9 green products are exchanged. However, if there were to be any
positive externality connected with the consumption of the green products, then
social welfare would increase if the government encouraged brown buyers to
swap to consuming green products, as green sellers are able to supply 3 further
units. To do so, the government should subsidise each buyer of at least 2 units
in order to make the brown buyer indi¤erent to brown and green products.
In this way, green production would increase to 12 units, whilst the only 6
goods would be exchanged in the brown market. In the real world, in the long
run, brown producers may nd it convenient to change technology and social
welfare could increase, provided the externality were big enough to o¤set the
14This is because we wanted to focus on the sellersand buyerschoices.
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potential drop in total consumption (as brown buyers may be partly driven o¤
the market) as well as welfare losses from raising money for the subsidy through
taxes. This also holds for the feasibility of the subsidies: if the externality is
lower than 2 units, then the subsidies would lower social welfare.
2.4 Results
Let us now turn to the analysis of our results. Given that our main goal is to
assess whether the introduction of a certicate enhances the outcome e¢ ciency,
we begin by comparing the theoretical prediction to the observed market out-
come under each of the treatments implemented. Then, we present the results
of non-parametric tests, followed by the regression analysis.
2.4.1 Efficiency
In paragraph 2.3.4, we have presented the predicted equilibria for each treat-
ment. This set of equilibria represents what should happen if the participants
in the experiment were perfectly rational and if there were no other variable
a¤ecting their behaviour.
Table 2.7 compares the empirical results with the theoretical predictions
across treatments. It is common, in experimental markets, that individuals
learn the optimal strategy as they get trading experience, which implies that at
the end of the session one observes closer-to-equilibrium behaviour. Therefore,
we also look at the empirical mean of the last ve periods and the one of the last
trading period. The table presents the average social welfare and the e¢ ciency
achieved as a percentage of the theoretical prediction.
As mentioned in the previous section, the maximum social welfare attainable
in Baseline and Ad treatments is higher than in the other treatments. For
this reason we look at the relative e¢ ciency in each treatment15. This has two
15% E¢ ciency = Empirical SWExpected SW  100
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Table 2.7: Social Welfare in the di¤erent treatments Treatment: Expexted vs.
Empirical
Baseline Ad Cert Ad+Cert
SW %E¤ SW %E¤ SW %E¤ SW %E¤
Expected 81 81 78 78
Empirical Mean 67.6 83.5 58.7 72.5 63.1 80.9 59.7 76.6
Last 5 periods 69.5 85.8 61.1 75.4 64.3 82.5 62.9 80.6
Last Period 69.7 86.0 59.3 73.2 56.0 71.8 62.3 79.9
practical advantages: it removes any bias given by the structure of the chosen
model; and it allows extrapolating more easily the e¤ect of unaccounted
factors (eg. externalities). The results show that under none of the treatments
implemented do the markets achieve full e¢ ciency. Nonetheless, the deviation
from full e¢ ciency is never too large. Across all treatments, the average in the
last 5 periods is higher than the average among the 10 periods. The Ad
treatment, and the last period of the Certication treatment, are the
exceptions, since in those cases e¢ ciency is below 75% of the value predicted
by microeconomic theory. In the three treatments with communication, the
last periods social welfare is lower than the average of the last ve periods16.
Behaviour is closest to the theoretical prediction in the Baseline treatment.
A Kruskal-Wallis test for the session average social welfare suggests that
social welfare does not di¤er across treatments (MW= 5.359; p-value = 0.15; N
= 12). To assess the e¤ect of cheap-talk information on social welfare, ideally,
we should compare social welfare in Baseline and Advertisement treatments,
and Certication and Ad+Cert treatments. However, due to the limited amount
16And in the Certication treatment, it is even lower than the 10 periods average.
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of independent observations17, these tests would have low statistical power18.
For this reason, we pooled the data of the treatments with cheap-talk adver-
tisement and compared them with the pooled data of the other treatments.
The result of the Mann-Whitney test for the session average social welfare
suggests that Advertisement a¤ects negatively social welfare compared to the
treatments where this was not allowed. (MW = 2.08; p-value = 0.04; N =
12)19. This result is in line with Mahenc (2009)s results. The same process20
has been applied to see whether certication has any impact on social welfare.
The Mann-Whitney test for the session average social welfare suggests that
social welfare does not di¤er across treatments (MW = 0.32; p-value = 0.8; N
= 12).
It is also interesting to look at each side of the market separately. Tables
2.8-2.10 present the predicted sellersprot, the achieved payo¤ (PO) and the
17As each participant interacts with all the other subjects throughout each session.
Therefore each session constitutes a single independent observation.
18The issue of the low number of observation is common to the majority of the
results. Due to the limited resources available for this experiment, it was not pos-
sible to run more sessions. This may have an impact on the results presented. For
this reason, we would like to highlight two things: (1) all the conclusions presented
are very conservative. Therefore, it is never claimed anything that is not fully sub-
stantiated by data; (2) appreciating that the lack of data may hide some interesting
results, we will often show the data graphically to show what may be going on.
We are currently working on a project to replicate the same experiment (at least
partly keeping it identical); the results of that experiment will strengthen the results
presented.
In passing, we have tried to calculate the averages presented in the tables above,
removing the data of the people who did not understand the game (see the last
paragraph of this section) and the results for the sessions with Cert are closer to the
expected values, making the di¤erence in e¢ ciency more marked. Again, this result
has limited statistically signicance and therefore it is not presented formally., but
it gives a powerful insight.
To conclude, although more observations could strengthen the results presented,
we believe that they are not only robust but interesting as they stand.
19Given that we are interested in an improvement on social welfare, we report
one-tailed Mann-Whitney results.
20Comparing the pooled data of the two treatments in which certication was
allowed with the remaining two treatments.
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Table 2.8: SellersProt in the di¤erent treatments Treatment: Expexted vs.
Empirical
Baseline Ad Cert Ad+Cert
PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤
Expected 36 36 60 60
Empirical Mean 40.5 113 42.5 118 34.9 58 37.8 63
Last 5 periods 38.8 108 42.3 118 36.6 61 37.5 63
Last Period 36.0 100 37 103 37.7 63 36 60
Table 2.9: Green SellersProt in the di¤erent treatments Treatment: Expexted
vs. Empirical
Baseline Ad Cert Ad+Cert
PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤
Expected 9 9 24 24
Empirical Mean 12.8 142.2 12.7 141.1 12.0 50.0 10.8 44.6
Last 5 periods 12.1 134.4 13.7 152.2 10.9 45.4 11.7 48.8
Last Period 9.6 106.7 16.7 185.6 12.7 52.9 10.3 42.9
relative e¢ ciency achieved by the sellers in each treatment. As we did for the
social welfare, we present the treatment average, the average for the last ve
trading periods and the average for the last period. It is possible to note that in
the Baseline and Ad treatments sellers achieve a higher-than-expected prot.
However, surprisingly, when certication is introduced their surplus plummets
below expected levels; this is true for both types of sellers. Another interesting
point is that looking at relative payo¤s, green sellers make higher prot than
brown sellers in treatments in which certication is not allowed.
As data shows, sellers are better o¤ when there is no possibility to truly
signal the type of good that they produce. We rst test treatment di¤erences for
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Table 2.10: Brown Sellers Prot in the di¤erent treatments Treatment:
Expexted vs. Empirical
Baseline Ad Cert Ad+Cert
PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤
Expected 27 27 36 36
Empirical Mean 27.6 102.2 29.8 110.4 22.8 63.3 26.8 74.4
Last 5 periods 26.8 99.3 28.7 106.3 25.7 71.4 15.3 42.5
Last Period 26.4 97.8 20.6 76.3 25.0 69.4 16.8 46.7
the sellersprot (by session). The result of a Kruskal-Wallis test suggests that
there are no signicant treatment di¤erences across sellersprots, (KW= 3.92;
df = 3; p-value = 0.270; N = 12). Additionally, looking at the average prots
by sellerstype, the Kruskal-Wallis test suggests that low quality sellers make,
on average, higher prots than high quality sellers across treatments (KW =
16.8; df = 1; p-value =0.0002; N = 12). Prots in the last period are lower than
the average of the last ve periods in all treatments but Certication.
Table 2.11: BuyersSurplus in the di¤erent treatments Treatment: Expexted
vs. Empirical
Baseline Ad Cert Ad+Cert
PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤
Expected 45 45 18 18
Empirical Mean 27.1 60 16.1 35.8 28.2 157 21.9 122
Last 5 periods 30.7 68 18.9 42.0 30.9 172 25.4 141
Last Period 33.7 75 20.0 44.4 29.3 163 26.3 146
We now turn to analyse buyersperformance. Tables 2.11-2.13 show the
theoretical prediction and the empirical results for buyerspayo¤ across treat-
ments. Unsurprisingly, as it can be seen in the table, and opposite to what
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Table 2.12: Green Buyers Surplus in the di¤erent treatments Treatment:
Expexted vs. Empirical
Baseline Ad Cert Ad+Cert
PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤
Expected 27 27 9 9
Empirical Mean 14.7 54.4 10.6 39.2 16.2 180.0 12.4 137.8
Last 5 periods 17.9 66.3 12.1 44.8 17.6 195.6 13.8 153.3
Last Period 19 70.4 16.3 60.4 15.3 170.0 14.2 157.8
Table 2.13: Brown Buyers Surplus in the di¤erent treatments Treatment:
Expexted vs. Empirical
Baseline Ad Cert Ad+Cert
PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤ PO %E¤
Expected 18 18 9 9
Empirical Mean 12.5 69.4 5.5 30.6 11.9 132.2 9.5 105.6
Last 5 periods 12.9 71.7 6.8 37.8 13.2 146.7 11.5 127.8
Last Period 14.4 80.0 3.7 20.6 13.9 154.4 12.0 133.3
happens with the sellers, buyers are better o¤ when they can get a truthful
signal of the product type and if they are green. Nevertheless, a Kruskal-Wallis
test comparing the average surplus across treatments suggests that there are no
treatment di¤erences (KW = 5.66; df =3; p-value = 0.129; N=12). Looking at
the last period, it is interesting to note how in Ad and Certication treatments
surplus is lower than the average in the last ve periods.
To understand better how surplus is formed, we look at two more variables:
prices and quality purchased. Price is obviously an important determinant for
surplus and prot alike. Quality purchased is important to determine the sur-
plus of HQ buyers.
Figures 2.7-2.10 show the period-average price charged by each category of
seller in the four di¤erent treatments. After a learning process, prices seem to
slowly converge in Baseline and Ad treatments, whilst they are quite di¤erent
in the other two treatments (roughly one unit of di¤erence). As mentioned
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Figure 2.7: SQ/HQ Average price in each period in Baseline treatment
Figure 2.8: SQ/HQ Average price in each period in Advertisement treatment
before, the independent observations are too few to run statistically signicant
tests. We cannot conclude anything univocal; however, to have a better under-
standing of the situation, we have computed the treatment average according
to technology for the last ve periods. The results are reported in gure 2.11.
Average price in Baseline and Ad treatments are very close to each other, with
the latter slightly higher than the former. In the treatments where certication
is allowed the prices charged by the two kinds of sellers are quite di¤erent, with
the di¤erence being larger when advertisement is not allowed (1.16 against 1.60
di¤erence).
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Figure 2.9: SQ/HQ Average price in each period in Certication treatment
Let us look at gure 2.12: it shows the share of pairing seller-buyer according
to type and divided by treatment. The blue bars show how many transactions
took place between green (HQ) sellers and HQ buyers, red bars exchanges
between brown (SQ) sellers and SQ buyers and so on. As expected, green
buyers were able to e¤ectively purchase more green goods when certication
was allowed and especially if advertisement was barred (increasing the HQ-HQ
matching by a third). On the other hand, in the Ad treatment the HQ buyers
fell for the cheap talk and ended up buying more SQ products than in any
other treatment.
However, looking only at the transactions made by HQ buyers and di¤er-
entiating when they buy HQ products from when they buy SQ ones, there
are no signicant di¤erences across treatments, meaning that green buyers
do not manage to identify the HQ products more easily when di¤erent types
of information are available. The Kruskal-Wallis for HQ-HQ exchange across
treatments suggests that there is no signicant di¤erence in the mean number
of HQ products bought by HQ consumers in each treatment (KW = 5.144; df
= 3; p-value = 0.16; N = 12). The highest rank corresponds to the Ad+Cert
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Figure 2.10: SQ/HQ Average price in each period in Ad+Cert treatment
treatment and the lowest to the Ad treatment. As for the HQ buyer-SQ seller
transactions, the highest rank corresponds to the Ad treatment and the lowest
ranks correspond to the Ad+Cert and the Certication treatment. This means
that cheap talk introduces noisy information that biases the HQ buyers towards
SQ products. The Mann-Whitney test for pairwise comparison on HQ-HQ
exchange is only signicant for the comparison between Ad and Certication
treatment, suggesting that there is more HQ-HQ exchange in the Certication
treatment than in the Ad treatment (MW = 1.99; p-value = 0.0463; N = 6).
These results seem to partly conrm Larson (2002) and Cason and Gangad-
haran (2002)s results that markets will tend to separate and prices to diverge;
however, our data is not completely conclusive.
It is also interesting to look at what kind of products were actually sold.
In our experiment, we have not considered any externality. However, often in
reality the di¤erence between the two categories is that green products inter-
nalise some externality. Therefore, if we ultimately want to see the e¤ect of
di¤erent government policies, we are not only interested in the total quantity
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Figure 2.11: SQ/HQ Average price per treatment
of products exchanged (which is one of the main determinants of social welfare)
but also in the quality of the products exchanged.
Of the 1,715 units sold over all the experimental sessions, 42% of them were
HQ products.
Table 2.14: Quantity of green products sold per treatment
Baseline Advertisement Certication Ad+Cert
# Green 180 156 200 194
# Brown 258 227 244 256
% Green 41.1 40.7 45.0 43.1
%E¤ 66.7 57.8 74.1 71.9
Table 2.14 shows how the quantity sold was composed in terms of quality of
products. The share of green goods of the overall product sold is fairly constant
for the di¤erent treatments. Compared to Baseline, green goods are exchanged
more frequently in Certication treatment and less frequently in Ad treatment,
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Figure 2.12: Match Seller (S)/Buyer (B) according to their type per Treatment
as percentage of Total
but no di¤erence is statistically signicant. Looking at the absolute quantity,
more green products were sold when certication was allowed. By contrast,
when only advertisement is allowed, the number is the lowest. The last row
compares the amount of green exchanges that e¤ectively took place with what
the theory predicts, creating an e¢ ciency index which echoes the ones presented
earlier: this standardisation allows for a clearer comparison among the di¤erent
scenarios. The total number of units sold in each session (by treatment) does
not di¤er signicantly across treatments (KW = 5.00; df =3; p-value = 0.172;
N = 12). The same result holds for HQ and SQ products separately (for HQ
products, KW = 5.09; df = 3; p-value =0.165; N=12 and KW = 5.54; df = 3;
p-value =0.136; N =12 for SQ products)21. Due to the low degree of freedom,
21Within treatment, the Mann-Whitney test for pairwise comparisons of per-
session averages of quantities sold suggests that in all but the Ad+Cert treatment,
SQ products are sold signicantly more than the HQ products (MW = 1.964; p-value
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despite the large di¤erence in units sold in each treatment, the di¤erences are
not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Finally, we also look at the use of the costly cheap-talk advertisement and
the certication. Figure 2.13 shows the use of advertisement over time, in the
two treatments where this kind of communication is allowed. The rst thing to
note is that in neither treatment does there seem to be a clear trend (although
the average use of advertisement in the last ve periods is lower than the
average in the rst ve). Secondly, there does not seem to be a di¤erence in
the use of advertisement in respect to the possibility of the use of certication.
Figure 2.13: Use of advertisement over time in di¤erent treatments - average
number of Ad per period
Figure 2.14 represents the relative frequency of the use of each signal in
the di¤erent treatments22. It is possible to see how in the Ad treatment the
amount of advertisement bought by HQ and SQ sellers is the same (31%). In
the Certication treatment, a larger proportion of HQ sellers choose to invest
in the certicate (54%). Finally, in the Ad+Cert treatment, in 66% of the cases,
= 0.0495; N = 6 for baseline and Ad+Cert, and MW = 1.091; p-value = 0.275; N =
6 for Ad and Certication).
22% of X-quality sellers purchasing Y over total quantity of that seller kind.
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Figure 2.14: Use of Additional information per technology per Treatment as
percentage of the Total
HQ sellers engage in some sort of signaling; however, in only two thirds of these
situations do the HQ sellers buy certication while in the other cases they invest
in advertisement. So, overall, it seems that sellers are willing to invest in some
type of signalling. This seems to be in line with Bougherara and Piguets results:
green sellers are keen to diversify themselves from the brown sellers and -to a
certain extent- they try to use Ad as a proxy for Certication. More than half of
the HQ sellers invest in the certicate when that is the only possible signal, but
the possibility of the advertisement in the Ad+Cert treatment crowds-out the
use of the certicate (2 = 3.21; p-value = 0.073). When comparing the use of
advertisement by the HQ sellers between the Ad+Cert and the Ad treatment,
the incidence of the ad is lower than in the Ad treatment, but the di¤erence is
not signicant (one-sample 2 test, 2 = 3.27; p-value = 0.19).
Additionally, SQ sellers (nearly in 43% of the cases) buy cheap-talk adver-
tisement, more often than in the Ad treatment (2 = 3.40; p-value = 0.065)
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and more often than the HQ sellers (2= 7.06; p-value = 0.008). SQ sellers
therefore compete with the HQ sellers investing in this signal even more than
in the Ad treatment.
Figure 2.15: Average use of signals made by the HQ sellers in the Ad+Cert
treatment by period
Figure 2.15 shows the HQ sellers average use of each signal in the Ad+Cert
treatment by period. While there is not a clear trend, the use of the (cheap-
talk) advertisement declines, while the use of the certicate increases over the
periods. The average of the last ve periods of Certication (Advertisement) is
higher (lower) than the average of the rst ve periods. Figure 2.16 compares
the average use of certicate with the average use of advertisement by the SQ
sellers in the Ad+Cert treatment by period. Again, there is no clear trend;
certication is used more frequently than advertisement, after period two; fur-
thermore, the data seems to suggest that the SQ sellers use the advertisement
to try to compete with the certicate of their HQ competitors.
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Figure 2.16: Average use of certicate and advertisement by period in Ad+Cert
treatment
2.4.2 Regression analysis
Table 2.15 shows the e¤ect of di¤erent determinants of sellersprot. Results
suggest that, ceteris paribus, on average HQ sellers make lower prots than SQ
ones. The regression results also show that the e¤ect of price on sellersprots
is nonlinear. The e¤ect of price is positive, though small, while the e¤ect of
the price squared is negative. This suggests that for low prices, a higher price
is associated with a higher prot, and after a point, a price increase implies a
lower prot, due to the negative e¤ect on units sold.
Regarding treatment e¤ects, the only signicant e¤ect is the one of the
Certication treatment; sellers in the Certication treatment make on average
1.4 ECUs less than one in the baseline treatment. However, if an HQ seller
who buys certication will earn almost 2 ECUs more than the average, making
him better o¤ than the average seller in Baseline treatment. This also lls part
of the gap between predictions and experimental results: because of the (bad)
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Table 2.15: Tobit of SellersProt
Green -5.98
(0.52)***
Price 2.90
(0.87)***
Squared Price -0.14
(0.04)***
Ad Treatment -0.36
(0.73)
Cert Treatment -1.42
(0.81)**
Cert+Ad Treatment -0.37
(0.66)
Using Ad in Ad -0.44
(3.80)
Using Ad in Cert+Ad -2.06
(2.53)
Using Cert in Cert+Ad -0.11
(1.56)
Using Cert in Cert 1.99
(0.84)**
G using Ad in Ad 0.92
(2.42)
G using Ad in Cert+Ad 1.20
(1.35)
Cons -5.39
(4.64)
N 720
choice of HQ sellers to not invest in certication, social welfare decreases and
the gap among di¤erent treatments blurs.23
Table 2.16 analyses buyerspayo¤. As we expect, green buyers have, on
average, a higher surplus: this is because they always have the opportunity
23If green sellers do not use certication, then the market will be identical to the
baseline scenario; but as they are better o¤ in a completely separating equilibrium
than in the baseline, then it is in their interest to use the certication.
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Table 2.16: Tobit of BuyersSurplus
Green Buyer 1.09
(0.56)**
Ad Treatment -2.37
(0.40)***
Green Buyer in Ad 0.71
(0.85)
Cert Treatment -0.19
(0.46)
Green Buyer in Cert Tr. 0.47
(0.72)
Ad+Cert Treatment -0.97
(0.47)**
Green Buyer in Ad+Cert Tr. -0.10
(0.82)
Constant 4.14
(0.26)***
N 720
to buy a higher quality product and enjoy a higher utility. Additionally, on
average, the consumer surplus is signicantly lower in the treatments where
cheap-talk advertisement is possible, compared to the Baseline treatment. Both
the dummy for the Ad treatment and the dummy for the Ad+Cert treatment
have a signicant negative coe¢ cient.
As for the quantity sold, let us consider Table 2.17: once again, unsurpris-
ingly, price and technology have a negative impact. Buying advertisement (in
either treatment) has a positive e¤ect: this means that it actually has an e¤ect
on consumers. It may be the case that when confronted with goods of the same
price (some with and others without advertisement), a buyer would opt for
the advertised one. However, very interestingly, advertisement in the Ad+Cert
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Table 2.17: Regression on Quantity Sold
Using Ad in Ad 1.51
(0.57)***
Using Ad in Cert+Ad -1.86
(0.74)***
Using Cert 1.25
(0.74)**
Using Cert in Cert 1.51
(0.92)*
HQ -1.63
(0.28)***
Price -0.77
(0.12)***
Ad Treatment -0.21
(0.34)
Cert Treatment -0.65
(0.39)*
Ad+Cert Treatment 0.16
(0.45)
Constant 10.31
(1.27)***
treatment has a signicant negative e¤ect on the numbers of units sold (almost
2 units less). Certication has a positive e¤ect (1.25), but the e¤ect is some-
what larger when certication is bought in the Certication treatment (1.51).
Green consumers exploit the available information but, advertisement still has
a (negative) impact on the e¤ectiveness of the certication, probably because
it introduces noise. This is reected in the green buyerslower surplus. Finally,
in the Certication treatment production is slightly lower with respect to the
Baseline treatment. This is probably because prices are higher.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
We are now ready to address the main questions we have raised at the begin-
ning. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: paragraph 2.5.2 will pro-
vide the answers to the core questions, drawing from the results presented
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earlier, while paragraph 2.5.3 will extrapolate the policy implications of these
results. Paragraph 2.5.4 summarises and concludes, providing some indications
for future research. Before starting with the interpretation of our results, para-
graph 2.5.1 discusses the hypothesis of rational behaviour within our experi-
ment.
2.5.1 Were subjects rational?
One of the main assumptions in economics is that subjects behave rationally.
Therefore, it is important to assess whether this is indeed true, in order to be
able to generalise the results we have come to. We expect subjects in a labora-
tory experiment not to be perfectly rational. As we have mentioned before, the
quantity of information as well as the ability to interpret it may limit the opti-
mality of an individuals decisions. Understanding if, how much and why people
do not behave rationally is very important to improve theoretical predictions
and, ultimately, policy making.
The rst consideration comes from recognising that, as results di¤er from
the predicted outcomes, subjects have not fully used the available information.
The important thing is, however, to see whether the issue was with the way
the experiment was set or in the nature of the subjects. The former is clearly a
concern, as it would imply that either the results cannot be considered general
or that, at least, some relevant aspects have not been considered fully. The
latter is instead something to look at closely, as it could give us insight into
better policy making.
The rst test we have run was to see whether people who did not understand
how the game worked actually performed worse than the others. We have there-
fore looked at the questionnaire participants compiled after the experiment and
we looked at the people who declared either that they did not understand the
game or declared to have used a tactic that did not make sense. We then
ran a Mann-Whitney test for the sellers and one for the buyers. The tests
157
showed that the people who did not undersand the game earned signicantly
less than the rest of the group (sellers: z =  3:299; signicance level 99%;
buyers: z =  1:957, signicance level 95%). The relation is stronger for the
sellers: this could be explained by the fact that sellers had a more di¢ cult
job and therefore understanding well the game was more important to achieve
good results. Future research could nd ways to make sure that the number
of people who do not know what they are doing is minimised (in our experi-
ment they were 22) and see this has e¤ects on the results. We have not tried
to run regressions removing this data, as it would have reduced the number of
observations signicantly.
We present here some more insight on specic data. The considerations
have not been statistically tested.
How do we know when a subject has been completely irrational?
A thing that we have not been able to explain is what looks like a "last
period e¤ect". Although statistically insignicant, social welfare in the last
period is almost always lower than the average of the last ve periods (whilst
we would expect it to be higher, if we consider a positive learning process). The
market has no particular mechanism that can lead to a di¤erent behaviour in
the last period. As sellers cannot be identied throughout the experiment,
there is no reputation to be exploited in the last period. As already noted,
the di¤erence is not statistically signicant but it would be interesting to see
whether the di¤erence is indeed coincidental or appears to be statistically non
signicant because of the low degrees of freedom. Other scholars have experi-
enced a similar event, although fairly marginal. Looking at the questionnaire
participants were asked to compile at the end of the session, we have found
out that a number of participants have expressly mentioned that they "tried
their luck" in the last period.A future iteration of the experiment could try to
ask participants to play for 11 periods and see whether the there is a di¤erence
between our results and the rst 10 periods of the new experiment.
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Another way to assess rationality is to consider when a subject has made a
loss in one period. On the one hand, sellers were advantaged, as the programme
would not allow selling under price. Therefore, their only possibility to make
a loss would be purchasing further communication and then being unable to
cover the cost with the sales. This is, however, an entrepreneurial risk which
cannot be considered completely irrational. Of the number of times sellers made
a loss, 16 times24 were brown sellers and 30 green. Losses were below two for
the former and below four for the latter, meaning that part of the investment
in information was recovered and that price was set high enough to allow for
this recovery (in other words, behaviour can be considered rational). On the
other hand, buyers were allowed to purchase products even when the price was
too high to give them a net benet. This treatment asymmetry is justied by
the intrinsic nature of the problem that the experiment is trying to address:
telling a buyer that she was overpaying for an item would defeat the purpose
of certication. Just above 4% of times, buyers made a loss. Of these, green
buyers made a loss on 13 occasions. Green buyers may make a loss as they
can buy goods assuming they are high quality but the goods are instead low
quality. Going back to paragraph 2.3.4, a green buyer expects to randomly buy
a green product 50% of the time and therefore she is willing to pay a bit above
her marginal utility for a brown good. From equation 2.10, we know that the
maximum amount she is willing to pay is one unit per good purchased. Having
said that, a third of the losses were well beyond three units (ie. the buyers have
not behaved rationally). Even more surprisingly, 16 brown buyers (roughly one
in 20!) made a loss. Considering that brown buyers care only about price, they
should have always known the maximum price they were willing to pay: brown
buyers making a loss has therefore no logical explanation.
24"16 times" means that, in the whole experiments, 16 "end of period" payo¤s.
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Finally, we have looked at the "impossible prices". One in 10 sellers (exactly
10%) have priced outside the acceptable ranges25. The majority (64%) were
prices higher than the maximum buyer was willing to pay for one unit of
product (the only justication for this is that sellers expected buyers to behave
highly irrationally. This happened roughly one time in ten); ten times a green
seller has tried to ask for less than seven (production cost for rst unit) and
twice a brown seller has tried to charge less than ve, therefore not entering
the market.
All these behaviours seem to point to the fact that some of the subjects had
not fully understood how the experiment worked. Is the behaviour correlated
with the complexity of the task? On the one hand, brown buyers had the easiest
task and yet it was the category making the highest number of losses. On the
other hand, we have considered in which treatments buyers have gone out of
their pockets more often . Considering the structure of the game, Baseline
treatment is the easiest to understand and Ad+Cert is the toughest, with
the other two treatments in the middle. Five losses have been experienced in
Baseline, only three in Cert treatment and eleven and ten for Ad and Ad+Cert
respectively. Furthermore, sellers seem to have made mistakes evenly across the
treatments. Therefore, there does not seem to be a strict correlation between
the errors and the complexity of the experiment. It is di¢ cult to ascertain
whether it is the uncertainty or the complex information that has caused the
irrational behaviour, but one thing can already be concluded: by reducing one
or the other, behaviour should become more sensible and therefore increase
social welfare.
To conclude, we have experienced a small share of irrational behaviour.
Part of this has to be factored in, due to human nature or pure errors26; some
circumstances were driven by the complicated information.
25For green sellers [7,14] and for brown ones [5,12] or [5,14] in case of pooled
equilibrium.
26One subject erroneously typed a price of "100" instead of "10".
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It is important to raise two nal caveats: rstly, the analysis here only
considers behaviour that is completely irrational. Anything that is within the
feasible range but still not prot/utility maximising is not being considered
here. Therefore, it is possible that simpler/clearer information may have an
impact on improving the e¢ ciency of this category of behaviour (which is the
majority of the cases). This is analysed in the rest of the chapter. Finally, some
of the irrational behaviour may have signicantly a¤ected our results27. Due to
the low number of observations, the relatively low number of non well-behaved
behaviour and the fact that errors were made in both directions (therefore
partly cancelling each other out), we have not eliminated any of the observa-
tions.
2.5.2 Verifying our predictions
The paper has tried to verify statements derived by a purely theoretical analysis
of this model. Here are the answers, based on the results of our experiment:
Claim 18 Self-certication is ruled out of the market, as costly and conveying
no information
The rst prediction that the theory suggests is that the market should rule
out cheap talk. The results previously presented have shown that this was not
the case in the experiment. The use of advertisement, although marginally lower
in the latter part of the experiment, does not tail out. This is true both when
the advertisement is the only possible communication and when certication
is allowed too.
Claim 19 Self-certication has no e¤ect on social welfare or private prot of
a part of the market
27Going back to the example raised in the previous note, a seller in Baseline treat-
ment has set a price of 100. Weighted average price for that particular treatment
(considering the three sessions this treatment has been tested) is nearly 0.5 higher
than without this observation.
161
Due to the limited number of independent variables, we cannot compare
Baseline with Ad treatment and Certication treatment with Ad+Cert. By
simply looking at the average social welfare it looks like advertisement has a
negative e¤ect in both cases. Pooling together these two pairs, we have found
that, e¤ectively, cheap talk has a negative impact on social welfare. Considering
that cheap talk was indeed used, the fact that it is costly and it bears no infor-
mation explains why social welfare is statistically lower when advertisement is
allowed.
Claim 20 When enough information is available, the markets separate and
green products are exchanged at a premium price
Unless perfect information is achieved, a perfect separation of the markets
is impossible. Considering the learning process within an experiment and the
partially rational behaviour of the participants, we did not really expect to see a
surgically separated market. We start observing that in every treatment where
further communication was available, more than half of the sellers would engage
in labelling: we can infer that green sellers are keen to separate and brown may
resist this, trying to extract higher prot. In order to judge to what extent
the markets have separated, we look at two things: (i) the amount of matches
between sellers and buyers of the same kind; and (ii) price. When treatments
with certication are compared with the ones without, it is possible to note
how the transactions between green sellers and buyers increase. Statistically,
the number of these transactions is signicantly higher only for certication
treatment compared to Ad treatment28. Looking at price, we have seen how
the market converges to a unique price when certication is not allowed, but
green sellers are able to charge a premium when this is allowed. This makes us
conclude that the markets do tend to separate and sellers are able to extract
a premium. The price di¤erential is higher than one unit but lower than two.
28As previously noted, despite the large di¤erence among the di¤erent values, the
low degree of freedom does not lead to conclusive results.
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This means that sellers are able to pass onto buyers nearly all the di¤erence in
production costs.
Claim 21 The quantity of green and brown products is always the same
Throughout the experiment, green products have consistently been sold
less than the brown (overall 42%). When certication was allowed, overall
exchanges would increase and so would the relative share of green products.
Regression analysis also points out how green sellers would sell less units, ceteris
paribus. However, none of these di¤erences is statistically signicant.
Claim 22 Certication always improves the e¢ ciency of the market
One of the main goals of this paper was to assess whether a market with
a potentially higher level of information was more e¢ cient. We have pointed
out that for the way the experiment was set up, the maximum social welfare
(in equilibrium) achievable in Baseline/Ad treatment was higher than the one
obtainable in the other treatments. This point is, however, immaterial as we
have then looked at relative e¢ ciency, rather than the absolute level of social
welfare. In this way, we can see whether more information was achievable (and
therefore more desirable exchanges).
The results point to some interesting conclusions: (1) looking at e¢ ciency
Ad+ Cert is slightly higher than Ad treatment (indicating that allowing certi-
cation when only advertisement is present is benecial to society). However,
Certication treatment is less e¢ cient than Baseline, which goes against the
reasoning just mentioned; (2) statistically, there is no di¤erence between the
e¢ ciency of treatments with or without the possibility to use certication; (3)
certication has a strong negative e¤ect on sellersprot. This is quite inter-
esting. In Baseline treatment, sellers sometimes make more than the expected
prot, whilst they only get about 60% of the available prot. Now, considering
that certication is optional and, if not adopted, the market degenerates in a
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Baseline market, it is slightly against logic that sellers would settle for lower
prot. What makes this even more striking is that green sellerspayo¤ (see
above) is lower relatively to the brown sellers. As it is up to the green buyers
to decide whether to buy extra certication, this seems quite disconcerting.
One possible explanation for this is that the game was too complicated for the
sellers to assess what the best outcome was. Going back to our theoretical pre-
diction (see paragraph 2.3.4), it is clear that green sellers had the hardest task.
Considering the time-limit, even the most conscientious participant would have
struggled to get to the solution. This may mean that longer repetitions may
have lead to more rational results29.
Claim 23 Self-certication may act as a proxy for certication, when the latter
is too expensive
In literature, it has been shown that cheap talk may be used as a cheaper
signal, when certication is too costly. In our experiment, when both kinds of
communication were allowed, some of the green sellers have swapped from the
use in certication to advertisement. However, the "swap" was only partial.
Furthermore, as brown sellers were allowed to purchase advertisement too, the
proxy did not work e¤ectively.
29To informally test this, I have run the test using exclusively economist graduates,
some with MSc and all with at least one-year work experience. I have only rewarded
the best performing in relative terms with a £ 150 prize, which was just below the
average paid in each of the previous experiments. Participants had about 15 minutes
to read the instructions and take notes. The experiment consisted of 15 periods and
the treatment administered was the Ad+Cert. The results showed a slow but more
marked improvement of e¢ ciency over time. Last periods pay o¤was lower than the
experiments average. However, the use of certication did not show any particular
trend. Advertisement was avoided by everyone in the rst period (probably as any
good economist gured out that it was cheap talk and that they were not expected
to choose it) but then it entered the market, although it was less used than in the
data reported in this article.
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2.5.3 Policy implications, revisited
Having highlighted how our empirical results di¤er from the theory predictions,
let us now turn to see what e¤ect this would have on policy-making, comparing
with those in 2.3.4.
1. Cheap Talk
1.1 In theory, nobody uses advertisement and therefore a ban would be
redundant. However, sellers often engage in cheap talk, to the detriment of
social welfare. Therefore, banning this kind of communication would improve
social welfare. This would be particularly benecial if the use of certication is
allowed, as more information is extracted.
In practice, it is virtually impossible to ban cheap talk, as it often borders
marketing details, packaging or advertisement. However, the policy maker could
try to set more stringent rules on the use of particular words, so that if a rm
were to try to deceive consumers, her e¤orts would be less e¤ective, because
the message would have to be more vague to follow the legislation. Going back
to the model presented in the previous section, this would be like decreasing
g or, in the setting of this experiment, would have the e¤ect of an increase
in price of Ad. This would make it less appealing for brown sellers and green
sellers would nd comparatively more appealing to use Certication.
1.2 If it were possible to gag brown sellers, then the green ones could use
advertisement as a proxy of the more costly certication. We have not tested
this assumption directly. However, we have noted how, due to the credence
nature of the goods, it would be very di¢ cult to discern green and brown
sellers.
2. Certication
2.1 We have not tested the e¤ect of changing the cost of certication. How-
ever, as it is used (when allowed) and directly a¤ects social welfare (both by
reducing the cost to sellers and by increasing the possibility to create HQ-HQ
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exchanges), it is most likely going to be good for society. Although social wel-
fare seems to decrease, the market performs more e¢ ciently. Further research
would be helpful to establish, as the results seem to suggest, whether decreasing
information costs would actually enhance social welfare as well.
2.2 We have seen that green sellers may swap from certication to adver-
tisement. If the price di¤erential were to be lower, the incentive would be lower
and more information would be conveyed. This could also lead brown sellers
to lose incentive to use advertisement the more green sellers use certication,
increasing social welfare even further.
2.3 Another important thing the regulator can do is simplify or clarify
the information available in the market. We have noticed how some of the
participants have not acted in a rational way. This may be due to human
nature, but we have also pointed out how particular circumstances can be
accounted for the large amount/complexity of information in the market.
2.4 It was concluded before that if nothing can be done in terms of infor-
mation cost, then banning certication would have been benecial to society.
Our experiment, if not conclusive in favour of compulsory certication, showed
how certication does not seem to negatively a¤ect social welfare.
2.5 Green sellers do make lower prot than brown sellers. Furthermore, the
quantity of green products sold is consistently lower. This could be a concern
for the policy maker, should the green products be deemed to be "better" in
the policy makers eye. We will discuss this below. We have pointed out how by
banning advertisement the di¤erence between the quantities of the two kinds
of product shrinks and overall quantity increases as well.
2.6 An industry-wide scheme would allow to reduce costs to rms (via
economies of scale) but keeping the labels e¤ectiveness high30.
3. Externalities
30This should increase market e¢ ciency, although the current experiment has not
modelled this feature in. For more discussion on the role of industry-wide labels, see
previous section.
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If negative externalities are present in the market, the policy maker would
want that at least green buyers consume only green products. This could
be obtained either by (a) decreasing production costs for green rms or (b)
decreasing information noise (lower certication cost or via buyerseducation,
ie. make the connection between quality and certication more accessible). If
information is too complex, the reduction of the types of labels (ie. banning
Ad) could be a way forward. With respect to the brown buyers, things are
slightly di¤erent, according to the size of the externality. If this is lower than
two units, then social welfare is maximised when brown consumers buy brown
products. It is important to note that banning brown products would likely
reduce social welfare, as they cater for half of the existing market.
Without over-elaborating on the di¤erent scenarios that have not been part
of our primary analysis, it is important to realise the trade o¤ present here. In
fact, we have noticed earlier that in the Certication treatment consumption of
green products increases, but so does the consumption of brown products (and
therefore the externality). If, instead, green producers were to substitute brown
producers, then the issue would be that due to the higher costs of production,
social welfare could still deteriorate.
2.5.4 Conclusions
Let us summarise and conclude our discussion. Information asymmetries are
present in most markets: sellers know what they sell, whilst buyers learn some of
the features only after purchase. Green products are often credence goods, since
the green characteristic is frequently connected with the production process or
resources. Firms may decide to engage in costly communication, in order to pass
the relevant information to interested consumers, ll the communication gap
and obtain a premium. This raises the issue of the reliability of the information
provided: in the absence of a third party certication, brown rms have the
incentive to mislead consumers.
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In this paper we explored whether in a market for credence goods, di¤erent
types of labels improve or hinder social welfare. In order to do so, we conducted
a market experiment in which there were two types of sellers (high-quality
sellers and low-quality ones) and two types of buyers (those who care about
quality and those who do not). We implemented four di¤erent treatments,
where we varied the quality of information available in the market, but it was
not possible to build reputation. In the Baseline treatment participants had to
interact in a market where signalling was not possible. In the Ad treatment,
any seller could, costly, advertise her product as high-quality. As this possibility
was available to all sellers, the advertisement could be considered cheap-talk.
In the Certication treatment, information was more expensive than in the pre-
vious treatment, but only the high-quality sellers were allowed to buy it. This
constitutes a non-noisy signal of high quality. Finally, in the Ad+Certicate
treatment, both types of information were available. These treatments relate to
di¤erent real-life scenarios. Baseline treatment represents a situation in which
both qualities of the product exist, but sellers are not aware of the fact that
buyers are interested in that particular feature. Ad treatment depicts a market
in which sellers know some buyers care for a particular feature of the product,
but communication is at best loosely regulated, or when the information is
conveyed with the use of self-certication. Certication is tantamount to third-
party awarded labels. An independent, reputable organisation will not have any
incentive to award undeserving sellers with their own seal of approval. Often
in markets, both kinds of labels are present, but sometimes legislation can be
tight enough to forbid unsubstantiated claims, e¤ectively banning self-awarded
labels.
Our results suggest that consumers are worse o¤ in any scenario with infor-
mation. However, they are signicantly worse o¤ in the treatments where the
cheap-talk advertisement is allowed. Due to the cost structure of the experi-
ment, social welfare is higher in the baseline scenario than when certication
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is allowed; the experiment conrmed this; when only advertisement is allowed,
social welfare is signicantly lower, whilst when certication is permitted the
market gets relatively closer to the e¢ cient equilibrium, implying that a dif-
ferent cost structure may make this treatment superior.
The most important ndings of the papers can be summarised as follows:
Conclusion 24 : Against theoretical predictions, the ban of advertisement
would impact positively on social welfare. Certication does not seem to have
a signicant e¤ect on social welfare, but it improves e¢ ciency in the market.
Conjecture 25 By reducing the cost of information social welfare should
increase, in relative and absolute terms (ie. the market would be more e¢ cient
than if there was no communication at all).
Conjecture 26 A single seller would potentially improve e¢ ciency, due to the
reduced cost in certication. This can also be interpreted as the creation of a
single exogenously-awarded label.
Conclusion 27 By banning certication (but not advertisement), social wel-
fare would decrease.
Conclusion 28 If there are externalities, the market would be more e¢ cient
if subsidies (which have to be lower than the unit externality) are paid to green
producers.
Chapter 3
Environmental lobbying: Decision making when the adviser may
be biased
One can only give an unbiased opinion about things that do not interest one,
which is no doubt the reason an unbaised opinion is always valueless. The man
who sees both sides of a question is a man who sees absolutely nothing. (Oscar
Wilde)
3.1 Introduction
In many policy settings, a decision maker has to balance di¤erent interests and
points of views, without having all the required information to take the decision.
Information may be private or too costly to obtain, and therefore the policy
maker has to seek advice from an informed party. Let us consider this example:
a lake is being polluted by the factories surrounding it. The people living in the
vicinity, concerned by preservation of the natural setting, angling and the value
of their properties - and the environmental organisations, concerned about
biodiversity, asked the local administrators to take action. They claim that if
pollution continues, the environmental damage will go beyond critical values
and the lakeside will become wasteland. On the other hand, the owners of
the polluting rms claim that the pollution emitted is not greater than that
produced in the last decades and (in any case) well below the legal limits.
Furthermore, banning production would have a signicant impact on the local
economy, in term of employment and local tax revenue.
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The decision maker has to take a di¢ cult decision for the good of society,
considering the overall net impact. Typically, he is unlikely to have enough
information or technical knowledge of the matter to take an informed decision.
He may therefore seek advice from someone better informed. This could be a
think-tank, an NGO or an academic: someone who is better informed as to the
best decision to take. If the chosen adviser has in mind the social interest, then
she will pass on her information and the local administrator can act accordingly.
However, some advisers may have di¤erent agendas. They may live in the area
or they may like shing in the lake; or, to the contrary, they could be married
to someone who works in one of the factories. Therefore the information she
passes to the decision maker may be biased.
The local administrator will consider the advice but also is likely to take it
with a pinch of salt, as he knows it may be insincere. As the adviser (be she
biased or not) knows she will not be fully believed, she will try to cultivate her
own reputation for being unbiased. The more the decision maker considers her
unbiased, the more weight he attaches to her advice.
An expert who advocates a particular cause is often referred to as a lobbyist.
The etymology of the word points to the derogatory connotation of its use: it
refers to the practice of networking in the entrance halls of legislative chambers,
in order to inuence politicians. As much as we may feel the 20th century has
invented the practice, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term
was in use already in the 1790s, meaning that the practice is likely to even
pre-date that.
In passing, the uninformed decision maker/potentially biased informed
adviser situation can also be recognised in di¤erent settings: (a) a policy
maker who needs to decide how to legislate on a particular issue; (b) a gov-
ernmental department has to decide how to allocate its budget among the
di¤erent policy areas; (c) a Treasury that needs to allocate central resources
among di¤erent activities, and so on.
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The common denominator in these situations is that the decision maker has
to make a decision without all the relevant information and therefore, he seeks
advice from agents who have relevant private information, to improve welfare.
This chapter looks into this situations precisely: an uninformed decision
maker who wants to maximise social welfare has to take two consecutive unre-
lated decisions. Can he extract any information from advices received by a
potentially biased, fully informed adviser? The decision maker has noisy prior
about the type of adviser he is facing and subsequent events will a¤ect this
belief. The model presented considers the circumstances in which a biased
adviser decides to invest on reputation and when she does not. A known nding
in this kind of literature is tha the adviser may decide to discloser her informa-
tion in the rst period (even if this goes against her interest) to gain credibility
as unbiased adviser, to then have more inuence in the second period. With
this model, we show that, although this holds true, we can reach some new,
interesting conclusions. Firstly, an adviser investing in reputation in the rst
period enters the following period with unchanged reputation. Then, we show
that the decision maker can extract full information in the rst period and,
more surprisingly, in the last period.
Our interest here is in the application of these in environmental policy
settings. This is particularly relevant in such situations, as we will discuss
below (3.1.1); 3.1.2 sets the di¤erence between absolute and relative bias and
how these concepts are considered in our context and 3.1.3 will present the
literature review on environmental lobbying and the broader literature to which
this paper belongs.
3.1.1 Lobbying and green issues.
The need for a government to seek advice from an expert is true in many policy
making contexts. This paper will focus on the application of lobbying problems
on environmental issues. We believe there are at least two good reasons to do
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so. First, the characteristics of many environmental decisions t this particular
structure well; second, green lobbying has become more and more common.
Let us consider these two arguments separately.
Lobbying in enviromental settings
This paragraph presents the reasons why the model is applied to environmental
issues. To do so, we consider its two main assumptions and see how they t
green markets. The key assumptions for the need of external advice are:
(a) the decision maker lacks at least some of the information
required to make the best decision. Several factors contribute to a very
imperfect market for information:
* the multidimensionality of the green issue1. Green characteristics pertain
to very di¤erent features of the product. Ordering them is to a degree subjective
(is it better to buy washing powder bio or non bio? Which of these is greener?
Organic, recyclable or low carbon footprint? etc);
* the rapidly evolving state of knowledge: science in the eld is advancing
rapidly, but dissemination amongst stakeholder groups happens at varying
rates;
* scientists do not agree on the science. New reports are often questioned
by other experts and confuted by other data. This adds to the confusion to
what the state of knowledge is. The impact is even wider as the general public
(who strongly inuence political decision) may be even less informed, as the
media may present particular statistics more prominently than others (be it
because it is more sensational or because of the political agenda of part of the
press);
* economists do not agree on the economics: most of the controversy is based
on the di¢ cult valuation of non-market goods or services. Their monetisation
is therefore di¢ cult. Another di¢ culty is to quantify environmental damages.
1See previous sections for more discussion about this.
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For example, the reason why CFCs were banned in the 80s is that as they
were responsible for the hole in the ozone layer and this, in the long run, would
have made the Earth uninhabitable: therefore, the costs were assessed to be
innite. The Montreal Protocol is now being updated to incorporate all the
gasses that have similar e¤ects to CFCs, but as economists do not agree on
their overall impact, a total ban does not seem to be convincing all parties.
Another important variable when it comes to environmental appraisal (which
is almost unique) is discounting; as environmental impacts lasts for a very
long time (if not forever), assessing correctly future values becomes critical.
Economists have strongly disagreed on how to value future costs and benets.
Stern (2006) presented the impact of climate change on the British economy;
however, its results were highly criticised, due to the authors choice of a very
low discount rate2.
To name only one example, recently in the UK, the National Environ-
ment Audit (UK NEA, 2011) has been published. The pioneering work assessed
the value of Britains natural capital, using the innovative ecosystem service
approach (ESA). In principle, ESA allows to compute the value of each service
the environment provides to society and, therefore, the monetary-equivalent
impact of any policy intervention. The values presented were striking, adding
up to many billions of pounds. If this values are accepted as robust, then policy
making in the UK would steer majorly from its current course. However, many
dispute their validity, on the basis that a large part of these values are driven
by the value attached to biodiversity, which is considered highly subjective.
b) there is at least one informed agent and her preferences are not
common knowledge and they may di¤er from the decision makers.
Environmental issues have been part of the economic discussion only relatively
2To understand the importance of this issue, lets consider a quick example. Lets
assume that the extinction of a bird will create a loss to society of £ 1 billion in
150 yearstime. If the cost is valued using Sterns assumption, then the cost would
be roughly £ 1 billion; but if we use HM Treasurys guidance, this would have a
discounted value today of roughly £ 5 million, 200 times lower.
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recently. In the next paragraph, we present more evidence regarding this; here
we only highlight the fact that, as in our initial example, the tension between
public benets and private costs lead to the creation of di¤erent interest groups.
This is also conrmed by the wide di¤erences among the political parties
manifestos and then between one partys stance at local and national level.
Environmental lobbying in real world
As public opinion has increasingly become weighted in favour of the environ-
ment and the values attached to environmental damages are increasing, green
pressure groups are increasingly inuential in the public debate.
Lobbying activity has lead to several changes. For instance, in Britain, the
work of Green Alliance (a politically-independent lobby group) has pushed
every major party in the UK to publish its green agenda in the political man-
ifesto before general elections; lobbying by NGOs has led to voluntary agree-
ments among supermarkets (from the early ban of incandescent light bulbs, to
the phase-out of F-gases in refrigeration, etc). To have an idea of the growth of
the phenomenon, in the USA, the number of companies recruiting lobbyists for
green issues increased in the period 2000-2008 from 4 to 291 (Mullins, 2008).
However, tighter environmental policies often imply higher costs for pro-
ducers or changes in the labour market structure (which in the short run
may imply unemployment). This has increased the strength of counterbal-
ancing groups to push the private industriesinterests. These groups are often
referred to as "brown lobbyists", as they advocate lower environmental stan-
dards. Looking at brown lobbyists, the gures presented above seem to pale:
only in 2009, fewer than 800 companies hired 2340 lobbyists to ght against
the "cap and trade" reform (Public Integrity, 2009).
It is important to note how the evidence reported so far merely shows how
di¤erent groups exercise e¤ort to present evidence supporting their causes. At
the same time, sometimes lobbyists have been accused of overexercising this
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inuence. The IPCC has been accused of publishing data which di¤ered from
that previously approved by its scientistspanel, in order to make the impact
of their reports stronger (Seitz, 1996). More recently (The Economist, 2010),
the IPCC has again been under re for allegedly misrepresenting the e¤ect
of climate change on the Himalayas and later for quoting Greenpeace funded
research, without questioning its assumptions (The Economist, 2011). Davies
(2009) notes that Greenpeace has been accused to use unsubstantiated argu-
ments in favour of climate change. On the other hand, UCS (2007) reports how
ExxonMobil in 7 years gave more than $15 millions to organisations aimed
at disseminating false information on climate change. Energy companies have
lobbied governments and the EU to invest in shale gas in order to reach the EU
2050 CO2 targets allegedly at a fraction of the cost of its alternative (ie. renew-
able sources). Oreskes (2004) presents data on brown industries promoting sci-
entic dissent on climate change for nancial reasons. The claims are based
on a highly publicised report (EGAF, 2011). However, Howarth et al. (2011)
suggests that shale gas is likely to be even more polluting than burning carbon.
A lobbyist would use her special access to decision makers to persuade them
to act in protection of her interests. Alternatively, this could be an opportunity
for interest groups who would otherwise have little public voice to be heard and
bring to the discussion table all the relevant issues. In many environmental
settings, even though the stakes are extremely high, there is often no way to
establish who is right and who is wrong, even by looking at data and scientic
reports.
The inuence of lobbying is generally considered to be negative for social
welfare, as it protects one particular interest group, without consideration for
the rest of society. Typical examples are the weapon and tobacco industries in
the US or farmersassociations within many European countries. Recently, in
several countries, the role of the lobbyist has been questioned, as it appears to
go beyond the common good and rules regarding their operations promulgated.
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In every country, it is possible to identify a numberof pressure groups which
is deemed to be more or less inuential in political decision making. In the
USA the practice of "cash for access" is legal, while in the majority of the
EU countries it is not. In the UK, the government nominated in 2012 a lobby
minister, in order to regulate the industry. The di¢ culty is, of course, twofold:
the legislator does not want to silence potential sources of precious information,
but wants to limit the practices which can be deemed as corruption.
3.1.2 Advisers & Economics: absolute bias and our model
Economists have long discussed the importance of lobby groups in the decision
making process: in a nutshell, lobby groups (more or less disguised) would try
to inuence policy decisions to increase their own utility. It may look counter-
intuitive and denitely contrary to common belief, but lobbying is actually
considered a good thing from an economicspoint of view, since it facilitates
the transmission of information, albeit imperfectly. This can enhance choices.
This is even more so in presence of irreversible limits (almost unique to envi-
ronmental issues, and against general assumption of standard economics), as
the damage of taking the wrong decision is enduring.
We will begin by analysing the lobbyistsbehaviour. As it has been said,
while the government tries to take into fair consideration the interests of each
component of society, a lobbyist prioritises the interests of one group above all
the others. This is the key to the bias in the evaluation of events. We could
distinguish a relative bias, when a lobbyist weighs less the utility of a subset
of members of society, from an absolute bias, when the utility of a subset of
subjects is completely disregarded. In the UK, associations like Greenpeace
are considered to be in the latter category, pursuing any environmental cause,
no matter the cost. Green Alliance, on the other hand, may be in the former
group, presenting reports that take into consideration the e¤ects of their rec-
ommendation on the whole economy.
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A trivial example of these two di¤erent categories can be found looking
at football fans. Die-hard supporters would defend their team even after a
disastrous game (absolute). More balanced fans would show their bias only in
less clear-cut situations, but recognise the superiority of another team, after a
humiliating performance (relative).
This has important implications for us. If the advisers interest is com-
pletely uncorrelated with the state of the world, then her advice conveys no
information at all. Let us consider our initial situation. If the local authority
has to decide what to do about the lake pollution, it will seek external advice.
If the lobby group supports the interests of the factories, then the advice will
be not to further intervene, regardless of the situation or the potential social
and environmental costs. The lobbyist would concentrate on the potential extra
prot of the group she represents, attaching no value to the economic, social
and ethical cost required to achieve it.
In other words, the lobbyist would give the same advice, regardless of the
state of the world, to maximise her own utility or to limit her future losses, as
she would be directly harmed by an adverse state of the world.
Despite the risk of receiving a biased advice, decision makers often rely on
external advisers, rather than making an uninformed decision.
It becomes essential, then, to understand when truthful advice is more
likely to be given and if there are ways to induce the adviser to disclose her
information more frequently. One way to do this is to ask the same adviser for
her opinion in consecutive separate events, creating in this way reputational
concerns: the adviser knows that if she misleads the decision maker today,
tomorrow she will be completely disqualied as adviser.
Then, there may be the case that an adviser may decide to tell the truth
in the initial period, in order to increase her inuence in the last period. This
means that if we consider the situation in which an adivser has to give two
consecutive advices, then giving the rst advice she will use a relative bias,
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while for the second, she will have an absolute bias. The partial interest for
the opposite cause in the rst decision is purely instrumental to improve her
reputation in the following period.
This means that the decision maker increases the chances of getting truthful
advice in the rst period. However, this incentive mechanism (reputation
building) creates also an opportunity for the adviser (potentially backring on
the decision maker). As an unbiased adviser passes on her information more
frequently, every time a biased adviser gives truthful advice, her reputation
improves for the following period. But if the biased adviser then lies in the last
period, then she will divert the decision more from the optimal solution.
In fact, if on the one hand social welfare may increase in the initial period(s)
because of the good advice, then in later period social welfare may decrease, as
bad advice will be relied upon more heavily. This paper analyses (i) the condi-
tions determining the advisers strategy; (ii) how much (if any) information the
principal can extrapolate from the signals of a potentially biased adviser who
has perfect information; and (iii) how the government can infer social welfare.
3.1.3 Literature review
As previously noted the literature has not focused on this particular topic.
The paragraph presents the literature that more closely relates to this paper,
although it does not refer in specic to environmental economics. Before that,
the next section briey gives an overview of the literature on green lobbying
which, however, is not stricty related to our model.
Environmental lobbying
To our knowledge, literature on environmental lobbying is mainly focused on
two areas:
a. Macroeconomics
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The vast majority of papers are applied to macroeconomics. They focus
mainly on the e¤ect lobbying has on green policies in political situations (ie.
when a decision maker wants to be re-elected). In other words, very often,
environmental policies are seen as bargaining chip to play to decide electoral
battles. Scholars do not seem to consider them on the same level as other
policy decisions. As most papers refer to climate change (and more specically
to international agreements), the models in this branch of literature use open
economies models. Air pollution being an international issue, the attention is
focused on the e¤ects of the decisions taken by di¤erent countries.
The general debate is about trade liberalisation and its e¤ect on environ-
mental regulation. On the one hand, green supporters believe that free trade
pushes governments to a race to the bottom: for the fear of losing competitive
edge, due to higher costs, governments relax the stringency of their national
environmental regulation. For this reason, the international community should
impose agreed policies to regulate markets. On the other, neoclassical econo-
mists believe that by increasing countriesopenness, markets create a surplus
that can then be reused in eco-friendly policies. The policy insights coming
from this literature focus on level of environmental taxation and the e¤ect of
lobbying on economic e¢ ciency and social welfare.
Aidt (2010), Fredriksson (1997), Damania (2003) and Persson (2012) look
at small open economies. Aidt (2010) looks at the e¤ect of di¤erent environ-
mental taxes on the market and on the votersreaction. The paper shows how
a brown lobbyist may opt for the revenue of this tax to be devolved to voters,
as even low level of taxations may please the voters. Damania develops the
existing model to endogenise the level of a nations corruption into the model
and shows how higher levels of corruption are inversely proportioned to envi-
ronmental regulation stringency. This is due to the fact that it is assumed that
corruption is more likely to come from brown lobbyists. Furthermore, it nds
that the trade liberalisation decreases incentives for lobby groups (brown and
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green alike) to inuence the decision maker, if the country has a comparative
disadvantage in the production of the polluting good. The model is conrmed
by empirical analysis based on data from several countries. Persson (2012) con-
rms the results in Damania, using a more general model. In particular, cor-
ruption decreases the incentive to consider externalities. International openness
a¤ects environmental taxes positively but with intensity that is inversely pro-
portionate to the level of local corruption (in other words, in more corrupted
economies, a freer international trade will increase a lot ecotaxes).
Grossman and Helpman (1994) Schleich et al. (2000) and Conconi (2003)
focus on large open economies.
Schleich et al. and Conconi use a Grossman-Helpman model, in which
two large nations trade a good, which creates trans-boundaries negative envi-
ronmental externalities (in either production or consumption). Governments
decide on internal policies as well as trade patterns. They can behave coopera-
tively or not. Lobbyists intervene to a¤ect the e¢ ciency of the system in order
to maximize prot. Schleich et al. (2000) show that lobbying can o¤set the com-
parative advantage and lead to ine¢ cient outcomes. The authors show that if
governments cooperate, higher welfare may be obtained but environmental pro-
tection may be lower than in non-cooperative settings. Conconi (2003) shows
that overall environmental quality depends on governmental cooperation but
also on coordinate actions from the lobbyists and the size of the spillovers.
If governments opt for free trade and one lobbyist pushes for more stringent
environmental regulation, national standards improve but the overall level of
pollution may increase.
b. Motivation to lobby
Another, more diverse, set of papers looks at lobbyistsmotives and strate-
gies. Shapiro (2011) shows the e¤ect of an increase in the reputation of an
unbiased adviser, if a lobbyist has the opportunity to pay to substitute her
opinion. An imperfectly informed unbiased expert sends his message to the
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decision maker. However, a biased lobbyist may decide to costly substitute the
experts message with her own. This means that there is a limit to the level of
information that the expert is allowed to have without triggering the lobbyist
to intervene, meaning that investing in better information is fruitless. This
model is then used to explain the current situation concerning climate change.
Polk and Schmutzler (2005) develop the model in Rodrik (1986), which
looks at the interaction of two lobbyists representing di¤erent sectors but both
interested in the reduction of environmental taxes. They have two ways to
a¤ect policy-making: one trying to lower the environmental standards, the other
creating exceptions (loopholes) to the general rule only to advantage the sector
they represent. An increased e¤ort to create a loophole for a sector makes the
other lobbyists e¤ort more costly. The paper concludes that general lobbying
tends to be underprovided and that loophole lobbying may e¤ectively push
environmental standards up.
Finally, a number of articles looks at the motivations that lead to caring
for the environment. Scholars have mainly focused on monetary incentives
(for example, La¤ont, 1995). Benabou and Tirole (2006) show however that
intrinsic incentives like warm glow can be applied to environmental protection.
The authors point out how, if there is no nancial gain beyond these intrinsic
motives, agents rely on their improved reputation. People who note a noble
behaviour that is not rewarded economically will trust this agent more in the
future. Banerjee and Shogren (2012) expand this model and study the role of
reputation as an incentive to internalise environmental externalities. The paper
denes crowding out as the reduction of an agents reputation, due to mon-
etary motives behind environmental care. Therefore, the government has to
nd ways to stimulate brown (low reputation) rms with economic incentives
and green (high reputation) rms by refraining from making any transfer to
them, as they would act anyway and the payment may reduce their credibility
in the eyes of the public. The authors show that brown rms may sacrice
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information rent and be willing to invest on reputation. They also show that
the more the information about contribution is public, the higher the voluntary
contribution.
The model presented here is not easily associable with any of the existing
literature. There exists a large, anecdotal and often non-academic, series of
publications looking at how lobby groups have a¤ected particular governments,
both by preventing or fostering environmental regulation. The rest of the lit-
erature review will look at models that share similar features to ours but that
are not applied to environmental economics.
Reputational concern and cheap talk
The model presented falls into the broad class of models incorporating cheap-
talk. A cheap-talk game is a signalling game in which none of the payo¤s
directly depends on the advisers message but only on the principals decision.
This implies that: (a) the signalling is costless (otherwise it would a¤ect the
advisers payo¤); (b) the principal is free to do whatever he wants with the
message received. He could follow it completely or disregard it altogether. Or
anything in between. Finally, (c) although the payo¤s are not a¤ected directly,
the principals decision is a function of the agents signal and this decision will
eventually determine both nal payo¤s. Let us explain this with an example: a
rm puts a label on its product stating "greener than ever". The communication
has no additional cost for the rm. Consumers read the label and they make
their decision. However, consumers know that the label may not convey any
real meaning and therefore they can choose to take it into consideration or not.
The literature on cheap talk and reputation building is relatively new but
quickly expanding, due to its relevance for so many real world settings. The
research in this eld can be grouped in many di¤erent ways. We distinguish
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between models in which the informed player has perfect or noisy information
about the state of the world.
Noisy signal.
Crawford and Sobel (1982), Benabou and Laroque (1992), Prat (2005) and
Morris (2001) all present models in which the adviser can have only one type of
bias and noisy information (ie. advisers know that the state of the world is going
to assume a particular value with probability p 2]0:5; 1]). Crawford and Sobel
(1982) provide the seminal analysis of cheap-talk games. Their main nding is
that in presence of noise in the system, with one possible bias (opposite utility
to the principal), the signaling equilibrium is more informative the closer the
congruence between the preferences of the adviser and the advisee. Benabou
and Laroque (1992) expand Sobel (1985), allowing for reputation to uctuate.
Morris (2001), formalising a concept rst expressed in Loury (1994), shows how
a partially informed adviser (with identical preference to the principals) has
an incentive to reveal completely her information; however, if the principal is
unsure about her preferences, and therefore he thinks she could be biased, it
might be in the advisers interest not to disclose her information in order to
signalher unbiasedness.
Morris considers the case in which the principal knows that the agent is
either unbiased or racist. Therefore, in this model all the information might
be lost (degenerating in a babbling equilibrium). In the repeated version of this
game, the adviser could lie in order to boost her reputation in later periods.
This phenomenon is referred to as political correctness. The paradox here is that
although the two players have exactly the same utility function, the adviser
wishes to signal she is not biased, and therefore she does not disclose infor-
mation that might taint her reputation. Two important assumptions are made
in the model: rstly, giving non-politically correct advice lowers the advisers
reputation, independently by the realised state of the world. Secondly, regard-
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less of the true state of the world, there is a particular outcome with intrinsic
value, that makes it superior (or more desirable) than all the alternatives3.
A number of papers (among which, Shin (1998), Dewatripont and Tirole
(1999), Ely and Va¯lima¯ki (2003), Battaglini (2004) and Li (2010) ) presents
models in which the principal uses more than one adviser. Battaglini (2004)
deals with the equilibrium when several advisers -with di¤erent and noisy
signals- are used by the principal. The paper is particularly interesting because
it shows that complete extrapolation of information is impossible in equilib-
rium: this is because of a trade o¤ between information precision and the elim-
ination of uncertainty about the reputation of the adviser. Dewatripont and
Tirole (1999) show the conditions under which a decision maker can extract
the maximum information by asking information to two imperfectly informed
advisers (each advocating a particular cause). In a similar setting, Shin (1998)
shows how the decision maker is not better o¤ by spending e¤ort undertaking
his own research in the matter, but he should rather rely on advocates.
Farrell (1995) and more extensively Farrell & Rabin (1996) characterise
the equilibria obtained by changing the playerspreferences and skills. They
nd that at the extremes, Pareto e¢ ciency and no information loss is achieved
(if the agents have the same preferences) or a babbling equilibrium (where all
information is lost). Babbling equilibria are always possible, but it is also pos-
sible to achieve an equilibrium where part of the information is passed on. This
will happen for two reasons: either because the principal will not trust com-
pletely the signal received or because the agent will simply not disclose all the
information in her possession. Finally, equilibrium is shown not to be unique.
Another set of papers looks at situations in which the playerss interest is
her own reputation only.
3For example: a genetic discovery linking red hair to ill temperament would surely
be frowned upon, even if it is proved to be a scientic fact.
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Ottaviani & Sørensen (2006) recognize that an adviser is often interested
in her own reputation rather than the nal outcome of the game. They present
a model with imperfectly informed advisers and continuous advice and state
of the world. It is shown how the signal that gives the highest reputational
outcome does not coincide with the observed one and therefore part of the
information available is lost. Political correctness here can be applied, with
a slightly di¤erent connotation: the goal is not to pass the information that
maximize ones own nal payo¤but, simply a concern for ones own reputation
per se; in other words, reputation is the aim and not the mean. Furthermore,
it is derived how in equilibrium, the adviser will indicate the right direction
of the signal but not its real intensity. Another case of distorted incentive is
presented by Leaver (2009). The paper analyses reputational concerns when
reputation can also be damaged by truthful advice. The author applies the
model to civil servants advising policy makers. To avoid thorny issues and
potential reputation backlashes, civil servants may settle for less than optimal
advice to please the public and politicians. In both cases, reputation concerns
make the adviser less likely to disclose information.
Finally, a large branch of game theory concentrates on models in which
cooperation may lead to mutual gain (or non-cooperation to larger losses). In
these games, both players have to build reputation for being cooperative. Fun-
denberg and Maskin (1986) show how in the context of a prisoners dilemma,
cooperation is sustainable in the long run. Hausken (2005) and Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (1996), on the other hand, show how to establish a reputation,
cooperation is not achieved, proportionately with the importance of the future
periods.
Finally, Hausken (2007) illustrates the conditions under which the reputa-
tion for patience of one player leads the other one to cooperate.
Non-noisy signal
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The model presented here deals with reputational concerns in a situation in
which the adviser receives a non-noisy signal. In other words, where the adviser
knows for sure what the state of the world is going to be.
Sobel (1985) describes the equilibrium in repeated game where signaling is
costly. The adviser is either good (identical interests as the decision maker) or
bad (opposite interests). Wrasai and Swank (2007) show that the policy makers
power to re his adviser (who can be either good or bad) after receiving bad
advice is not always e¢ ciency enhancing. Frisell and Lagerlof (2007) present
the model most similar to ours, when it comes to characterise the adviser, who
can have di¤erent biases.
Setting the advice binary and a perfectly informed adviser are hypotheses
previously made in literature in di¤erent context. We have decided to take this
direction for several reasons. Firstly, it simplies the model. But mostly, it is
believed not only that the two work well together, but they do not deprive the
model of much explanatory power.
By allowing the adviser to give only yes/no advice, the decision maker forces
the adviser to either tell the truth or lie. This is also in line with the fact that
if the adviser is fully informed, it would not make sense for the adviser to give
advice which di¤ers from one of the possible outcomes (as she know exactly
what is going to happen).
Authors who have used noisily informed advisers have raised the point that
the opposite assumption implies that the adviser can be "damned" forever for
deviating only one time, whilst allowing for noisy information, the advisers
reputation can uctuate indenitely.
But the principle with which the models are constructed are the same and
the di¤erences do not seem to add much to the model. In fact, our model
maintains intact the three characteristics of the relation between adviser and
policy maker, that is:
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1. The adviser will tell the truth if by doing so her present and future payo¤s
will be a¤ected positively;
2. The adviser will tell the truth if by doing so her current loss will be lower
than her future gains;
3. The adviser will not disclose her information if this will a¤ect negatively
her overall payo¤.
These are the conditions that an adviser with a noisy signal would consider
as well. In the context of the model presented, it was not felt that the fur-
ther complication of an imperfectly informed adviser would add much to the
ndings.
3.1.4 The model and its context
The model follows Morris (2001) in its general setting, but we apply it to an
environmental context. A decision maker (he) has to take two consecutive, inde-
pendent decisions in a particular matter, the outcome of which is a Bernoulli
trial. As we mentioned before, this could be whether to stop pollution of a lake
or not. The net benet of the ban may be positive or negative. Social welfare is
maximum when the true state of the world is guessed. To improve the quality
of the decision, he seeks the advice of a perfectly informed adviser. The decision
maker has a priori imperfect information on the advisers utility function. The
adviser can be unbiased (and therefore share the governments aim of welfare
maximisation) or biased, preferring a particular state of the world. She is green
if she always prefers the government to act, while she is brown if she prefers
the government not to stop pollution. The adviser can only give binary advice
which is communicated costlessly. The principal takes into consideration the
advice and the advisers reputation and then takes a decision. After the deci-
sion is taken, the true state of the world is realised and the advisers reputation
is updated.
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This paper adds to the known existing literature in four di¤erent ways.
(1) the adviser can be unbiased or have one of the two existing biases. In
Morriss model, the unbiased lobbyist could only be confused for one kind (say
- green). In the model presented here, he can either be unbiased, green or
brown. Incorporating this assumption, the results obtained are rather di¤erent.
Also, (2) this is di¤erent from the papers in which advisers can be good or
bad. In this branch of literature, it is assumed that an advisers utility would
always (or never) be aligned with the decision makers; in our model, a biased
advisers ideal outcome could be the same as the decision makers but not
in the following period. So, in a way, our biased advisers are similar to the
advocates in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) or Shin (1998), as they would
always support the same side, which may or not be the best choice for social
welfare. However, in our model only one adviser is chosen and the decision
maker does not know which side she is supporting. (3) The model presents
another di¤erence with the existing literature: the weight of the second period
is not restricted to be below one. Existing literature considers this parameter
as time discounting. In our model, the weight has two further explanations:
on the one hand, it represents the situation in which the second outcome is
more important than the rst even after discounting. On the other, the second
period could be considered as the sum of pay-o¤s of a series of future periods.
Finally (4), the advisers reputation update presented here is more complex,
for two reasons: rstly, because the adviser can belong to three, and not two,
distinct categories; then because in each period the government has the chance
to update the advisers reputation twice (after the advice is received and after
the state of the world is realised).
The model presented here falls into the category of reputation building
with non noisy signal. It enriches existing literature in several ways: (1) to our
knowledge, it is the rst paper on reputation building specically applied to
environmental issues; (2) it presents the situation in which the adviser can be of
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three di¤erent types: unbiased, green or brown. This is important, as it removes
the possibility for the unbiased adviser to signal their type via political correct-
ness; (3) we show that the principal can extract complete information in the
rst and -more surprisingly- in the second period. This is due to the fact that,
as all parameters are known at the beginning of the game, the decision maker
knows what the best strategy for a biased adviser is. (4) Interestingly, when
the advisers preferred strategy is going for reputation, she enters the second
period with unchangeds reputation. We also highlight how (5) to increase social
welfare, the decision maker can a¤ect the advisers strategy when the latter is
indi¤erent between her two possible strategies.
3.2 The Model
In this section we present the model. All the full mathematical derivations are
included in the Appendix.
A decision maker (he) has to take two consecutive, uncorrelated decisions
on a particular situation. The state of the world is the result of a Bernoulli
trial:
wi = f0; 1g
i = 1; 2
where i represents the period. Going back to out example, the decision
maker has to decide whether or not to allow pollution of the lake. He needs to
know if the current state of things is sustainable and therefore no intervention
is needed (w = 0) or if critical values will be crossed and action is required
(w = 1).
Knowing the state of the world, the decision would be consistent with it.
He can take a decision (d) in the continuous interval:
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di 2 [0; 1]
d represents the intensity of regulation, where d = 1 regulation is the
tightest and pollution has to stop completely. This means that, unless d = 0;
pollution activities are at least partly restricted. The policy maker is interested
in taking the right decision, according to the state of the world, regardless of
which one it is: in other words, there is not a more socially, morally or politi-
cally acceptable decision. $1 of environmental damages weighs as much as $1
of avoidable costs to the private sector.
The government has no information on the future outcome and therefore
he has no grounds to make an informed decision. For this reason, he seeks the
advice from a perfectly informed adviser. The adviser (she) may be unbiased,
or biased. If she is biased, she may prefer one or the other state of the world.
The government does not know which type she is, but he has a priori belief on
her reputation, ie. the probability that the agent is unbiased (p) or if biased
(1  p); the probability she is an environmentalist (g) always preferring w = 1;
or industry-lobbyist (1  g) preferring w = 0.
In other words, the probability of the government facing each type of advisor
can be expressed as follow:
P (unbiased) = p (3.1)
P (green) = (1  p)g (3.2)
P (brown) = (1  p)(1  g) (3.3)
Furthermore, to simplify the model, we assume:
g0 =
1
2
(3.4)
where the subscript represents the sequence of updates the reputation (0
therefore refers to the initial reputation). Eq. 3.4 means that, at the beginning,
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the government has no information on the probability that a biased adviser is
green. A green lobbyist wants the government to always intervene and set more
stringent environmental laws; a brown lobbyist instead wants the government
to never intervene, as new laws would imply extra costs for rms.
The adviser has perfect information about the state of the world and, con-
sidering that and her utility function, she provides binary advice f0; 1g to the
decision maker. After receiving the advice, the government updates his beliefs
on the adviser and takes a decision. Reputation updates are made using Bayes
rule.
At the end of each period, the true state of the world is observed and payo¤s
are calculated. The government considers if the advice he received was correct
or not and adjusts once more his beliefs on the advisers reputation. The second
period follows the same pattern.
Figure 3.1 shows the sequence of the moves in the game on a time-line.
Figure 3.1: The Sequence of Events
Before addressing the solution of the model, in the following sections we
will describe the main characteristics of the model: 3.2.1 presents the di¤erent
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utility functions; 3.2.2 the di¤erent kinds of advisers; 3.2.3 reputational con-
cerns; 3.2.4 reputation updates. 3.2.5 presents the decision rule for the adviser.
Finally 3.2.6 discusses the solution of the model and its implication on social
welfare.
3.2.1 Utility Functions
Let us now introduce the di¤erent utility functions of the players. The game is
played by a principal, the local administrator in our example, and an agent, the
lobbyist. The decision maker -the principal- cares about social welfare. Going
back to the example we have given before, if a rare species of animal lived in a
lake which is polluted by a rm, the government would have to decide whether
to implement new, more stringent environmental policies (if the pollution might
lead to extinction of this species) which represents a cost for the rm, or leave
things as they are. The government cares exclusively about taking the right
decision. We rule out political correctness or intrinsic preferences.
If we dene the state of the world in period i as wi;for wi = 0, there is
no need for intervention by the principal: although the lake is being polluted,
there is no risk of endangering its ecosystem; for wi = 1, on the contrary, the
environmental damages are so high that this species will eventually die out; it
is in societys best interest for the government to intervene and impose more
stringent environmental regulation (hence increasing the cost for the rm). We
can capture this with the simple function:
SW =
2
 
X
i=1
i (wi   di)2 (3.5)
Social welfare is the weighted sum of the welfare in the two di¤erent periods.
di is the decision taken in period i = 1; 2: The weights are expressed by i.
Since there are only two periods, we can express the weight on the second
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period relatively to the one on the rst (1 = 1 and 2 = ) and re-write the
previous equation as:
SW =   (w1   d1)2    (w2   d2)2 (3.6)
As said, if wi = 1(0), then the current level of pollution is (not) going
to further a¤ect the environment negatively and it would be in societys best
interest (not) to intervene.
di is continuous, twice di¤erentiable and its derivatives are continuous. The
function can take values included in the interval [0; 1]. d is a function of the
advice (a), the reputation of the adviser of being unbiased (expressed by the
probability that the adviser unbiased, p) and the probability of green bias (g).
The value of d represents the e¤ort of the government to o¤set potential
social cost (which depends on the occurrence of the state of the world w = 1),
which creates private costs for a particular group of individual in society. The
decision rule will have the form:
d = d(a; p; g)
Later we will consider the best decision rule for the decision maker. But
prior to that, we can make some general observations about it.
a) The higher the reputation of the adviser of being unbiased, the closer
the principal will follow her advice:
@ p d  a p
@p
< 0
lim
p!1
p d  a p= 0
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Clearly, if the government knows for sure that the adviser is unbiased, then
he will follow her advice fully. But the higher the possibility she is biased the
more the government will be cautious in accepting her advice blindly.
b) The more the government is convinced the adviser is biased, the more
his decision will approximate the uninformed choice of 1
2
4.
lim
p!0
d =
1
2
(3.7)
lim
p!0
p d  a p= 1
2
c) If g > 1
2
(i.e. if the adviser is biased, she is more likely to be green than
brown), then the government will give more weight to her advice if it is a = 0.
p = p g = g >
1
2
! d(0; p; g) <j d(1; p; g)  1 j (3.8)
^ g = g < 1
2
(3.9)
! j d(1; p; g)  1 j< d(0; p; g) (3.10)
or expressed in other terms:
g1 > g ! d(0; p; g) > d(0; p; g1) (3.11)
g1 > g ! d(1; p; g) > d(1; p; g1) (3.12)
The expressions in 3.8 and 3.10 simply state that if the government considers
the adviser to be more likely green (brown), then he will weight her advice more
if it is a = 0(1); as it is more likely to be against her interest.
4If the government has no information, then his problem is to maximise social
welfare, considering the two state of the world equally probable. In other words,
max(w   d)2 = max[12(0  d)2 + 12(1  d)2]
F.O.C. d = 12 :
giving the optimal decision.
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This is simple to understand through example. The government has to
decide whether to increase tax on CO2 emissions of cars and he seeks external
advice. The government has strong beliefs the adviser is a green lobbyist. If she
advises to increase tax, the government will follow the advice, but weighting
heavily the possibility that the advice may convey no information. But if she
were to advise against the increase, then the government will give more weight
to the advice, as seemingly against her own interest (and therefore increasing
the chance the adviser is unbiased). If a supposedly brown lobbyist recommends
to the government that the species living in the lake is endangered and action
ought to be taken, the government will take the advice into consideration more
than if it suspected her to be green-biased.
Finally,
d) For any given reputation of the adviser,
d(1; p; g) > d(0; p; g) (3.13)
This simply means that, everything else constant, the decision is higher
if the advice is 1 rather than 0. The principal may take into consideration a
lot, or very little the advice, but since there is a possibility that this conveys
information about the true state of the world, the condition must hold.
The social welfare function is convex; this implies that the loss increases
more than proportionately, the larger the mistake is in guessing the real state
of the world. Furthermore, the governments costs of deviation are symmetrical.
In other words, social welfare decreases in the same way whether it over/under-
legislates: the important thing is how far his decision is from the ideal one. As
it is expressed by the Eq. 3.5, the government has no preference for either state
of the world, provided he is able to forecast it correctly: there is no intrinsic
preference for either a cleaner world or a more industry-oriented one.
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One last note on social welfare. The function is the sum of the costs borne
in each period by society: Eq. 3.5 represents the net social cost arising from
(i) a particular situation, and (ii) the decision that is preventively taken. The
government will have set all his other policy to maximise social welfare, con-
sidering all the other aspects of the economy. In other words, when considering
social welfare, we do not dene it as the sum of the playersutilities.
Let us consider now the advisers pay o¤ functions. For a lobbyist, this is
an opportunity to inuence the government to pursue her private interest. The
unbiased adviser has similar preferences to the principals, i.e. she is motivated
by social welfare.
POu =  
2X
i=1
i (wi   di) (3.14)
where u stands for unbiased. It is easy to see that the function is maximised
when w = d; an unbiased adviser does not have preferences for a cleaner
environment or the contrary. He cares for the true state of the world.
If instead the adviser is biased, then she will want the government to weight
a particular interest more (the environment welfare or the minimisation of costs
for the rm), regardless of the state of the world.
The biased advisers will have similar function, independent from the realised
state of the world; in particular:
POb =  
2X
i=1
idi (3.15)
POg =  
2X
i=1
^i (1  di) (3.16)
where the subscript b; g stands for brown and green. The period weighs
; ; ^ need not be the same for the government and the di¤erent advisers
(hence the di¤erent notation). However, for simplicity, they are assumed to be
identical; from now we will call them .
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We can imagine that the utility functions 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16 are actually
identical but for the biased advisers the actual state of the world is substituted
with the most desired state of the world (0 in the case of the brown adviser and
1 for the green one): the farther the decision is from what the adviser wishes
for, the worse o¤ she is.
On the one hand, a brown lobbyist wants to be sure that rms will not
face increased costs by an imposed adoption of new greener policies, regardless
whether current practice is seriously harming the environment or not: the social
costs are completely disregarded.
On the other hand, an environmentalist seeks to eliminate those damages,
regardless of the implied costs for the rms. For a green lobbyist payo¤ is
highest when the government plays 1, imposing more stringent environmental
policies, even when the extra burden on rms is disproportionate to the foregone
environmental damage.
We have previously dened this as an absolute bias. Looking closely at it,
it may look as though the green adviser is more of a rm-hater, disguised as
environmentalist. This is a common assumption in this branch of literature.
Let us assess how realistic this assumption is.
As much as it is possible to identify a handful of existing organisations that
can actually fall into this category, our aim is to describe an agent whose utility
derives by an unbound love for a cause, rather than an irrational hate for some-
thing. Indeed, it is possible to explain this characteristic in a more realistic and
compelling way. As we have mentioned before, we are characterising absolute
biased advisers. This implies that their advice will be completely independent
from the actual state of the world, and therefore constant even when the state
of the world changes.
Additionally, it is also easy to add further explanatory power to this func-
tion. As we have said, wi represents the state of the world of a particular phe-
nomenon that may (or may not) a¤ect the environment. An environmentalist
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would prefer the government to always take action, regardless of the possi-
bility of the endangerment of a species: she will prefer a cleaner environment,
regardless of the necessity or economic e¢ ciency of the action. In other words,
even if that particular animal is not in danger, for the green adviser cleaner is
always better. Are we then describing an irrational behaviour? The answer is
no, as this behaviour can be explained if we consider di¤erent preferences and
di¤erent discounting.
The bottom line here is that, unlike many applications of biased advisers,
this particular setting has an almost unique characteristic: the cost borne by
the rm has the e¤ect of improving the environment and therefore increasing
the utility of an environmentalist, regardless of the state of the world. This
characterisation of the green environmentalists draws similarities with Morriss
political correctness: one state of the world holds intrinsic features for some
people in society which makes it preferable, regardless of reality.
One nal note: as we will see, game repetition will make this behaviour less
radical.
3.2.2 Adviser and advice
At the beginning of period 1, the government knows that the probability of
choosing each category of adviser is as follows:
P (unb) = p0
P (green j biased) = g0 = 1
2
P (b row n j biased) = 1  g0 = 1
2
P (green) = (1  p0)1
2
As we have already mentioned, for simplicity we assume that the initial
probability of facing a green and brown adviser is the same.
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The adviser is (perfectly) informed about the future state of the world. The
government asks for a binary advice. The agent therefore has to decide what
is in her best interest and then communicate the advice as:
ai = f0; 1g i = 1; 2
If she is unbiased she will always truthfully disclose her information.
On the other hand, if the adviser is biased and the outcome is contrary
to her best interest, then she has to make a strategic decision: if she lies she
will get a higher payo¤ in the current period; however, when the government
realises the bad quality of the advice, he will downgrade her reputation and
disregard her advice in the following period. Alternatively, she could decide to
disclose the truth and gain more trust for the following period. This part will
be developed analytically in the following sections.
The government adjusts his beliefs on the adviser and then takes his deci-
sion. A green adviser is more likely to recommend action, while a brown one is
more inclined to advise to leave things as they are.
3.2.3 Information Update
The government updates the advisers reputation in each period in two di¤erent
ways, in response to the two information he receives: (a) the advice; and (b)
the state of the world. On the one hand, he will consider the advice per se, i.e.
which of the two state of the world is advised; then he will evaluate the quality
of the advice, i.e. if the forecast was accurate or not. Probability updates are
made using Bayesrule.
In particular:
a) after the advice is announced,
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pi+1 = P (unb j ai = a) = P (ai = 0 j unb)P (unb)
P (ai = a)
(3.17)
gi+1 = P (green j ai = a) = P (ai = 0 j green)P (green)
P (ai = a)
(3.18)
b) after the rst state of the world is observed,
P (unb j ai = 0 ^ wi = 0) = P (ai = 0 ^ wi = 0 j unb)P (unb)
P (ai = 0 ^ wi = 0) (3.19)
P (unb j ai = 0 ^ wi = 1) = 0 ) g = 0 (3.20)
Let us consider these general expressions and make some considerations. In
period 1, if a brown adviser nds out that w1 = 1, she knows that by telling
the truth, her payo¤ in the current period would be lower than if she would
lie. This can be seen by plugging Eq. 3.13 in Eq. 3.15 show. However, the
price to pay for her honesty is attenuated, as Eq. 3.18 and 3.11 shows. In fact,
as the advice is a1 = 1, then the probability the adviser is green increases
(as a proportion of the biased advisers) and therefore the decision maker will
discount this by decreasing his decision. This latter e¤ect is the rst component
of the reputation strategy.
Eq. 3.20 conveys an important condition about the reputation update.
As the adviser is perfectly informed, if the advice turns out to be wrong,
then the government knows that she is biased and therefore he also knows that
the advice in period 2 will surely not convey any information and hence take
the decision to disregard the advice in the last period.
If in period 1 a brown adviser chooses not to disclose her information (a1 = 0
when w1 = 1), then this implies that as the adviser is perfectly informed, she
cannot be unbiased (p = 0)5 nor green (g = 0), as only a brown adviser would
lie and communicate 0 when the state of the world is actually 1.
5In fact P (a 6= w p unb) = 0:
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The government in this model utilises his information fully, conditioning to
two di¤erent information the probability of the adviser to be unbiased. It is
important to note that if the government were to update only conditional to
the fact that the advice is actually equal to the state of the world, he would
put together the two distinct alternative options:
(1) a = 0
(2) a = 1
But clearly a green (brown) adviser will advise 1(0) more frequently. Once
the policy maker knows that a = 0, the probability that the adviser is green
decreases, as a green adviser would advise against her interest less. This leads
to the above expression which uses all the available information.
Period 2 provides the opportunity for two updates, but only one will feed in
the quality of the decision: once the second state of the world is observed, the
game is nished and the information cannot be used to improve on the decision
making. When -instead- the second advice is revealed, then the update will be
the same as in (a) above. However, solving Eq. 3.18, we can note that:
P (green j a2 = 0) = 0
P (b row n j a2 = 1) = 0! P (green) = 1  p3
As there is no reputational concern in period 2, one of the two biases can
be ruled out. This means that this period will be identical to the second period
in Morriss model.
3.2.4 Advisers strategies
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Unbiased adviser
If the adviser is unbiased, there is actually no strategic decision to take: in fact
the actions in her best interest are actually also maximising social welfare. She
will choose to disclose her information in both cases.
The adviser gives truthful advice. If the principal could know that the
adviser is unbiased, he will follow the advice fully and social welfare would be:
di = ai i = 1; 2
POu = SW =   (w1   a1)   (w2   a2)
as ai = wi ! SW = 0
which is the maximum attainable as
SW  0
meaning that all the information has been passed to the principal and social
welfare (and private prot) maximised.
However, this is not possible, as the type of the adviser is unknown to the
principal. Therefore the decision will reect the reputation of the adviser (p)
and her advice. We can state that
@POu
@p
 @SW
@p
> 0 (3.21)
At the end of period 1, the payo¤ will reect this information asymmetry.
In period 2, the reputation of the agent will be higher and therefore the payo¤
higher, as a direct consequence of the condition expressed in Eq. 3.21 and of
the fact that the advice will once more be truthful.
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Biased adviser
More interesting is the case in which the adviser is biased. In this case, since
her prot function di¤ers from social welfare, disclosing her information may
not be in her best interest. Let us consider the case of a brown adviser6. She
may face two di¤erent scenarios:
a) w1 = 0. In this case, it is irrelevant that she is biased. In period 1, she
will (truthfully) advise the government to intervene, as their prot functions
coincide. In fact, recollecting Eq. 3.14 and Eq. 3.15:
SW1 =   (w1   d1) =  d1
POb;1 =  d1
As in the case of the unbiased adviser, the closer the decision is to the advice,
the higher the prot in this period. However, there is a major di¤erence. In
fact, the biased adviser will enter period 2 with a higher reputation of being
unbiased (which is untrue). In the second period, whatever the state of the
world, she will advise to play 0; as there is no room for punishment afterwards,
being there "no tomorrow" to apply it. This also implies that if the true state
of the world is 1, the adviser will have a higher prot, but social welfare will
decrease. If, instead, the state of the world in Period 2 is once again 0, then goals
coincide, information is passed fully and social welfare is maximised (taking into
consideration the constrain of the information asymmetry).
b) w1 = 1. This event poses a dilemma to the adviser. In fact, if she sends
an advice a1 = 0 and lowers the decision in period 1, the government takes a
decision in the wrong direction. However, in the following period, the decision
maker will know that she is denitely biased and play d2 = 12 .
6As the model is perfectly symmetric, we present only the case in which the
adviser is brown. Mutas mutandis, the following discussion holds for a green adviser.
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Alternatively, the adviser discloses her information in period 1 sending the
message a1 = 1 , and have a lower payo¤ in period 1; this would however
improve her reputation for the following period and therefore increase her payo¤
in period 2. Her choice will depend upon which option will give her the highest
payo¤. This choice is presented in the next paragraph.
3.2.5 Advisers decision rule
As we have seen in the previous paragraph, a biased adviser may nd herself in
the situation in which she has to decide whether to build reputation in period
1 and harvest it in period 2, or go for a larger payo¤ in period 1 and then pay
the consequences in period 2. The adviser will see which alternative will give
the highest payo¤.
POrep > POnorep (3.22)
where rep stands for "reputation (ie. disclose information) and norep the
opposite situation.
If Eq. 3.22 is satised she will opt to bank on her reputation and if it is not,
she will lie in Period 1 and pay the consequence in Period 2. Using Eq. 3.15,
we can specify the previous inequality:
 d1(1)  d2(0) >  d1(0)   1
2
(3.23)
The rst term on each side represents the payo¤ in period 1, depending
whether the advice is 1 (left hand side) or 0 (right hand side). The second
term represents the payo¤ in period 2. If the adviser chooses to disclose her
information, her reputation is now higher (hence, the government will listen
to her more); in the other case, the government knows for sure the adviser is
(brown) biased:
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To solve the inequality 3.23, we need to nd the decision rule for each period.
Let us start from period 2. If the adviser has given bad advice in period 1, then
the government knows that:
p02 = P (unb) = 0
This also implies that the governments decision will be7:
d2 =
1
2
8a2
If, instead the adviser has played a truthful advice in period 1, then her
reputation is higher than zero. As we have assumed her to be brown, then in
period 2 she will play 0: The decision maker will update his beliefs as follows:
P (unb j a2 = 0) = p3
P (b row n j a2 = 0) = 1  p3
as a green adviser would never play 0, this category is ruled out.
Table 3.1: Strategies after the second advice is equal to 0
w2 = 0 w2 = 1
unbiased 0 1
biased (brown) 0 0
Table 3.1 summarises the decision makers information after he receives
the advice. It is important to note how at this stage, this model departs from
previous literature. In fact, in Morriss model government knows that if he
receives an advice a2 = 0, then the adviser is unbiased; in this case, this
certainty is impossible, as if the government does receive a2 = 0, then he
7See condition 3.7 and demonstration in footnote.
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would have to rule out the possibility that he is facing a green adviser and his
set of information can be written as reported in table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Strategies after the second advice is equal to 1
w2 = 0 w2 = 1
unbiased 0 1
biased (green) 1 1
Therefore, the second advice does improve the decision makers information,
ruling out one possible bias, but it does not allow him to be sure that in a given
case the adviser is unbiased. Table 3.3 summarises the information the decision
maker has after he receives the second advice.
Table 3.3: General strategies after the second advice is disclosed
w2 = i w2 = j
unbiased i j
Green j=1; i=0
Brown j=0; i=1 j j
Then, the government will update his beliefs as follow8:
p3 = P (unbiased j a2 = 0) =
1
2
p2
1
2
p2 + (1  p2)g2 (3.24)
Now he can make his nal decision, by determining the probability that the
advice is truthful, namely:
p = P (w2 = 0 j a2 = 0) (3.25)
p =
1
2  p3 (3.26)
8p2 = P (unbiased j a2 = j)
=
P (a2 = j j unbiased)P (unbiased)
P (a2 = j)
=
1
2p0
1
2p0 + (1  p0)
=
p0
2  p0
207
The decision rule is simply the weighted average of (i) following the advice
(times the probability the adviser is telling the truth) and (ii) the alternative
(times the probability that the adviser is lying9).
d2 = p
a2 + (1  p)a2 (3.27)
d2(a2 = 0) =
1  p3
2  p3 (3.28)
d2(a2 = 1) =
1
2  p3 (3.29)
Eq. 3.28 and 3.29 represent the solution to period 2. It is easy to see what
happens when p = 0 (d2= 12) and p = 1 (d2= 1).
Now that we have solved period 2, we can go back to the rst period. The
adviser communicates her rst advice and the policy maker will update his
beliefs as follows:
p1 = P (unb j a1 = 0) = P (a1 = 0 j unb)P (unb)
P (a1 = 0)
= p0 (3.30)
p01 = P (unb j a1 = 1) =
P (a1 = 1 j unb)P (unb)
P (a1 = 1)
= p0 (3.31)
g1 = P (green j a1 = 0) = P (a1 = 0 j green)P (green)
P (a1 = 0)
=  (3.32)
g01 = P (green j a1 = 1) =
P (a1 = 1 j green)P (green)
P (a1 = 1)
= 1   (3.33)
where  is the probability that a biased adviser will disclose a harmful
information in period 1.
 = P (a1 = 0 j green)
9In passing, this is the same as the weighted average of the advice times the
probability of the adviser being unbiased and playing 12 multiplied the probability
the adviser is biased.
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 is strictly dependent upon the values of  and p0: For higher , the
adviser has a higher incentive to su¤er a loss in the rst period to enjoy a
better reputation in the following period and therefore  increases. The relation
between  and p0 is more complex and it will be analysed later in this section.
It follows that  can be further qualied as follows:
[0;
1
2
] (3.34)
The decision maker now has to make his decision. This will be in the form
of Eq. 3.27.
p = P (w1 = 0 j a1 = 0) (3.35)
p =
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  )
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  2) (3.36)
d1 = p
a1 + (1  p)a1 (3.37)
d1(0) = 1  1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  )
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  2) (3.38)
=
(1  p1) (22   3+ 1)
p1 + 2(1  p1)(22 + 1  2) (3.39)
For the symmetry of the model, it is easy to see how:
p0 = P (w1 = 1 j a1 = 1) (3.40)
p0 =
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  )
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  2) = p
 (3.41)
d01(1) =
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  )
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  2) = 1  d1(0) (3.42)
After the true state of the world is observed, the government updates again
the advisers reputation:
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p02 = P (unb j a1 = 0 6= w1) = 0 (3.43)
p2 = P (unb j a1 = 0 = w1) = p0
(2  1)(1  p0) + 1 (3.44)
g02 = P (green j a1 = 0 6= w1) = 0 (3.45)
g2 = P (green j a1 = 0 = w1) = 
2
(  1
2
)(1  p0) + 12
(3.46)
We have now derived all we need to solve the advisers dilemma. Going
back to the expression 3.23, we can re-write it as follows:
 d1(1)  d2(0) >  d1(0)   1
2
(3.47)
[
1
2
  d2(0)] > 1  2d1(0)
 > 2
1
2
  d1(0)
1
2
  d2(0) (3.48)
Eq. 3.47 uses the symmetry of the model, for which:
d1(0) = 1  d1(1) (3.49)
Condition 3.4810 tells us that if  is larger than the expression on the right
hand side, then the adviser chooses to tell the truth in the rst period. However,
to solve the condition above, we need to determine the value of .  is the value
for which condition 3.48 is exactly satised.
10If the adviser is green then:
 d1(0)  d2(1) >  d1(1)   1
2
[
1
2
  d2(1)] > 1  2d1(1)
 > 2
d1(1)  12
d2(1)  12
By using Eq. 3.49, it is easy to see how this is the same condition expressed in Eq.
3.48.
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 = 2
d1(1)  12
d2(1)  12
(3.50)
For each value of  and p0; Eq. 3.50 is solved for a di¤erent value of : In
passing, we can dene  as:
 j POrep = POnorep
that is the value which makes the adviser indi¤erent between the two strate-
gies. This means that if this value is within the range of feasibility [0; 1
2
] , then
the adviser is indi¤erent to the two strategies. If the equation is satised for
 < 0, then the adviser will choose not to disclose information in the rst
period, whilst if  > 1
2
, then the adviser will go for reputation.
Conclusion 29 Once the parameters are set, the advisers strategy is univo-
cally set. When the value of  is included in the feasible range, the adviser is
indi¤erent to her possible strategies.
Conclusion 30 When the critical value of  is higher than 0.5, then the
adviser always prefers to go for reputation. The vice versa holds true if  is
instead below zero.
Let us try to express Eq. 3.50 only in terms of  and p0: Plugging in Eq.
3.29 and 3.42 into Eq. 3.50 we obtain an equation11 which cannot be explicitly
solved for :
To gain a better insight into how the model works, we solve this graphically:
we substitute  with di¤erent values and graph the function in terms of  and
p0 and using a surface graph, we can nd the equilibrium values of 12. Putting
11 =  2(2+ p0   2p0)
p0
  84p0 + 84 + 43p0   43   22p20   22p0 + 42 + p20   p0 + p0
(22   + p0   22p0 + 1) (4+ p0   42   4p0 + 42p0   2)
12These graphs can be found in Appendix 3.
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together all the information, we can then derive a single graph. Figure 3.2 shows
a biased advisers the preferred strategy for di¤erent combination (; p0).
Figure 3.2: Summary of a Biased Advisers strategy
The x-axis represents p0 and  is represented on the y-axis. The blue
(bottom right) area represents the combinations for which the adviser is better
o¤not going for reputation. The red (top right) area shows the values for which
she is better o¤ invest in reputation and the purple (central) area where she is
indi¤erent between the two strategies.
Let us consider gure 3.2: for low values of ; as the second period is not so
valuable compared to the rst, reputation building is relatively non important.
Therefore, if the initial reputation is high, the marginal gain in reputation in
period 2, arising from disclosing information will not be high enough to o¤set
the loss made in period 1 (which is very high, as the decision maker will give
great consideration to her advice, since her reputation is so high): it is better
to bank on the initial reputation and then, in period 2, the adviser knows that
her "punishment" is going to be 1
2
. However, d2 = 12 is less damaging than
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disclosing her information in period 1, as d1(a = 0) << 12 , being her reputation
high.
Conclusion 31 For values of  lower than 2, there is always a certain value
p for which if p0 < p then the adviser is indi¤erent between the two strategies,
whilst if p0 > p, then the adviser opts for not disclosing her information in
period 1.
In other terms, we can express that  < 2:
@p
@
> 0
Furthermore,
lim p = 0
!0
(3.51)
lim p = 1
!2
(3.52)
Condition 3.51 is intuitive: if the second period has no value at all, then
the adviser will try to extract as much prot from period 1 and not care about
the consequences at all. Condition 3.52 can be understood easily too. In fact,
by substituting  = 2; in condition 3.50, we obtain:
d2(1) = d1(1) (3.53)
which is satised for p = 1:
Conclusion 32 The closer  to 2, the closer p to 1. The closer  to 0, the
closer p to 0.
For  = 2, the adviser is always indi¤erent to the two strategies, for any
value of p0.
213
If we now consider  > 2, after the critical value of p; the value of  for which
condition 3.50 is satised is higher than 1
2
: Remembering that  is probability
with which a green (brown) adviser would send the signal 0(1), it means that
the adviser always discloses her information and opts for reputation. This is
because, as  increases, so does the cost of lying in period one. Here the more
her reputation increases, the more the biased adviser wants to invest in her
reputation, as the gains in period 2 are very high. This is true even if the
higher p the lower the marginal gains in reputation. In passing, we can also
note that:
@p
@
< 0
lim p = 0
!+1
lim p = 1
!2
Conclusion 33 For values of  higher than 2, there is always a certain value
p for which if p0 < p then the adviser is indi¤erent between the two strategies,
whilst if p0 > p, then the adviser opts for reputation in period 1. The closer 
to 2, the closer p to 1. The higher , the closer p to 0.
3.2.6 Governments Decision and Strategy
We are now ready to see what the governments decision is and his possible
strategies. As we know, the government updates his beliefs using Bayesrule
and his decisions are the welfare maximising ones, as described in Eq. 3.27.
The adviser will make her choice has described in paragraph 3.2.5.
The government will get good advice if: (a) the adviser is unbiased; (b) if
the state of world is favourable to the biased adviser; or (c) in period one if it
is in the biased advisers best interest to disclose her information.
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However, as his information about the type of adviser is noisy, he does
not know when he actually gets good advice and part of the information he
receives is lost. Even so, it is possible to identify situations in which full extrac-
tion of information is possible. These will be presented separately in the next
paragraphs.
The advisers best strategy is reputation
As the decision maker knows the values of  and p0; then knowing the di¤erent
advisersutility functions, he can infer what the biased advisers best strategy
is. In fact, we have showed how the decision depends on what value  assumes.
This in turn is determined univocally by  and p0; parameters that are set
at the beginning of the game. If this is "reputation", then the decision maker
knows that the message is true with probability one. In fact, if the state of
the world is 0, the unbiased and green advisers will pass on their information
(as it is always in their interest) and so would the brown adviser (as going for
reputation is her best strategy).
This is particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, because the optimal
decision becomes:
p = P (w1 = 1 j a1 = 1) (3.54)
p = 1 (3.55)
d1 = p
a1 + (1  p)a1 (3.56)
d1 = 1 = a1 (3.57)
SW1 = 0 (3.58)
What previous literature seems to have overlooked is that as p0 and  are
known parameters, then  is known and this leads to this situation in which
full extraction of information is possible in period 1.
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Conclusion 34 For a subset of the feasible (; p0); in period 1 the decision
maker can extract all the information from the adviser, achieving maximum
social welfare.
The other side of the coin is -however- about reputation. Deriving the
updated reputation, we obtain:
p1 = P (unb j a1 = 0) = P (a1 = 0 j unb)P (unb)
P (a1 = 0)
= p0 (3.59)
g1 = P (green j a1 = 0) = 1
2
= g0 (3.60)
p2 = P (unb j a1 = 0 = w1) = p01
2
(21
2
  1)(1  1
2
p0) + 1
= p0 (3.61)
g2 = P (green j a1 = 0 = w1) =
1
2
2
1
2
(1
2
  1
2
)(1  1
2
p0) +
1
2
=
1
2
(3.62)
p2 = p0 (3.63)
g2 = g0 (3.64)
Eq. 3.63 and 3.64 show the consequence of using fully the available infor-
mation in period 1: there is no information update entering period 2. In other
words, by choosing to invest in reputation, a biased adviser makes a sacrice
in period 1 simply to enter period 2 with her initial reputation. This is still
a rational decision, as the alternative would be to signal her biasedness and
drive her reputation to zero. In terms of social welfare, this is a cost, should
the adviser be unbiased, but also an opportunity, if the adviser is biased.
Conclusion 35 Whenever [; p0] are so that a biased adviser would decide to
opt for reputation, the adviser enters period 2 with unchanged reputation.
p3 =
1
2
p0
1
2
p0 + (1  p0)12
= p0 (3.65)
p =
1
2  p0 (3.66)
d2(a2 = 1) =
1
2  p0 (3.67)
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Eq. 3.65 shows that after the second advice is communicated, the reputation
has not changed (the only variation is that if a2 = 1 ! g3 = 1 and mutas
mutandis in the other scenario). This result o¤ers a very interesting insight:
even when the adviser has a poor reputation, the decision maker may achieve
the position of taking a good decision.
The advisers best strategy is to lie in period one
If the decision maker knows that the adviser wont disclose painful information
(ie. POnorep > POrep), then his updated beliefs are as follows (obtained by
substituting  = 0 in the original expressions):
a1 = 0 (3.68)
p1 = p0 (3.69)
g1 = 0 (3.70)
p =
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)
1
2
p1 + (1  p1) =
1
2  p0 (3.71)
d1(0) =
1  p0
2  p0 (3.72)
p02 = P (unb j a1 = 0 6= w1) = 0 (3.73)
p2 = P (unb j a1 = 0 = w1) = p0 (3.74)
Eq. 3.70 shows yet another interesting feature of this subset of the solution:
as the policy maker knows that a green adviser would never play a = 0, after
receiving such signal, he knows that the adviser is either brown or unbiased. Eq.
3.74 gives another insight into the solution of the game. In fact, the probability
that the adviser may be unbiased (p) is unchanged. This is quite obivous. As
we have ruled out the possibility that the adviser is green, then both unbiased
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and brown adviser would disclose their information with the same probability
(= 1).
Conclusion 36 If [; p0] are so that a biased adviser would not go for repu-
tation, then the decision maker can rule out one of the type of biases after he
receives the rst advice.
Conclusion 37 If the advisers best strategy is not to disclose her information,
but the advice in period 1 is correct, the adviser enters period 2 with unchanged
reputation.
Once period 1 is over, the state of the world is revealed. If the adviser lied
in period 1, then the decision maker knows she is biased and would discount
completely whatever advice he receives (and play d2 = 12). If, instead the advice
was truthful, he updates his belief. When the second advice is announced, the
decision maker makes the following update (according to the advice):
p3 = P (unb j a2 = 0 ^ a1 = 0) = p0
2  p0 (3.75)
d2 =
2  2p0
4  3p0 (3.76)
p03 = P (unb j a2 = 1 ^ a1 = 0) =
1
2
p2
1
2
p2 + (1  p2)  0 = 1 (3.77)
d02 = 1 (3.78)
Eq. 3.75 and 3.76 show the reputational update and decision, if the advice
is the same as the one received in period 1. More interesting are however Eq.
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3.77 and 3.78. As in period 1, the advice was 0, the policy maker could rule
out that the adviser was green. In this period, since the advice is 1; he is sure
the adviser is unbiased, as a brown adviser would never play a2 = 1. This has
an important and unexpected consequence: in the situation in which a biased
adviser is better o¤not disclosing her information in period 1, the policy maker
can either face the possibility of having a babbling equilibrium or he could be
in a position to extract complete information from the advice.
Conclusion 38 If the adviser is unbiased, if the biased advisers best strategy
would have been witholding information in period one and if the states of the
world in the two periods are di¤erent, then the decision maker can extract full
information in period 2, obtaining the maximum social welfare possible in that
period.
The adviser is indifferent between the two strategies.
Finally, there is the case in which the adviser is indi¤erent between the two
strategies. This is the situation that has been discussed in the existing literaure.
In particular, if the adviser opts for reputation, then she will enter period 2
with a higher reputation. For any value of ; the adviser enters the last decision
process with an improved reputation. This will lead to a decision closer to the
advice. Alternatively, if she chooses to bank in period 1, she will be disqualied
as adviser in period 2.
The question is, then: what can the decision maker do to improve social
welfare? He knows that the adviser is indi¤erent between the two strategies. If
we assume the adviser is self interested (but not "evil"), we could then expect
she would choose the decision makers preferred option. If that is the case, the
adviser will choose to maximise social welfare.
Conclusion 39 If the adviser is self-interested and indi¤erent between the two
strategies, her choice will maximise expected social welfare.
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However, we could also assume that the adviser may randomise her choice.
In this scenario, the decision maker does not know which strategy the adviser
has gone for. This means that expected social welfare becomes:
E(SW ) =
1
2
SWrep +
1
2
SWnorep (3.79)
The decision maker could try to modify the advisers decision process in
order to inuence her advice. We propose here a way this could happen.
Firstly, the decision maker has to evaluate whether he has any preference
between the two strategies. The reasoning behind this decision is as follows:
if the decision maker pushes the adviser towards no reputation, the risk in
period 1 is to get a bad advice, but then minimise the loss in period 2, by
simply playing d2 = 12 : If the advice was instead correct, then on top of the
good choice made in period 1, period 2 o¤ers two opportunities and a threat. In
fact the decision maker has now 1
2
p to obtain a di¤erent advice than in period 1
and therefore he will be able to fully guess the state of the world. Alternatively,
he has 50% chance13 to get a good advice and play a decision that is closer to
the truth (as reputation has improved after period 1). There is also the case
that 1
2
(1 p) times he will get a bad advice and, since he is relying more on this
advice he will reduce social welfare. If he, instead, opts for reputation, then he
will achieve maximum social welfare in period 1 and enters period 2 with the
initial reputation, and therefore reducing the potential losses (and gains) with
respect to period 2 in the other scenario.
More formally, he will choose by seeing which strategy leads to the highest
social welfare:
13 1
2p that the state of the world is the same as in period 1 and the adviser is
unbiased plus 12(1 p), that is the probability that the adviser is biased but the state
of the world is favourable to her and therefore she gives good advice.
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SWrep > SWnorep (3.80)
 [w1   d1(0)]2   [w2   d2(1)]2 >  [w1   d1(1)]2    1
4
(3.81)
 >
1  2d1(0)
(d2(1)  14)2
(3.82)
d1 and d2 depend on p0,  and : However, as we have said  has already
been univocally determined by the advisers preferences and the others are
parameters. Therefore, the decision maker knows at the beginning of the game
the sign of the condition 3.8214. As it is not possible to nd  explicitly, it is
not possible to solve this condition either. However, we can o¤er an example.
Let us consider Figure 3.2. If we assume that  = 2 and p0 = 0:8, then the
adviser is indi¤erent between the two strategies. The value of  is found by
substituting these values in Eq. 3.50. We obtain:
205 + 224 + 63   102 + 32  10 = 0
By interpolation, we nd that  ' 0:3294. Substituting the values of p0, 
and  in Condition 3.82, we nd that the condition is satised, meaning that
the decision maker prefers the adviser to disclose her information in the rst
period. The decision maker could then try to persuade the adviser to choose his
preferred strategy by o¤ering to play a decision in period 2 dened as follows:
~d2 = d2   ( 1)a2  "
" is a small positive number which satises:
14In passing, it is interesting to note how the sign of this condition is not univocal,
meaning that social welfare could be maximised by either strategy.
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" j 1
2
SWrep +
1
2
SWnorep < SW ( ~d2) (3.83)
 [w2   ~d2(1)]2 <  [w2   d2(1)]2   [w1   d1(1)]2    1
4
" <
1
2
  d1(1)

  1
2
(
1
4
  d22) (3.84)
in other words, the di¤erence between the social welfare in the two di¤erent
scenarios15. In this way, the adviser will choose to go for reputation, receiving
a payo¤ of
POrep( ~d2) > POnorep = POrep (3.85)
Condition 3.85 shows that the incentive would be worth it for the adviser.
To see if this is a credible promise, we need to see how this modication of the
decision rule a¤ects social welfare:
SWrep > SWnorep (3.86)
1
2
SWrep >
1
2
SWnorep (3.87)
1
2
SWrep +
1
2
SWnorep = E(SW ) > SWnorep (3.88)
Finally, using Eq. 3.83, we obtain the desired condition:
SWrep( ~d2) > E(SW ) > SWnorep
Expression 3.86 tells us that social welfare in the presence of incentives is
higher than the one obtained if the adviser lies in period 1, but most impor-
tantly that social welfare is higher than the expected social welfare using the
15The full expression would be:  [w1 d1(0)]2 [w2  ~d2(1)]2 <  [w1 d1(0)]2 
[w2   d2(1)]2   [w1   d1(1)]2    14 :
The rst term on each side is identical and therefore evened out.
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initial decision rule. This means that the incentive is credible and the equilib-
rium a stable one.
Conclusion 40 If the adviser is indi¤erent between her strategies and if she
randomises her choice, then the decision maker can o¤er her an incentive to
choose the strategy that maximises social welfare, increasing her payo¤ as well
as expected social welfare.
On the other hand, let us consider whether:
SWrep 7 SWrep( ~d2) (3.89)
We have assumed that social welfare is maximised when the adviser discloses
her information in period 1. If the adviser lies in period 2, as with the new
decision rule relies more on the advice, social welfare will be lower than the
one obtainable with old decision rule. However, it is interesting to note that if
the adviser is unbiased, or if the state of the world is favourable to the biased
adviser, then a2 = w2 and therefore
(w2   ~d2)2 < (w2   d2)2
meaning that the decision is closer to the state of the world and therefore
social welfare obtained by o¤ering incentives to the adviser is higher than the
one we would have got with the original decision rule.
Conclusion 41 If a biased adviser would be indi¤erent to which strategy to
play, the decision maker can provide an incentive in order to make her choose
the option that leads to the higher social welfare. Furthermore, if the state of
the world is favourable to the biased adviser or if she is unbiased, then not only
is the advisers payo¤ higher, but the incentive will increase the achieved social
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welfare; furthermore it will be higher than the one potentially achievable with
the original decision rule.
One nal observation. By changing the decision rule, the policy maker leads
this third scenario (adviser being indi¤erent to the two strategies) back to the
initial two: if the policy makers preferred strategy is for the adviser to go for
reputation, and he o¤ers her the right incentive, then he knows that using the
new decision rule he will get a truthful advice in period 1 with probability 1.
3.2.7 Civil Servants
As an extension of the main model, let us consider how the role of civil servants
may a¤ect the model presented. The British Government is the nations largest
employer of professional economists (along with many other experts of di¤erent
disciplines). It seems therefore plausible to assume that these specialists may
provide some sort of lter to the advisers messages. As they become more and
more knowledgeable in their departments, they may be able to realize when
an adviser is not being truthful or to some extent- to act as deterrent for a
biased adviser. In literature, this role has been already considered. Hubbard
(1998) and Emons (1997) and Dulleck et al (2001) all point to the fact that if
the person who is going to purchase an experience good or service has some
knowledge in the eld would be less likely to be overcharged (or undersold).
The examples presented vary from mechanics services to surgical operations.
It is important to answer two questions. (a) Could this be credibly applied
to our case? And if so, (b) how does this a¤ect our results.
The answer to the rst question is: possibly, but unlikely. The reasons for
this are diverse: (i) as Leaver (2009) has pointed out, a civil servant may not
whistle-blow, as minimal squawkmay be best for his career; (ii) civil servants
may not have the freedom to dismiss information, due to bureaucratic rules;
(iii) decisions on environmental issues often require advanced multidisciplinary
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knowledge which is very di¢ cult to nd in a single individual and collating
information from di¤erent people would be costly, time consuming and di¢ cult
considering tight resources available; (iv) issues are often based on new data
and research which may have had limited circulation or peer review. It would
therefore be unlikely that a GES member would be able to have an informed
opinion on the issue (knowing that Error Type I are more accepted and Type
II); (v) problems (and solutions) may not be always straight-forward. This
means that correct results that look counter-intuitive may be deemed as awed,
even by a well-meaning civil servant. As example, a report from a consultant to
Defra has reported how air pollution has a net positive impact on agriculture:
although it may sound wrong, the analysis behind it is considered the best
available and completely sound.
If we, however, assume that civil servants may be able to act as partial lter
for the advisers message, then we need to distinguish two cases:
1. The adviser is able to improve the decision makers level of information
regarding the biasedness of the adviser (p0). In this case, our model would be
able to incorporate this role with no real change;
2. The adviser is able to improve the decision makers level of informa-
tion regarding the type of biased the adviser may have (g0). As the model
presented relies on the initial symmetry of the two potential biases, the results
presented here would be a¤ected. Future research could see whether the change
would a¤ect the qualitative outcomes. We believe that this change would indeed
increase the generality of the model, but it should not a¤ect the overall results.
3.3 Discussion and Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to look at the possibility of extracting infor-
mation from a potentially biased adviser. In many occasions, policy makers
have to take decisions with a limited amount of information. In particular, we
have looked at an environmental context, where the wrong decision could cause
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irreparable damages to an ecosystem or biodiversity or else it could a¤ect nega-
tively the economy. Informed advisers are available to provide their knowledge.
However, the decision maker cannot distinguish unbiased advisers from biased
ones. Green lobbyists would want the government to always tighten environ-
mental regulation; brown lobbyists, instead, prefer no change to the status quo.
Government and unbiased advisers care to take the right decision. We look at
a model in which the decision maker asks to consecutive advices to the same
agent. As the policy maker updates his beliefs on the adviser after realising
the true state of the world in period 1 and as the decision is function of this
beliefs, a biased adviser may have the incentive to disclose her information in
period 1, in order to be able to inuence more strongly the decision in the last
period.
We have shown that unbiased advisers and biased advisers, facing favourable
states of the world, always disclose their information. We have then focused on
the situation in which biased advisers face an adverse state of the world; they
have the two alternatives of either lie in period one or invest in reputation.
In other words, a lobbyist protecting the industries interests may nd that
encouraging the government to tighten environmental regulation today may
lead the government to think of her as balanced and unbiased and therefore
he will take her advices more into consideration in the future.
Firstly we have noted how, although in theory, the adviser has to make a
choice between the two strategies, once the parameters are set, she has only
one logical alternative.
We have showed that, according to the di¤erent values of her reputation and
the weight put on the second period, either strategy could be prot maximising.
We have also showed that under particular conditions, the adviser may be
indi¤erent between the two. When the second period has high importance with
respect to the rst, then the adviser will be better o¤ (or at least as well o¤)
by investing in reputation. If, instead, the second period is less than twice as
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important than period one, then the adviser will be better o¤ (or at least as
well o¤) by not disclosing her information.
In terms of reputation building, we have showed something quite interesting:
if a biased adviser would prefer not to go for reputation, then the policy maker
learns something about the adviser as soon as he receives the rst message.
However, although he can rule out one of the two types of bias, he does not
improve his knowledge about the honesty of the adviser, even after nding out
that the rst advice was correct. What is more surprising is that if the adviser
does go for reputation, she will enter period 2 with her initial reputation: in
other words, when the adviser has a preferred strategy, then whichever her
strategy, it will not a¤ect her reputation (unless, of course, she lies in period
1). The only situation in which if the adviser chooses to go for reputation she
can actually improve it is when she is indi¤erent between the two strategies.
In terms of policy making, we have showed that not only reputational con-
cerns lead to more frequent disclosure in period 1, but that the decision maker
can eliminate the uncertainty regarding the message he receives and maximise
social welfare. More surprisingly, in the situation in which a biased adviser
would have not gone for reputation, we showed that the policy maker could
extract full information in period 2. This result, in a way, is similar to what
Morris (2001) found in his paper: I say one thing now, in order to be believed
more in the future when I state the opposite. In our case, however, in both
periods the adviser discloses her information and, more importantly, in our
model in the last period the decision maker plays a d2 = a2. To our knowledge,
no other paper has come to fully informative equilibrium in the last period of
similar reputational games.
These are very interesting and reassuring results: the decision maker
improves the quality of his decision and he is able to obtain unbiased advices.
If we consider situations in which critical values can be surpassed and cause
irreparable damages to the environment, these ndings are important. The
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decision maker can use the information available and be more likely to avoid
wrong decisions. This is even more so when the adviser is indi¤erent between
the two strategies. In fact, in this case, the choice falls in the decision makers
hand. According to his preferences, he can induce the adviser to opt for one
or the other. In particular, we showed how by providing a small incentive, it
is possible to achieve level of social welfare that are higher than the expected
social welfare and, in particular circumstances, even better than the best
possible scenario with the original decision rule.
The analysis presented can also be used to achieve particular policy objec-
tives. Let us suppose that the decision maker wants to be sure that the rst
decision is not only as correct as possible, but completely precise. Let us con-
sider that it is possible that by not stopping the exploitation of a particular
area, biodiversity will be a¤ected irreversibly. If regulation is tightened, but not
completely, the degradation will slow down but it will still lead to irreversible
damages. On the other hand, the costs of doing so are very high. For the deci-
sion maker, playing anything that is not no change or complete change
is a losing game: it is either going to be an extremely costly and unrequited
cure or it will be costly and insu¢ cient. The decision maker should then try to
increase the advisers interest in period 2 or trying to invest in research about
the advisers reputation.
To conclude, let us make some considerations on how to extend this model
to t a wider range of real life situations. In reality a decision maker has to
take more than two decisions. We can briey sketch how our model can be
useful in these settings. If we consider Period 2 as the sum of all the future
decisions, then the value of  is likely to be high. In this context we have
seen that if the reputation of the adviser is su¢ ciently high, then she will
disclose her information in the rst period. In the following period, period 2
can be considered as the rst period and the new period 2 as all the following
periods. It follows that the decision maker can tie the adviser to be truthful for
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several consecutive periods. When the adviser provides an untruthful advice,
then he can change adviser and start the 2-periods game again. In this way, the
decision maker does not need to seek the advice of several advisers to obtain
information.
Another nal consideration can be made. We have assumed that the
intertemporal weight, , is the same for the decision maker and the adviser.
In the real world, lobbyists may discount the future more heavily: this could
be due to the necessity of showing to the stakeholders they are protecting
that they are obtaining results. In this case, then, it is more likely that, if
her reputation is high enough, then she will be better o¤ by not disclosing
her information. Should the policy maker prefer the adviser to disclose her
information in period 1, then, he can again try to increase her interest in
future decisions, in order to make her indi¤erent between the two strategies
(see graph 1) and then adjust the payo¤ in order to make her better o¤ by
disclosing her information.
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Appendix B
Instruction Chapter 2
B.1 Baseline Treatment
You are about to take part in an experiment. If you read the following instruc-
tions carefully, you can, depending on your and other participantsdecisions,
earn a signicant amount of money. It is therefore important that you take
your time to understand the instructions. Please do not communicate with the
other participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, ask
us.
You will be called to make one or more decisions. You will have to make your
decisions without knowing other participantsdecisions. Other participants will
not know your decisions either.
You should take your time to make your decision. All the information you
provide will be anonymous.
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Earnings will be condential.
Below is presented the general functioning of the experiment. You will also
nd some questions to allow you to check that you have understood the mech-
anisms correctly.
The Experiment simulates the functioning of a Market. You and the other
participants in the room will be randomly divided between Sellers and Buyers.
The computer will randomly determine your role (Buyer or Seller) and you will
keep that role until the end of the experiment. There will be 6 Buyers and 6
Sellers. There is only one product sold and bought. However, the product can
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th
H 7 8 9 10
S 5 6 7 8
be Standard Quality or High Quality. The experiment consists of 10 consecutive
trading periods.
Below you will nd a thorough description of the Seller and Buyers roles
and of the functioning of the market.
SELLERS
Sellers will be randomly divided into 2 groups: one will produce High quality
products (that are also more costly to produce), while the other group will
produce Standard quality products. For brevity, we will call H-Seller the one
selling High Quality products and S-Seller the ones selling Standard quality
products. Sellers need to decide what price they will charge for their products.
Price has to be an integer (1;2;3... not 2.8; 7.5 etc...)
Sellers spend money to produce products (sellers costs) and receive revenue
from the sales of the products. Their nal monetary payo¤ depends on their
prot (revenue minus costs). In other words, the higher your prot in each
single trading period, the higher you monetary reward of the experiment!
Take a moment to consider the table below. It represents the cost to Sellers
of producing each unit. His the row of unit costs for the H-Sellers and S
for the S-Seller. Costs of production for each unit of product increase with
quantity. Therefore, the rst unit will be cheaper than the second, and so on.
If a H-Seller sells 2 products at a price of 12, then his total prot is going
to be:
Revenue=12*2=24
Cost=7+8=15
Prot=24-15=9
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If a S-Seller sells 3 products at a price of 10, then his prot is:
Revenue=10*3=30
Cost=5+6+7=18
Prot=30-18=12
In the experiment, you can produce up to 4 units for each trading period.
The only condition is that you must cover your production cost. Going back
to the previous table, if you are a S-Seller and you decide to charge a price of
20, then you will produce 4 units. However, if you decide to charge a price of
6, then you will be able to produce only 2 units (as, if you were producing a
third unit, the cost of production would be higher than your revenue!!). In the
experiment the computer will check this for you and will determine the amount
you will produce in each period accordingly.
However, you may not be always able to sell all the products brought to
the Market. In this case, you will pay only for the costs of production of the
sold products.
So, if a H-Seller produces 4 products but sells only 3 at a price of 14, then
the prot will be:
Revenue: 14*3=42
Costs: 7+8+9=24
Prot: 42-24=18
BUYERS
Buyers are divided into two groups as well: some do not care about the
quality of the product (High or Standard), while others prefer High quality.
For brevity we will call the former SQ Buyers and the latter HQ Buyers.
Buyersnal monetary payo¤ depends on the satisfaction they get from
consuming the items purchased. In other words, the higher satisfaction at the
end of each single trading period, the higher your monetary reward at the end
of the experiment!
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1st 2nd 3rd
HQ=SQ product 12  p 11  p 10  p
A HQ Buyer will get higher satisfaction buying higher quality products;
on the other hand, a SQ Buyer will get the same satisfaction from a High
quality and a Standard quality product. Total satisfaction is given by the sum
of the satisfaction obtained consuming each unit of product minus the cost
of purchasing the products. Consuming the rst unit gives higher satisfaction
than consuming the second and so on. Each Buyer can purchase a maximum
of 3 units.
Below you can nd a table representing the satisfaction of the Buyers con-
suming products of the two di¤erent qualities and p denotes the price the
consumer paid for each unit bought.
Satisfaction is higher for the consumption of the rst product and it
decreases for each extra unit consumed:
If a SQ-Buyer buys 2 units of High Quality products at a price of 7, then
his satisfaction is going to be:
Satisfaction: (12-7)+(11-7)=5+4=9
Looking at the table, it is easy to see how the same satisfaction is obtained
by buying 2 products of Standard Quality as the numbers are the same.
Again, if a SQ Buyer buys 1 unit of High Quality products at a price of 10
and 2 of Standard Quality products, at a price of 11 the total satisfaction is:
Satisfaction= (12-10)+(11-11)+(10-11) =2+0-1=1
It is important to notice how purchasing the 3rd unit of the product is actu-
ally decreasing the total satisfaction. If the Buyer had bought only 2 products
at the same price, his satisfaction would have been actually higher; in fact:
Satisfaction= (12-10)+(11-11)=2+0=2
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HQ-Buyers, though, do get more satisfaction if they buy High Quality prod-
ucts. In particular, for each unit of High Quality product they buy they have
an extra 2 of satisfaction.
If a HQ-Buyer buys 1 High Quality product at a price of 8, his satisfaction
is going to be:
Satisfaction: (12-8)+2=6
It is easy to see that if he buys 1 Standard Quality product at the same
price his satisfaction (12-8=4) is actually lower.
If, again, he buys 2 units of High Quality products at a price of 8 and 1
unit of Standard Quality product at a price of 7, then his satisfaction is:
Satisfaction: (12-8)+(11-8)+(10-7)+(2*2)=4+3+3+4=14
Market functioning
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly assign you
and the other participants in the room one of the four possible roles: S-Sellers,
H-Sellers, HQ-Buyers and SQ-Buyers. Following that, the sellers will decide
what price they want to charge for their own products. Given the chosen prices,
the computer determines the production of each seller as already explained
above.
Then, the products are presented to the Buyers. Buyers are ordered ran-
domly and one by one they will choose how many products they want to buy.
So each Buyer in the list will only be able to choose among the products that
are left after the previous Buyer has bought what he wants. Once all the Buyers
have made their choices, prots and satisfactions are calculated.
The same procedure is repeated 10 times. Every new trading period, pro-
ducers will be able to change their prices and Buyers will be able to buy up
to 3 units. At the end of the 10th trading period the experiment will nish,
the computer will calculate your earnings and the experimenter will come to
your desk and pay your earning in cash. You will be paid the earnings of ALL
trading periods.
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Before starting the experiment, please answer the following Questionnaire
to check that the game has been explained clearly. You are asked to use the
tables presented before.
*A H-Seller produces and sells 4 products at a price of 15.
His prot is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*What is the maximum amount of units a Seller can sell?................................
*What is the maximum amount of units a Buyer can buy?...............................
*A S-Seller produces 4 products but only sells 2 at a price of 12.
His prot is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
*A HQ Buyer buys 2 High Quality products at 13 and 1 Standard Quality
at a price of 10.
His satisfaction is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................
*A SQ Buyer buys 1 High Quality product at 12, and 2 Standard Quality
at a price of 9.
His satisfaction is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................
B.2 Cheap Talk Treatment
You are about to take part in an experiment. If you read the following instruc-
tions carefully, you can, depending on your and other participantsdecisions,
earn a signicant amount of money. It is therefore important that you take
your time to understand the instructions. Please do not communicate with the
other participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, ask
us.
You will be called to make one or more decisions. You will have to make your
decisions without knowing other participantsdecisions. Other participants will
not know your decisions either.
You should take your time to make your decision. All the information you
provide will be anonymous.
237
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Earnings will be condential.
Below is presented the general functioning of the experiment. You will also
nd some questions to allow you to check that you have understood the mech-
anisms correctly.
The Experiment simulates the functioning of a Market. You and the other
participants in the room will be randomly divided between Sellers and Buyers.
The computer will randomly determine your role (Buyer or Seller) and you will
keep that role until the end of the experiment. There will be 6 Buyers and 6
Sellers. There is only one product sold and bought. However, the product can
be Standard Quality or High Quality. The experiment consists of 10 consecutive
trading periods.
Below you will nd a thorough description of the Seller and Buyers roles
and of the functioning of the market.
SELLERS
Sellers will be randomly divided into 2 groups: one will produce High quality
products (that are also more costly to produce), while the other group will
produce Standard quality products. For brevity, we will call H-Seller the one
selling High Quality products and S-Seller the ones selling Standard quality
goods. Sellers need to decide what price they will charge for their products.
Price has to be an integer (1;2;3... not 2.8; 7.5 etc...)
Sellers spend money to produce goods (sellers costs) and receive revenue
from the sales of the goods. Their nal monetary payo¤depends on their prot
(revenue minus costs). In other words, the higher your prot in each single
trading period, the higher you monetary reward of the experiment!
Take a moment to consider the table below. It represents the cost to Sellers
of producing each unit. His the row of unit costs for the H Sellers and S
for the S-Seller. Costs of production for each unit of product increase with
quantity. Therefore, the rst unit will be cheaper than the second, and so on.
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th
H 7 8 9 10
S 5 6 7 8
If a H-Seller sells 2 products at a price of 12, then his total prot is going
to be:
Revenue=12*2=24
Cost=7+8=15
Prot=24-15=9
If a S-Seller sells 3 products at a price of 10, then his prot is:
Revenue=10*3=30
Cost=5+6+7=18
Prot=30-18=12
In the experiment, you can produce up to 4 units for each trading period.
The only condition is that you must cover your production cost. Going back
to the previous table, if you are a S-Seller and you decide to charge a price of
20, then you will produce 4 units. However, if you decide to charge a price of
6, then you will be able to produce only 2 units (as, if you were producing a
third unit, the cost of production would be higher than your revenue!!). In the
experiment the computer will check this for you and will determine the amount
you will produce in each period accordingly.
However, a seller may not be always able to sell all the products s/he brings
to the Market. In this case, s/he will pay only for the costs of production of
the sold goods.
So, if a H-Seller produces 4 goods but sells only 3 at a price of 14, then his/
her prot will be:
Revenue: 14*3=42
Costs: 7+8+9=24
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Prot: 42-24=18
After you have made the decision about the price, you will be asked whether
you want to advertise. Advertisement is costly (it will cost 2, for every period
you advertise, but regardless of the units of products you sell). However, by
advertising, you signal yourself to be selling High Quality products. This does
not need to be necessarily the case. So whether you are a H-Seller or S-Seller,
you can still decide to advertise.
BUYERS
Buyers are divided into two groups as well: some do not care about the
quality of the product (High or Standard), while others prefer High quality.
For brevity we will call the former SQ Buyers and the latter HQ Buyers.
Buyersnal monetary payo¤ depends on the satisfaction they get from
consuming the items purchased. In other words, the higher satisfaction at the
end of each single trading period, the higher your monetary reward at the end
of the experiment!
A HQ Buyer will get higher satisfaction buying higher quality products;
on the other hand, a SQ Buyer will get the same satisfaction from a High
quality and a Standard quality product. Total satisfaction is given by the sum
of the satisfaction obtained consuming each unit of product minus the cost
of purchasing the products. Consuming the rst unit gives higher satisfaction
than consuming the second and so on. Each Buyer can purchase a maximum
of 3 units.
Below you can nd a table representing the satisfaction of the Buyers con-
suming products of the two di¤erent qualities and p denotes the price the
consumer paid for each unit bought.
Satisfaction is higher for the consumption of the rst product and it
decreases for each extra unit consumed:
1st 2nd 3rd
HQ=SQ product 12  p 11  p 10  p
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If a SQ-Buyer buys 2 units of High Quality products at a price of 7, then
his satisfaction is going to be:
Satisfaction: (12-7)+(11-7)=5+4=9
Looking at the table, it is easy to see how the same satisfaction is obtained
by buying 2 products of Standard Quality as the numbers are the same..
Again, if a SQ Buyer buys 1 unit of High Quality products and 2 of Standard
Quality products, at a price of 11 the total satisfaction is:
Satisfaction= (12-10)+(11-11)+(10-11) =1+0-1=0
It is important to notice how purchasing the 3rd unit of the product is actu-
ally decreasing the total satisfaction. If the Buyer had bought only 2 products
at the same price, his satisfaction would have been actually higher; in fact:
Satisfaction= (12-10)+(11-11)=1+0=1
HQ-Buyers, though, do get more satisfaction if they buy High Quality prod-
ucts. In particular, for each unit of High Quality product they buy they have
an extra 2 of satisfaction.
If a HQ-Buyer buys 1 High Quality product at a price of 8, his satisfaction
is going to be:
Satisfaction: (12-8)+2=6
It is easy to see that if he buys 1 Standard Quality product at the same
price his satisfaction (12-8=4) is actually lower.
If, again, he buys 2 units of High Quality products at a price of 8 and 1
unit of Standard Quality product at a price of 7, then his satisfaction is:
Satisfaction: (12-8)+(11-8)+(10-7)+(2*2)=4+3+3+4=14
One more thing. Some Seller will invest in Advertisement. This is a costly
activity for them to make their products stand out. You will nd this informa-
tion in the table with prices and quantity. However, you should be aware that
(a) advertisement may not be truthful and (b) a H-Seller may decide not to
advertise.
Market functioning
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At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly assign you
and the other participants in the room one of the four possible roles: S-Sellers,
H-Sellers, HQ-Buyers and SQ-Buyers. Following that, the sellers will decide
what price they want to charge for their own goods. Given the chosen prices,
the computer determines the production of each seller as already explained
above. Sellers also decide if in this particular period they wish to advertise.
Then, the products are presented to the Buyers. A table will present the
quantity available for each price and it will also highlight which of the Sellers
have decided to advertise or not. Buyers are ordered randomly and, one by one,
they will choose how many products they want to buy. So each Buyer in the list
will only be able to choose among the products that are left after the previous
Buyer has bought what he wants. Once all the Buyers have made their choices,
prots and satisfactions are calculated.
The same procedure is repeated 10 times. Every new trading period, pro-
ducers will be able to change their prices and Buyers will be able to buy up
to 3 units. At the end of the 10th trading period the experiment will nish,
the computer will calculate your earnings and the experimenter will come to
your desk and pay your earnings in cash. You will be paid the earnings of ALL
trading periods.
Before starting the experiment, please answer the following Questionnaire
to check that the experiment has been explained clearly. You are asked to use
the tables presented before.
*A H-Seller produces and sells 4 products at a price of 15 and decides to
advertise.
His prot is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*What is the maximum amount of units a Seller can sell?................................
*What is the maximum amount of units a Buyer can buy?...............................
*A S-Seller produces 4 products but only sells 2 at a price of 12.
His prot is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
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*A HQ Buyer buys 2 High Quality products at 13 and 1 Standard Quality
at a price of 10.
His satisfaction is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................
*A SQ Buyer buys 1 High Quality product at 12, and 2 Standard Quality
at a price of 9.
His satisfaction is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................
B.3 Third-party Certification Treatment
You are about to take part in an experiment. If you read the following instruc-
tions carefully, you can, depending on your and other participantsdecisions,
earn a signicant amount of money. It is therefore important that you take
your time to understand the instructions. Please do not communicate with the
other participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, ask
us.
You will be called to make one or more decisions. You will have to make your
decisions without knowing other participantsdecisions. Other participants will
not know your decisions either.
You should take your time to make your decision. All the information you
provide will be anonymous.
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Earnings will be condential.
Below is presented the general functioning of the experiment. You will also
nd some questions to allow you to check that you have understood the mech-
anisms correctly.
The Experiment simulates the functioning of a Market. You and the other
participants in the room will be randomly divided between Sellers and Buyers.
The computer will randomly determine your role (Buyer or Seller) and you will
keep that role until the end of the experiment. There will be 6 Buyers and 6
Sellers. There is only one product sold and bought. However, the product can
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th
H 7 8 9 10
S 5 6 7 8
be Standard Quality or High Quality. The experiment consists of 10 consecutive
trading periods.
Below you will nd a thorough description of the Seller and Buyers roles
and of the functioning of the market.
SELLERS
Sellers will be randomly divided into 2 groups: one will produce High quality
products (that are also more costly to produce), while the other group will
produce Standard quality products. For brevity, we will call H-Seller the one
selling High Quality products and S-Seller the ones selling Standard quality
goods. Sellers need to decide what price they will charge for their products.
Price has to be an integer (1;2;3... not 2.8; 7.5 etc...)
Sellers spend money to produce goods (sellers costs) and receive revenue
from the sales of the goods. Their nal monetary payo¤depends on their prot
(revenue minus costs). In other words, the higher your prot in each single
trading period, the higher you monetary reward of the experiment!
Take a moment to consider the table below. It represents the cost to Sellers
of producing each unit. His the row of unit costs for the H-Sellers and S
for the S-Seller. Costs of production for each unit of product increase with
quantity. Therefore, the rst unit will be cheaper than the second, and so on.
If a H-Seller sells 2 products at a price of 12, then his total prot is going
to be:
Revenue=12*2=24
Cost=7+8=15
Prot=24-15=9
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If a S-Seller sells 3 products at a price of 10, then his prot is:
Revenue=10*3=30
Cost=5+6+7=18
Prot=30-18=12
In the experiment, you can produce up to 4 units for each trading period.
The only condition is that you must cover your production cost. Going back
to the previous table, if you are a S-Seller and you decide to charge a price of
20, then you will produce 4 units. However, if you decide to charge a price of
6, then you will be able to produce only 2 units (as, if you were producing a
third unit, the cost of production would be higher than your revenue!!). In the
experiment the computer will check this for you and will determine the amount
you will produce in each period accordingly.
However, you may not be always able to sell all the products brought to
the Market. In this case, you will pay only for the costs of production of the
sold goods.
So, if a H-Seller produces 4 goods but sells only 3 at a price of 14, then the
prot will be:
Revenue: 14*3=42
Costs: 7+8+9=24
Prot: 42-24=18
After you have made the decision about the price, H-Sellers (not S-Sellers)
will be o¤ered the possibility to advertise. Advertisement is costly (it will cost
4, for every period you advertise, but regardless of the units of products you
sell). However, you signal that your products are High Quality.
So, for example, if a H-Seller sells 3 units at 11 and decides to advertise,
then his prot will be:
Revenue: 11*3=33
Cost of Production: 7+8+9=24
Prot: 33-24-4=5
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1st 2nd 3rd
HQ=SQ product 12  p 11  p 10  p
BUYERS
Buyers are divided into two groups as well: some do not care about the
quality of the product (High or Standard), while others prefer High quality.
For brevity we will call the former SQ Buyers and the latter HQ Buyers.
Buyersnal monetary payo¤ depends on the satisfaction they get from
consuming the items purchased. In other words, the higher satisfaction at the
end of each single trading period, the higher your monetary reward at the end
of the experiment!
A HQ Buyer will get higher satisfaction buying higher quality products;
on the other hand, a SQ Buyer will get the same satisfaction from a High
quality and a Standard quality product. Total satisfaction is given by the sum
of the satisfaction obtained consuming each unit of product minus the cost
of purchasing the products. Consuming the rst unit gives higher satisfaction
than consuming the second and so on. Each Buyer can purchase a maximum
of 3 units.
Below you can nd a table representing the satisfaction of the Buyers con-
suming products of the two di¤erent qualities and p denotes the price the
consumer paid for each unit bought.
Satisfaction is higher for the consumption of the rst product and it
decreases for each extra unit consumed:
If a SQ-Buyer buys 2 units of High Quality products at a price of 7, then
his satisfaction is going to be:
Satisfaction: (12-7)+(11-7)=5+4=9
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Looking at the table, it is easy to see how the same satisfaction is obtained
by buying 2 products of Standard Quality as the numbers are the same..
Again, if a SQ Buyer buys 1 unit of High Quality products at a price of 10
and 2 of Standard Quality products, at a price of 11 the total satisfaction is:
Satisfaction= (12-10)+(11-11)+(10-11) =2+0-1=1
It is important to notice how purchasing the 3rd unit of the product is actu-
ally decreasing the total satisfaction. If the Buyer had bought only 2 products
at the same price, his satisfaction would have been actually higher; in fact:
Satisfaction= (12-10)+(11-11)=2+0=2
HQ-Buyers, though, do get more satisfaction if they buy High Quality prod-
ucts. In particular, for each unit of High Quality product they buy they have
an extra 2 of satisfaction.
If a HQ-Buyer buys 1 High Quality product at a price of 8, his satisfaction
is going to be:
Satisfaction: (12-8)+2=6
It is easy to see that if he buys 1 Standard Quality product at the same
price his satisfaction (12-8=4) is actually lower.
If, again, he buys 2 units of High Quality products at a price of 8 and 1
unit of Standard Quality product at a price of 7, then his satisfaction is:
Satisfaction: (12-8)+(11-8)+(10-7)+(2*2)=4+3+3+4=14
One more thing. Some Seller will invest in Advertisement. This is a costly
activity for them to let you know their products are SURELY High Quality.
However, you should be aware that a H-Seller may decide not to advertise.
Market functioning
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly assign you
and the other participants in the room one of the four possible roles: S-Sellers,
H-Sellers, HQ-Buyers and SQ-Buyers. Following that, the sellers will decide
what price they want to charge for their own goods. Given the chosen prices,
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the computer determines the production of each seller as already explained
above. Sellers also decide if in this particular period they wish to advertise.
Then, the products are presented to the Buyers. A table will present the
quantity available for each price and it will also highlight which of the Sellers
have decided to advertise or not. Buyers are ordered randomly and, one by one,
they will choose how many products they want to buy. So each Buyer in the list
will only be able to choose among the products that are left after the previous
Buyer has bought what he wants. Once all the Buyers have made their choices,
prots and satisfactions are calculated.
The same procedure is repeated 10 times. Every new trading period, pro-
ducers will be able to change their prices and Buyers will be able to buy up
to 3 units. At the end of the 10th trading period the experiment will nish,
the computer will calculate your earnings and the experimenter will come to
your desk and pay your earnings in cash. You will be paid the earnings of ALL
trading periods.
Before starting the experiment, please answer the following Questionnaire
to check that the experiment has been explained clearly. You are asked to use
the tables presented before.
*A H-Seller produces and sells 4 products at a price of 15 and decides to
advertise.
His prot is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*What is the maximum amount of units a Seller can sell?................................
*What is the maximum amount of units a Buyer can buy?...............................
*Can a S-Seller advertise?
*A S-Seller produces 4 products but only sells 2 at a price of 12.
His prot is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
*A HQ Buyer buys 2 High Quality products at 13 and 1 Standard Quality
at a price of 10.
His satisfaction is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................
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*Can a High Quality product bear no advertisement?.........................................
*A SQ Buyer buys 1 High Quality product at 12, and 2 Standard Quality
at a price of 9.
His satisfaction is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................
B.4 Both Certification Treatment
You are about to take part in an experiment. If you read the following instruc-
tions carefully, you can, depending on your and other participantsdecisions,
earn a signicant amount of money. It is therefore important that you take
your time to understand the instructions. Please do not communicate with the
other participants during the experiment. Should you have any questions, ask
us.
You will be called to make one or more decisions. You will have to make your
decisions without knowing other participantsdecisions. Other participants will
not know your decisions either.
You should take your time to make your decision. All the information you
provide will be anonymous.
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Earnings will be condential.
Below is presented the general functioning of the experiment. You will also
nd some questions to allow you to check that you have understood the mech-
anisms correctly.
The Experiment simulates the functioning of a Market. You and the other
participants in the room will be randomly divided between Sellers and Buyers.
The computer will randomly determine your role (Buyer or Seller) and you will
keep that role until the end of the experiment. There will be 6 Buyers and 6
Sellers. There is only one product sold and bought. However, the good can be
Standard Quality or High Quality. The experiment consists of 10 consecutive
trading periods.
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1st 2nd 3rd 4th
H 7 8 9 10
S 5 6 7 8
Below you will nd a thorough description of the Seller and Buyers roles
and of the functioning of the market.
SELLERS
Sellers will be randomly divided into 2 groups: one will produce High quality
products (that are also more costly to produce), while the other group will
produce Standard quality products. For brevity, we will call H-Seller the one
selling High Quality products and S-Seller the ones selling Standard quality
goods. Sellers need to take two decisions:
1.Decide what price they will charge for their products. Price has to be an
integer (1;2;3... not 2.8; 7.5 etc...)
2.Decide whether to advertise or not.
1. Choice of Price.
Sellers spend money to produce goods (sellers costs) and receive revenue
from the sales of the goods. Their nal monetary payo¤depends on their prot
(revenue minus costs). In other words, the higher your prot in each single
trading period, the higher you monetary reward of the experiment!
Take a moment to consider the table below. It represents the cost of Sellers
of producing each unit. His the row of unit costs for the H-Sellers and Sfor
the S-Seller. Costs of production of each unit of product increase with quantity.
Therefore, the rst unit will be cheaper than the second, and so on.
If a H-Seller sells 2 products at a price of 12, then his total prot is going
to be:
Revenue=12*2=24
Cost=7+8=15
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Prot=24-15=9
If a S-Seller sells 3 products at a price of 10, then his prot is:
Revenue=10*3=30
Cost=5+6+7=18
Prot=30-18=12
In the experiment, you can produce up to 4 units for each trading period.
The only condition is that you must cover your production cost. Going back
to the previous table, if you are a S-Seller and you decide to charge a price of
20, then you will produce 4 units. However, if you decide to charge a price of
6, then you will be able to produce only 2 units (as, if you were producing a
third unit, the cost of production would be higher than your revenue!!). In the
experiment the computer will check this for you and will accordingly choose
the amount you will produce in each period.
However, you may not always be able to sell all the products brought to
the Market. In this case, you will pay only for the costs of production of the
sold goods.
So, if a H-Seller produces 4 goods but sells only 3 at a price of 14, then the
prot will be:
Revenue: 14*3=42
Costs: 7+8+9=24
Prot: 42-24=18
2. Advertisement
After you have made the decision about the price, you will be asked whether
you want to advertise. Advertisement is costly. In this way, however, you signal
yourself to be selling High Quality products. There are two kinds of advertise-
ment:
*For all Sellers: A cheap advertisement (Ad1, that costs 2, for every period
you advertise, but regardless of the units of products you sell). You market
your good as being High Quality. This does not need to be necessarily the case
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(so you can use Ad1 even if your products are Standard Quality). So whether
you are a H-Seller or S-Seller, you can still decide to advertise.
*For H-Sellers: A more expensive advertisement (Ad2, that costs 4, for every
period you advertise, but regardless of the units of products you sell); Ad2 will
indicate to buyers that your goods are surely High Quality.
H-Sellers can choose either kinds of advertisement but cannot use both at
the same time. S-Sellers can only opt for the cheap advertisement, should they
wish to advertise at all.
So if a H-Seller decides to go for Ad2 and sells 3 units at 13, then his prot
is:
Revenue= 12*3=36
Cost of Production=7+8+9=24
Prot=36-24-4=8
Remember that you can still decide not to advertise.
BUYERS
Buyers are divided into two groups as well: some do not care about the
quality of the product (High or Standard), while others prefer High quality.
For brevity we will call the former SQ Buyers and the latter HQ Buyers.
Buyersnal monetary payo¤ depends on the satisfaction they get from
consuming the items purchased. In other words, the higher satisfaction at the
end of each single trading period, the higher your monetary reward at the end
of the experiment!
A HQ Buyer will get higher satisfaction buying higher quality products;
on the other hand, a SQ Buyer will get the same satisfaction from a High
quality and a Standard quality product. Total satisfaction is given by the sum
of the satisfaction obtained consuming each unit of product minus the cost
of purchasing the products. Consuming the rst unit gives higher satisfaction
than consuming the second and so on. Each Buyer can purchase a maximum
of 3 units.
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1st 2nd 3rd
HQ=SQ product 12  p 11  p 10  p
Below you can nd a table representing the satisfaction of the Buyers con-
suming products of the two di¤erent qualities and p denotes the price the
consumer paid for each unit bought.
Satisfaction is higher for the consumption of the rst product and it
decreases for each extra unit consumed:
If a SQ-Buyer buys 2 units of High Quality products at a price of 7, then
his satisfaction is going to be:
Satisfaction: (12-7)+(11-7)=5+4=9
Looking at the table, it is easy to see how the same satisfaction is obtained
by buying 2 products of Standard Quality as the numbers are the same.
Again, if a SQ Buyer buys 1 unit of High Quality products at a price of 10
and 2 of Standard Quality products, at a price of 11 the total satisfaction is:
Satisfaction= (12-10)+(11-11)+(10-11) =2+0-1=1
It is important to notice how purchasing the 3rd unit of the product is actu-
ally decreasing the total satisfaction. If the Buyer had bought only 2 products
at the same price, his satisfaction would have been actually higher; in fact:
Satisfaction= (12-10)+(11-11)=2+0=2
HQ-Buyers, though, do get more satisfaction if they buy High Quality prod-
ucts. In particular, for each unit of High Quality product they buy they have
an extra 2 of satisfaction.
If a HQ-Buyer buys 1 High Quality product at a price of 8, his satisfaction
is going to be:
Satisfaction: (12-8)+2=6
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It is easy to see that if he buys 1 Standard Quality product at the same
price his satisfaction (12-8=4) is actually lower.
If, again, he buys 2 units of High Quality products at a price of 8 and 1
unit of Standard Quality product at a price of 7, then his satisfaction is:
Satisfaction: (12-8)+(11-8)+(10-7)+(2*2)=4+3+3+4=14
One more thing. Some Sellers will invest in Advertisement. This is a costly
activity for them to make their products stand out. You will nd this informa-
tion in the table with prices and quantity.
Ad2 tells you that the products are surely High Quality.
Ad1 tells you that the product may be High Quality (but maybe not).
However, a product does not need to be advertised to be High Quality.
Market functioning
At the beginning of the experiment the computer will randomly assign you
and the other participants in the room one of the four possible roles: S-Sellers,
H-Sellers, HQ-Buyers and SQ-Buyers. Following that, the sellers will decide
what price they want to charge for their own goods. Given the chosen prices,
the computer determines the production of each seller as already explained
above. Sellers also decide if in this particular period they wish to advertise.
Then, the products are presented to the Buyers. A table will present the
quantity available for each price and it will also highlight which of the Sellers
have decided to advertise or not. Buyers are ordered randomly and, one by one,
they will choose how many products they want to buy. So each Buyer in the list
will only be able to choose among the products that are left after the previous
Buyer has bought what he wants. Once all the Buyers have made their choices,
prots and satisfactions are calculated.
The same procedure is repeated 10 times. Every new trading period, pro-
ducers will be able to change their prices and Buyers will be able to buy up
to 3 units. At the end of the 10th trading period the experiment will nish,
the computer will calculate your earnings and the experimenter will come to
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your desk and pay your earnings in cash. You will be paid the earnings of ALL
trading periods.
Before starting the experiment, please answer the following Questionnaire
to check that the experiment has been explained clearly. You are asked to use
the tables presented before.
*A H-Seller produces and sells 4 products at a price of 15 and decides to
use Ad1.
His prot is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*What is the maximum amount of units a Seller can sell?................................
*What is the maximum amount of units a Buyer can buy?...............................
*Howmuch does an Ad2 cost?.................................................................................
*Who can choose to use Ad1?...................................................................................
*A S-Seller produces 4 products but only sells 2 at a price of 12.
His prot is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
*A H-Seller sells 2 products at 10 and chooses Ad2.
His prot is..................................................................................................................
*Can a High quality product be without advertisement?..................................
*Can a Standard quality product be advertised with Ad1?........................................
*A HQ Buyer buys 2 High Quality products at 13 and 1 Standard Quality
at a price of 10.
His satisfaction is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................
*A SQ Buyer buys 1 High Quality product at 12, and 2 Standard Quality
at a price of 9.
His satisfaction is. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................
Appendix C
Demonstrations - Chapter 3
Eq. 3.24:
p3 = P (unb j a2 = 1) = P (a2 = 1 j unb)P (unb)
P (a2 = 1)
P (a2 = 1 j unb) = 12
P (unb) = p2
P (a2 = 1) =
1
2
p2 + (1  p2)g2
p3 =
1
2
p2
1
2
p2 + (1  p2)g2
Eq. 3.26
p = P (w2 = 1 j a2 = 1) = P (a2 = 1 j w2 = 1)P (w2 = 1)
P (a2 = 1)
P (a2 = 1 j w2 = 1) = p3 + (1  p3) = 1
P (w2 = 1) =
1
2
P (a2 = 1) =
1
2
p3 + (1  p3) = 1  1
2
p3
p =
11
2
1  1
2
p3
=
1
2
2 p3
2
=
1
2
2
2  p3 =
1
2  p3
Eq. 3.30:
p1 = P (unb j a1 = 0) = P (a1 = 0 j unb)P (unb)
P (a1 = 0)
P (unb) = p0
P (a1 = 0 j unb) = 12
P (a1 = 0) =
1
2
p0 + (1  p0)12+ (1  p0)(1  12)(1  ) = 12
p1 = P (unb j a1 = 0) =
1
2
p0
1
2
= p0
Eq. 3.31:
p1 = P (unb j a1 = 1) = P (a1 = 1 j unb)P (unb)
P (a1 = 1)
P (unb) = p0
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P (a1 = 1 j unb) = 12
P (a1 = 1) =
1
2
p0 + (1  p0)12(1  ) + (1  p0)(1  12) = 12
p1 = P (unb j a1 = 1) =
1
2
p0
1
2
= p0
Eq. 3.32:
P (green j a1 = 0) = P (a1 = 0 j green)P (green)
P (a1 = 0)
P (green) = 1
2
P (a1 = 0 j green) = 
P (a1 = 0) =
1
2
p0 + (1  p0)12+ (1  p0)(1  12)(1  ) = 12
P (green j a1 = 0) =
1
2
1
2
= 
Eq. 3.33:
P (green j a1 = 1) = P (a1 = 1 j green)P (green)
P (a1 = 1)
P (green) = 1
2
P (a1 = 1 j green) = 1  
P (a1 = 1) =
1
2
p0 + (1  p0)12(1  ) + (1  p0)(1  12) = 12
P (green j a1 = 1) =
(1  )1
2
1
2
= 1  
Eq. 3.36:
P (w1 = 0 j a1 = 0) = P (a1 = 0 j w1 = 0)P (w1 = 0)
P (a1 = 0)
P (a1 = 0 j w1 = 0) = p1 + (1  p1)g11
2
+ (1  p1)(1  g1)
= 2g1   2g1p1 + 1  g1 + g1p1
= p1 + (1  p1)1
2
+ (1  p1)(1  ) = p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  )
P (w1 = 0) =
1
2
P (a1 = 0) =
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)g1+ (1  p1)(1  g1)(1  )
=
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  2)
P (w1 = 0 j a1 = 0) = 1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  )
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  2)
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Eq. 3.41
p0 = P (w1 = 1 j a1 = 1) = P (a1 = 1 j w1 = 1)P (w1 = 1)
P (a1 = 1)
P (a1 = 1 j w1 = 1) = p1 + (1  p1)g1 + (1  p1)(1  g1)1  1
2
= 2g1   2g1p1 + 1  g1 + g1p1
= p1 + (1  p1)1
2
+ (1  p1)(1  ) = p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  )
P (w1 = 1) =
1
2
P (a1 = 1) =
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)g1(1  ) + (1  p1)(1  g1)
=
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  2)
p0 =
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  )
1
2
p1 + (1  p1)(22 + 1  2) = p

p02 = P (unb j a1 = 0 6= w1) = 0
p2 = P (unb j a1 = 0 = w1) = p0
p0 + (1  p0)(22   + 1)
g02 = P (green j a1 = 0 6= w1) = 0
g2 = P (green j a1 = 0 = w1) = 
2
p0 + (1  p0)(22   + 1)
Eq. 3.43:
p02 = P (unb j a1 = 0 6= w1) =
P (a1 = 0 6= w1 j unb)P (unb)
P (a1 = 0 6= w1)
P (a1 = 0 6= w1 j unb) = 0! p02 = 0
Eq. 3.44:
p2 = P (unb j a1 = 0 ^ w1 = 0) = P (a1 = 0 ^ w1 = 0 j unb)P (unb)
P (a1 = 0 ^ w1 = 0)
P (a1 = 0 ^ w1 = 0 j unb) = 12
P (unb) = p1
P (a1 = 0 ^ w1 = 0) = p1 12 + (1  p1)g1+ (1  p1)(1  g1)12
=   1
2
+ 1
2
p1   p1 + 12
= (  1
2
) + 1
2
  2p1(  12) = (  12)(1  p0) + 12
p2 =
1
2
p1
g1   12g1 + 12g1p1   g1p1 + 12
=
1
2
p0
2   1
2
+ 1
2
p0   2p0 + 12
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=
p0
(2  1)(1  p0) + 1
Eq. 3.45:
g02 = P (green j a1 = 0 6= w1) =
P (a1 = 0 6= w1 j green)P (green)
P (a1 = 0 6= w1)
P (a1 = 0 6= w1 j green) = 0! g02 = 0
Eq. 3.46:
g2 = P (green j a1 = 0 = w1) = P (a1 = 0 = w1 j green)P (green)
P (a1 = 0 = w1)
P (green) = 
P (a1 = 0 = w1 j green) = 
P (a1 = 0 ^ w1 = 0) = p1 12 + (1  p1)g1+ (1  p1)(1  g1)12
=   1
2
+ 1
2
p1   p1 + 12
= (  1
2
) + 1
2
  2p1(  12) = (  12)(1  p0) + 12
g2 =
2
(  1
2
)(1  p0) + 12
Eq. 3.82:
 [w1   d1(0)]2   [w2   d2(1)]2 >  [w1   d1(1)]2    1
4
 d1(0)2   [w2   d2(1)]2 >  d1(1)2    1
4
(
1
4
  [w2   d2(1)]2) > d1(0)2   d1(1)2
 >
d1(0)
2   d1(1)2
1
4
  1
2
( d2(1))2   12(1  d2(1))2
 >
(d1(0)  d1(1))(d1(0) + d1(1))
1
4
  1
2
d22(1)  12d22 + d2   12
 >
2d1(0)  1
1
4
  1
2
d22   12d22 + d2   12
 >
2d1(0)  1
 (d22   d2 + 14)
 >
1  2d1(0)
(d2(1)  14)2
Figures C.1, C.2 and C.3 show (for a given value of ) the critical values of
alpha (vertical axis) for the di¤erent values of p0:
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Figure C.1: Alpha, when Beta<2
Some care is required interpreting this set of gures. Let us consider gure
C.1 for instance. This shows that if  is lower than 21 (in the graph  = 1);
under a certain value p (in the graph p = 0:70), values of  are included within
the feasible range; this means that, considering the intertemporal weighting 
and her initial reputation p0; the adviser will be indi¤erent to the two strategies.
Once her initial reputation goes above the threshold p (0:7 in the graph),
then we can see how  would have to become negative2. This means that the
adviser will nd more convenient not to disclose her information in period 1
and face punishment in the following period. So, if period 2 is less than twice as
1The condition of  < 2 has been found by extrapolation. It is in fact satised
for  = 1:99 but not for  = 2:
2In passing, let us draw the attention on how to interpret critical values of 
outside the specied range

0; 12

:  is:
 = P (a1 = 0 j green)
that is the probability that a green adviser would disclose that the state of the
world in period 1 is zero. Negative probability then means "never" and it should be
considered (for our purposes) as  = 0: If  > 12 , this means that whenever w1 = 0
she will disclose her information and therefore it should be considered  = 12 :
260
important than period 1, the brown adviser will be indi¤erent as to whether to
tell the truth or not up to a certain level of reputation. After that, she decides
to bank on her reputation in period 1 and be recognised as biased in period 2.
Figure C.2: Alpha, when Beta=2
Figure C.2 shows that for  = 2, the adviser is always indi¤erent to the two
strategies, for any value of p0.
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Figure C.3: Alpha, when Beta=3
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